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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann §
78-2-2(4) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE # 1
Whether the trial court was correct in concluding that the facts stated on pages 1-4 of
Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Johnson"'s Summary
Judgment Opposition Memorandum'^failed to conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, and therefore, concluded that those facts would not be
considered for purposes of appellee/defendant Utah Department of Transportation's (;iUDOT")
Motion for Summary Judgment.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has recognized that "a trial court may exercise its discretion to require
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly rule 4-501," and therefore, will
review the trial court's actions to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. Fennell v. Green,
77 P.3d 339, 341-42 (Utah App. 2003).

1

Johnson's Docketing Statement identified this issue as one of the issues being raised on
appeal. (Docketing Statement at pp. 3-4 (UDOT was unable to locate the Docketing Statement in
the Appellate Record or Index)). As discussed more fully herein, however, Johnson's Appellate
Brief fails to identify or make any reference to this issue. Therefore, it is UDOT's position that
Johnson has waived any right to challenge this issue on appeal.
1

ISSUE # 2
Whether the trial court was correct in granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment,
thereby dismissing appellant/plaintiff Craig Johnson's (wcJohnson") negligence claims against UDOT
as a matter of law. This issue can be divided into the following three sub-issues:2
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that Johnson's claim

that UDOT was negligent in its design of the traffic control plan, and specifically the decision to use
plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers, is barred by the discretionary function exception of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to -38);
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that UDOT cannot

be held liable for any failure to implement or monitor the traffic control plan during the course of
the construction project; and
3.

Whether the trial court was correct in ruling, as a matter of law, that UDOT cannot

be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of co-defendant Granite Construction Company,
an independent contractor hired by UDOT to implement the traffic control plan and perform the road
construction project.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, no deference is given to the trial court's
conclusions of law, and the grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Dick Simon
Trucking. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2004 UT 11, _ P.3d_ (Utah, Jan. 30,2004). The facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id.

2

Johnson's Appellate Brief states four sub-issues rather than three. (Johnson Appellate
Brief at pp. 1-2). UDOT's sub-issue (2) actually encompasses Johnson's sub-issues (a) and (b).
2

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3:
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, . . .
*

*

*

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8:
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located on them.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within
the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is
abused;
*

*

*

(4)
a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;
*

*

3

*

RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 56:

(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all
or any part thereof.
(c)
Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. . .

Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-50U2)(B):3
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains
a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material
facts which support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.

3

CJA Rule 4-501 was recently repealed, effective November 1, 2003, and the rule was
essentially incorporated into Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The above-stated
version of Rule 4-501 was still in effect, however, at the time of the trial court's consideration
and grant of UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, and is applicable for purposes of this
Court's review of the trial court's decision.
4

STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a claim for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Johnson in a one-car
motor vehicle accident that occurred during the early morning hours of September 14, 1996. The
accident occurred when Johnson's vehicle, while traveling southbound through a highway
construction zone (referred to herein as the ''Layton-Clearfield Project'') on Interstate 15 near Layton,
Utah, left the traveled portion of the highway and entered the construction area where the vehicle
went into and out of several large holes that had been created where sections of highway had been
removed for replacement. Johnson brought claims against both UDOT and Granite, alleging that
they were negligent in failing to adequately separate the highway traffic from the construction zone.4
Johnson's negligence claims against UDOT are based on the following three theories:
1.

Johnson alleges that UDOT was negligent in its design of the traffic control plan for

the Layton-Clearfield Project, and specifically in its decision to use plastic barrels rather than
concrete barriers to separate the motoring public from the construction zone;
2.

Johnson alleges that UDOT was negligent in failing to inspect, monitor and supervise

Granite's work on the Layton-Clearfield Project to ensure proper implementation of the traffic
control plan; and
3.

Johnson alleges that UDOT should be held vicariously liable for Granite's alleged

negligence.

4

Johnson's claims against Granite are still pending in the trial court, and are not part of
this appeal.
5

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Johnson commenced this litigation with the filing of his Complaint on October 3, 1997. (R.
1-5). UDOT filed its Answer to the Complaint on November 7, 1997. (R. 29-34).
On October 16, 2002, and after considerable discovery had been completed, UDOT filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 676-677) and Memorandum in Support of Defendant UDOT's
Motionfor Summary Judgment (R. 678-779) (Attached hereto as Addendum 1). Johnson responded
to UDOT's motion on November 12,2002 with Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 862-962) (Attached hereto as Addendum 2)(hereinafter ''Johnson's
Memorandum"). UDOT submitted its Reply Memorandum in Support ofDefendant UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment on November 18, 2002 (R. 1024-1107) (Attached hereto as Addendum 3).
On November 19,2002, UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the trial court
for oral argument. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1195) (Attached hereto as Addendum 4). At the
commencement of this hearing, and throughout the arguments, the trial court expressed concern over
the fact that Johnson's Memorandum failed to conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, thereby making it difficult for the trial court to evaluate
whether there were disputed material facts that would preclude summary judgment. (R. 1195:3-6,
45-46, 55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court's concern focused on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum
which contained twenty numbered fact paragraphs which Johnson claimed "dispute the facts alleged
in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 862-866 (Add. 2)). Those twenty numbered
paragraphs on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum made no reference to the facts stated in
UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. The trial court concluded that pages 1 -4 of Johnson's
Memorandum failed to comply with the Rule 4-501 requirement that a summary judgment
opposition memorandum "shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of
6

the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a
concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall
be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies/' (R. 1195:55-56; R. 1158 (Add. 4)) (quoting CJA Rule 4-501).
As a result of Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501, the trial court disregarded the facts stated
on pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum for purposes of UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
While the trial court rejected pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum, the trial court
acknowledged that a second section of facts found on pages 5-8 of Johnson's Memorandum did
conform with the Rule 4-501 requirements in that it responded directly to the specific numbered
paragraphs from UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. (R. 1195:55-56; R.l 158 (Add. 4)).
On pages 5-8 of Johnson's Memorandum, Johnson attempted to dispute Fact Nos. 3, 5, 6, 20, 21,
22,23,24, and 26 from UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum. (R. 866-869 (Add. 2)). UDOT
responded to Johnson's attempt to dispute these specific facts in its Summary Judgment Reply
Memorandum (R. 1032-1034 (Add. 3)), and the trial court sought further clarification on each of
these individual facts during the oral arguments in an attempt to determine whether there was any
disputed fact that would preclude summary judgment.5 (R. 1195:6-17 (Add. 4)).
Based upon the written submissions and the oral arguments, the trial court concluded that
Johnson had failed to establish any material disputes that would preclude summary judgment, and
granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT. (R. 1195:55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court's Order

* UDOT's Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum also responded to the facts stated on
pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum, therein showing that Johnson's non-conforming facts
failed to establish any dispute that would preclude summary judgment in favor of UDOT. (R.
1025-1032 (Add. 3)). Those facts were not singled out by the trial court during oral arguments,
however, since the trial court chose to disregard that portion of Johnson's Memorandum
altogether.

7

of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice was entered on January 8, 2003. (R. 1157-60)
(Attached hereto as Addendum 5). In addition to granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment,
that Order expressly states:
There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary
judgment on plaintiffs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts
1-20 on pages 1-4 of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOT's
Statement of Facts. While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5,6,20,21,22.23,
24, and 26, found on pages 5-8 of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's
Motion for Summary Judgment, does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiff s response
to those facts does not establish any genuine issues of fact which would preclude
summary judgment.
(R. 1158,H1 (Add. 5)).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts found on pages 4-12 of Johnson's Appellate Brief relies heavily on
factual allegations and evidence that were presented to the trial court in pages 1-4 of Johnson's
Memorandum. Since the trial court disregarded that portion of Jolinson's Memorandum for failing
to comply with Rule 4-501, UDOT contends that this Court's analysis should be limited to those
facts and evidence that were properly before the trial court, and that many of the facts being
presented by Johnson on appeal should likewise be disregarded by this Court.6
In order to assist the Court in reviewing those facts which were properly before the trial court,
UDOT provides the following verbatim restatement of the "Statement of Undisputed Facts" set forth
in UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum (Add. I):7

6

This issue is addressed in greater detail in the Argument. Section I, of this Brief.

7

For those citations to the record in this Statement of Facts that are [bracketed], UDOT
has substituted a citation to the Appellate Record for the citation originally contained in UDOT's
Summary Judgment Memorandum.
8

1.

Prior to September 26, 1995, UDOT let out for bid Project No.

IM-15-7(191)332, a highway construction project involving joint repair and slab
replacement on sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County (hereinafter referred to as
the "Layton-Clearfield Project"). (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre,ffif5-6, [Add. 1, R.
710]).
2.

UDOT's bid specifications on the Layton-Clearfield Project included

a proposed traffic control plan. The proposed traffic control plan called for the use
of plastic road construction barrels, rather than concrete barriers, as the primary
channeling devices to be used to separate the motoring public from the actual
construction area throughout most of the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Affidavit of
Dyke LeFevre, | 7 [Add. 1, R. 710]).
3.

The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel

traffic throughout this project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT
organization. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, HP-13 [Add. 1, R. 710-712]).
4.

At all times relevant to this case, the organizational structure of

UDOT officials and employees involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project was,
from top to bottom, as follows:
(a) Clint Topham was UDOT's Deputy Director. As the
Deputy Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the State of
Utah, and had the final say for all transportation related engineering
decisions.

The only official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT

hierarchy wras the UDOT Executive Director who reported directly to
the Governor of the State of Utah.
9

(b) Dvke LeFevre was the Director of Region One. Within UDOT,
the entire State of Utah is divided geographically into four different regions.
UDOT's Region One covers the northern-most part of the state starting in
Farmington, and included the Layton-Clearfield Project area.

Each of

UDOT's four regions are headed by a single Director who oversees all
transportation related matters for that particular region. As the Director of
Region One. Mr. LeFevre reported directly to UDOT Deputy Director, Clint
Topham.
(c) Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineer who oversaw
all road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported to Region
One Director, Dyke LeFevre, as to the status of these Region One projects.
(d) Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project and dealing directly
with Granite.
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, «j1j 3-4, 8 [Add. 1. R. 710-712]; aUDOT Organizational
Chart is attached as [Add. 1, R. 717]; a map of the state of Utah showing UDOT's
different regions is attached as [Add. 1, R. 719]).
5.

The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete

barriers in the proposed traffic control plan was made by Dyke LeFevre in
consultation with Clint Topham. Several key factors were weighed as part of this
decision, including the following:
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public;
10

(b) The costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and
(c) The impact on traffic congestion by increasing or decreasing the overall
time to complete the project.
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, H 13-16 [Add. 1, R. 712-713]).
6.

As part of UDOT's decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted

with the Federal Highway Administration about the use of barrels rather than
concrete barriers as channeling devices on similar projects in other states. Following
these conversations with the Federal Highway Administration, Mr. LeFevre was
confident that plastic barrels would provide adequate traffic channelization for the
safety of project workers and the motoring public. Mr. LeFevre also concluded that
the cost and time considerations also weighed in favor of using barrels rather than
concrete barriers. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre,ffif12,14-16 [Add. 1, R. 712-713]).
7.

On or about September 26, 1995, UDOT awarded the contract on the

Layton-Clearfield Project to Granite, one of several road construction contractors
who had bid on the project. (A copy of relevant portions of the UDOT/Granite
Contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project is attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 721722]).
8.

The formal contract between UDOT and Granite for the

Layton-Clearfield Project identified Granite as the "Contractor," and stated that "the
Contractor agrees to furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all
materials not specifically mentioned as being furnished by [UDOT] and to do and
perform all work in the construction of [the Layton-Clearfield Project] for the
approximate sum of [$4,998,249.00]." (See [Add. 1, R. 721-722])
11

9.

Incorporated as part of the formal contract between UDOT and

Granite were various attachments, one of which contained the following provision:
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The
CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect, and maintain barriers,
barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and
shall protect the work and safety of the public. Highway sections
closed to traffic shall be protected by barriers and barricades, and
obstructions shall be illuminated during darkness. Warning signs
shall be provided to control and direct traffic.
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations where
operations may interfere with the use of the road b\ traffic, and at all
intermediate points where the new work crosses or coincides with an
existing road. Warning signs shall be constructed and erected in
accordance with the traffic control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades,
lights, or other protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed
without permission of the ENGINEER.
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and
other protective devices shall meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways and Traffic Control
provisions of this specification.
(See [Add. 1,R. 722])
10.

Granite's construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project

commenced in approximately March of 1996. (Rick Parkin Deposition at p. 13,
relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 724-725])
11.

On or about February 21, 1996, prior to the commencement of the

construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project, a pre-construction meeting was
held between representatives of UDOT and Granite to discuss work on the project.
During that meeting, representatives of Granite raised the possibility of using
concrete barriers in lieu of barrels in order to channel traffic through the construction
site and to protect both motorists and construction workers.

12

(Preconstruction

Conference Agenda, attached as [Add. 1, R. 727-737]; Ray Vlaovich Deposition at
p. 35, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 739-740]; Chuck Lindsay
Deposition at pp. 10-11, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 742-745];
Kent Nichols Deposition at p. 10, relevant pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 747748])
12.

At or about the time of the pre-construction meeting, Chuck Lindsay

and Grant Fowkes, on behalf of Granite, expressed concerns about appropriate traffic
control. Granite's representatives inquired as to whether they could use pre-cast
concrete barriers, rather than plastic barrels, to separate the construction area from
the motoring public. Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer, requested that
Granite's representatives prepare and submit a written proposal regarding the use of
concrete barriers. (Preconstruction Conference Agenda at p. 8 [Add. 1, R. 734];
Chuck Lindsay Depo. at pp. 10-11 [Add. 1, R. 743-744])
13.

On or about March 20, 1996, Chuck Lindsay, acting on behalf of

Granite, wrote a letter to Kent Nichols proposing the use of pre-cast concrete barriers
to "channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT employees overseeing the project,
and the traveling public." Mr. Lindsay's letter noted that "traffic would be very close
to [Granite's employees' work] and they would be virtually unprotected without the
concrete barrier." Mr. Lindsay's letter indicated that the proposed use of concrete
barriers would allow the construction to proceed at a faster pace, thereby resulting in
an estimated net savings of approximately 56 days of construction time. The net
additional costs associated with the use of concrete barriers were estimated by
Granite to be approximately $540,475.00. (3/20/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add.
13

1,R. 750-753])
14.

After receiving Granite's 3/20/96 written proposal, Kent Nichols wrote

a memorandum dated March 21, 1996 to UDOT Region One Director, Dyke
LeFevre, P.E., and included with the memorandum a copy of Granite's proposal. Mr.
Nichols' memorandum stated that he shared in Granite's concerns regarding the safety
of this project, and requested that Granite's proposal "be given serious consideration."
(3/21/96 Memorandum attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 755])
15.

On or about March 26,1996, a meeting was held between Granite and

UDOT representatives at UDOT's Region One office. During that meeting, Granite
proposed a new traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, again
requesting the use of pre-cast concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels. The details
of Granite's proposal were formalized in a letter dated March 29, 1996 from Chuck
Lindsay to Kent Nichols. Mr. Lindsay's 3/29/96 letter requested that consideration
be given for the new traffic control plan for "the safety of our workers, UDOT
employees, and the traveling public." Mr. Lindsay's written proposal estimated that
the net additional cost for the proposed changes would be approximately $767,885.
Granite's 3/29/96 proposal also stated that the proposed changes would result in the
project being completed 28 days earlier than required under the original contract.
(3/29/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 757-760])
16.

Kent Nichols received Granite's 3/29/96 proposal, and reviewed the

proposal with UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. In a letter dated April
2,1996, Kent Nichols responded to Granite's proposal, stating that Dyke LeFevre had
considered Granite's cost breakdown and that Mr. LeFevre felt that "as [the proposal]
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stands he does not feel that we could get approval." Mr. Nichols indicated that
justification for the traffic control plan could be made only if the additional costs for
the proposal were below $450,000 and would result in at least a 50 day reduction in
the overall time needed to complete the entire construction project. Mr. Nichols
indicated that UDOT was "not closing the door on this proposal" and requested that
Granite review certain items in an attempt to lower the price of the proposed traffic
control plan changes and to determine whether the project could be hastened because
of the proposed changes. Mr. Nichols acknowledged that the proposed change to the
traffic control plan "has merit" and indicated that he would "present a request for
additional money to the Commission" if certain criteria were met. (4/2/96 Letter
attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 762-763])
17.

In a letter dated April 11,1996, Granite responded to UDOT's 4/2/96

letter, stating that "in our judgment we cannot meet the criteria established by UDOT
to justify a change in the traffic control plan." Granite's letter indicated that with
UDOT providing certain equipment, the cost of the proposed traffic control plan
changes could be lowered to approximately $490,000, but that Granite could not
promise any additional time savings beyond 28 days. Granite's 4/11/96 letter
concluded by stating that Granite "will proceed with the original traffic control plan
established by UDOT." (4/11/96 Letter attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 765])
18.

On or about JuK 2, 1996. after work had commenced on the

Layton-Clearfield Project, Chuck Lindsay once again wrote a letter on behalf of
Granite to Kent Nichols at UDOT asking for approval of the proposal to use pre-cast
concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project. (7/2/96 Letter attached hereto as
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[Add. 1,R. 767])
19.

On July 2, 1996, after receiving Chuck Lindsay's 7/2/96 letter, Kent

Nichols forwarded a memorandum to his superiors, Stan Nielsen, P.E., Region One
Construction Engineer, and Dyke LeFevre, P.E., Region One Director.

This

memorandum, which was also copied to Clint Topham, P.E., UDOT Deputy
Director, voiced concerns about "serious problems with control of traffic and
providing safety for our contractor's workers as well as our own personnel." Mr.
Nichols requested that his superiors review and give "serious consideration" to
pre-cast concrete barriers and traffic cross-overs in order to maintain safety. (7/2/96
Memorandum attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 769])
20.

Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the

use of pre-cast concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT
management personnel including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and
rejected the proposal based upon the same cost-benefit considerations that motivated
the prior decisions to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers. (Affidavit of
Dyke LeFevre, flf 17-18 [Add. 1, R. 713-714])
21.

Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract for the

Layton-Clearfield Project, Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of
construction it desired in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in
the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 11, relevant pages
attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 771-773])
22.

Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed

the contractor to select the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control
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plan would be implemented and enforced. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 14 [Add.
1,R. 773])
23.

Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to the

terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, Granite could have provided pre-cast concrete
barriers for the Layton-Clearfield Project at its own cost, but chose not to do so.
(Chuck Lindsay Deposition at pp. 11-12 [Add. 1, R. 744-745]; Affidavit of Dyke
LeFevre,1f 19 [Add. 1,R. 714])
24.

Granite's 3/20/96, 3/29/96, and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised

concerns over the speed limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that
the speed limit be reduced from 65 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. throughout the construction
zone. (See [Add. 1, R. 750-753, 757-760, 767])
25.

While the posted speed limit in the construction zone at the time of

the September 14, 1996 accident was 65 m.p.h., temporary orange advisory speed
limit signs had also been posted throughout the construction zone with an advisory
speed limit of 50 m.p.h. The Utah Highway Patrol officer who investigated the
accident stated in his accident report and again during his deposition that these 50
m.p.h. advisory speed limit signs were posted throughout the Layton-Clearfield
Project at the time of the accident. (Greg Lundell Deposition at pp. 38-39, relevant
pages attached hereto as [Add. 1, R. 775-776]. A copy of the police report showing
the posted speed limits and advisory speed limits at the time of the accident is
attached hereto as [Add. 1, 778-779])
26.

On or about September 14,1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor

vehicle accident within the confines of the Layton-Clearfield Project when his car left
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the traveled portion of the highway and entered into the construction zone where it
collided with one or more holes created as part of the ongoing slab replacements.
(Amended Complaint ffl 9-11 [R. 98-99])
27.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries

allegedly sustained in the 9/14/96 accident, and alleges that UDOT and Granite "were
negligent in one or more of the following particulars:"
(a)

"The defendants failed to adequately warn of the condition of the
roadway."

(b)

"The defendants failed to properly control freeway traffic in
the area."

(c)

"The defendants failed to adequately barricade and/or provide a safe
lane of travel to the [plaintiff] and other motorists."

(d)

"The defendants failed to properly train, supervise, or otherwise
control their particular agents, servants, or employees in aspects of
traffic safety and construction zone traffic control."

(e)

"The defendants failed to comply with applicable regulations
concerning traffic control and construction zone safety for the type of
construction occurring in the area."

(f)

"The defendants specifically failed to use jersey barriers, flaggers, or
other appropriate warning devices, failed to provide a safe zone
between the lane of travel and the construction area, and failed to
adequately illuminate the dangerous condition."

(Amended Complaint, 1 12 [R. 99])
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28.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges that Granite was acting

as "the agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT and therefore, the negligence of
Granite would be imputable to UDOT. (Amended Complaint,ffif3, 13 [R. 97-99])

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UDOT contends that the trial court was correct in determining that there were no issues of
fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of UDOT, and that UDOT was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. From a procedural standpoint, the trial court acted correctly in limiting
the scope of facts being considered because Johnson failed to comply with the requirements of Rule
4-501 in responding to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. Because Johnson failed to even
address this issue in his appellate arguments, and because the trial court acted within its discretion,
this Court should likewise limit the scope of the facts being considered on appeal to those facts that
were properly before the trial court.
As for the substantive issues. UDOT contends that the discretionary function exception to
the Governmental Immunity Act protects UDOT from being held liable for its design of the traffic
control plan used on the Layton-Clearfield project, and specifically the decision to use plastic barrels
rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic through the construction zone. The undisputed facts
of this case show that the traffic control plan was reviewed and authorized by UDOTs upper
management in consultation with the Federal Highway Administration, and that the decision to use
barrels was made by UDOT's Region One Director. Since these decisions were clearly made at the
"policy making'' level, and not by "operational" employees, Johnson's claim against UDOT must
be barred by the discretionary function exception.
UDOT also cannot be held liable for failing to inspect, monitor or supervise Granite's work.
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The contract between UDOT and Granite expressly provides that Granite is the party responsible for
performing all work on the project, and that Granite is responsible for implementing the traffic
control plan and maintaining highway safety throughout the construction zone. Thus, any failure to
follow the traffic control plan would be attributable to Granite, and not UDOT. Furthermore, even
if UDOT had a duty to inspect or monitor Granite's work, UDOT would be protected from liability
by the negligent inspection exception to the Governmental Immunity Act.
Finally, UDOT cannot be held vicariously liable for Granite's alleged negligence. It is clear
under Utah law that someone who hires an independent contractor cannot be held liable for a
dangerous condition created by that independent contractor, unless the employer maintains control
over, and actively participates in the work being performed by the independent contractor. Since it
is undisputed that UDOT did not maintain control over, or actively participate in Granite's work,
UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence.
Therefore, it is UDOT's position that the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLATE REVIEW SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THOSE
FACTS THAT WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

Before this Court can consider the substantive issues being raised on appeal, the Court needs
to address a procedural issue that arises from Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration in his summary judgment pleadings filed at the trial court
level. As a result of Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501, the trial court entirely disregarded
approximately four pages of alleged facts contained in Johnson's Memorandum, many of which
Johnson relies upon on appeal. UDOT contends that those alleged facts should likewise be
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disregarded by this Court, and that the appellate review should be limited in scope to those facts that
were properly before the trial court.
Rule 4-501(2)(B) requires that "[t]he points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the
movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a
concise statement of material facts which support the party's contention'' and fejach disputed
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the opposing party relies." This Court has emphasized the importance
of complying with Rule 4-501(2)(B), and recognized that it is within the trial court's discretion to
require compliance with the rule. Fennell v. Green, 77 P.3d 339, 341-42 (Utah App. 2003).
In Fennel], the plaintiff had filed a summary judgment opposition memorandum that "did not
refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only his own statement
of undisputed facts." Id. at 341. During the arguments on the motion, the trial court "noted its
frustration with" the plaintiffs response to the motion for summary judgment, and granted the
motion for summary judgment, in part, because of plaintiffs "failure to comply with [Rule 4501(2)(B)] by not specifically controverting the facts as set forth by Defendants in the memoranda
in support of their motions for summary judgment." Id. at 341-42, n.2.
On appeal, this Court stated *"[i]t is clear that Fennell failed to comply with the rule . . . As
a result, it was unclear what facts Fennell contended were disputed." IcL at 341. The Court
recognized a long line of Utah cases where the appellate courts have placed enforcement of Rule 4501 within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 342; see e.g., Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist 63 P.3d
705 (Utah 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that there was insufficient evidence to support summary
judgment because plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 4-501 requirement to specifically
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controvert those facts that are claimed to be disputed); Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d
694, 701-702 (Utah App. 1994) (upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept
supplemental memoranda outside bounds of rule 4-501); Golding v. Ashlev Cent. Irrigation Co.. 902
P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1995) (determining that failure to comply with Rule 4-501 made additional
filings moot).
This Court noted that "these cases establish that a trial court may exercise its discretion to
require compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly rule 4-501, without
impairing a party's substantive rights/' Fennell, 77 P.3d at 342. The Court went on to conclude that
the trial court in Fennell had not abused its discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501. Id.
Because the trial court had acted within its discretion, this Court limited the scope of its appellate
review by relying on only those facts that the trial court deemed to be admitted under Rule 4-501.
Id
The scope of the Court's appellate review in the present case should likewise be limited for
the same reasons addressed by the Court in Fennell. Contrary to the requirements of Rule 4501(2)(B), Johnson's Memorandum began with four pages of facts which Johnson claimed "dispute
the facts alleged in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment/*but which made no reference to
UDOT's numbered fact paragraphs, thereby leaving the trial court to speculate as to which of
UDOT's facts Johnson wras attempting to dispute. The trial court expressed its frustration with
Johnson's failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B), stating "there's no secret why we have Rule 4501 as it relates to summary judgment motions, and that is so the judge who has to review a
summary judgment doesn't have to have [sic] through, you know, six inches of paper and put it
together for themselves." (R. 1195:4-5 (Add. 4)). At the conclusion of the arguments, the trial court
again stated, UI don't know how many times this needs to be said, but the whole purpose of Rule 422

501 as to summary judgment is to help a judge say is there an issue, because everybody's going
down the same way and following the procedure. And when they don't do that, it's very hard." (R.
1195:55-56 (Add. 4)). The trial court also pointed out that in the language used in Rule 4-501 (2)(B),
"it's a 'shall begin', it doesn't say may begin, of [sic] if you'd like it to, it says shall." (R. 1195:5
(Add. 4)). In the end, the trial court, like the trial court in Fennell exercised its discretion and
concluded that the first four pages of Johnson's Memorandum had failed to comply with Rule 4501(2)(B), and that those facts would not be considered for the purpose of UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. 1158 (Add. 5)).
Johnson's Docketing Statement suggested that he would challenge this aspect of the trial
court's ruling on appeal. Johnson's Appellate Brief, however, makes no mention of this issue, and
Jolinson makes no attempt to challenge the trial court's ruling that pages 1-4 of Johnson's
Memorandum failed to comply with Rule 4-501, and therefore, would not be considered for purposes
of summary judgment. Since Johnson makes no attempt to challenge this issue in his Appellate
Brief, UDOT contends that Johnson has waived any right to challenge the issue. As a result, there
is no need for this Court to review the trial court's action to determine if there was an abuse of
discretion. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to review the trial court's ruling on this issue,
UDOT contends that the above-stated facts and authority clearly support a conclusion that the trial
court acted well within its discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501, in limiting the scope
of facts to those facts that were properly before the trial court, and in rejecting the factual allegations
contained at pages 1-4 of Johnson's Memorandum..
While Johnson has waived his right to challenge this issue on appeal, his Appellate Brief
nevertheless relies heavily on many of the same factual allegations properly disregarded by the trial
court due to Johnson's non-compliance with Rule 4-501. In addition, UDOT contends that the
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manner in which many of these facts are presented, both to the trial court and on appeal, is
misleading, and often lacks proper evidentiary support from the record. For example, Johnson
makes reference to Granite's requests to lower the speed limit from 65 mph to 55 mph in an attempt
to imply that UDOT was negligent in failing to allow Granite to reduce the speed limit throughout
the construction zone. This issue, however, is a red herring, and has absolutely nothing to do with
Johnson's negligence claims against UDOT. While UDOT has been unable to locate any evidence
confirming that it responded to Granite's speed limit request, it is undisputed from the Highway
Patrol accident report and the deposition testimony of the investigating Highway Patrol officer that
50 mph advisory speed limit signs were posted throughout the construction zone on the night of
Johnson's accident. (R. 775-779 (Add. 1)). Thus, Johnson's continued attempts to raise this issue
can be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to confuse the real issues.
Another example is Johnson's allegation that a UDOT representative instructed Granite to
open a second lane of travel in violation of UDOT's traffic control plan. This particular allegation
is relied on heavily by Johnson in his appellate arguments. The trial court did not. and this Court
need not, consider this allegation since it was presented on page 4 of Johnson's Memorandum which
did not comply with Johnson's duties under Rule 4-501. Even if that allegation had been considered
by the trial court, UDOT pointed out in its Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum that the citation
of Jimmie Keyes' deposition testimony, which is the only evidence cited by Johnson in support of
this allegation, does not state that anyone from UDOT expressly authorized two lanes of traffic on
the night of Johnson's accident, or that UDOT ever authorized Granite to set up the barrels in the
manner Johnson alleged occurred on the night of his accident. (R. 1031, f 18 (Add. 3)). In addition,
Johnson has failed to present any evidence showing that UDOT ever authorized Granite to open two
lanes of traffic in any manner other than that specified for peak hour traffic in the traffic control plan.
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The allegations that the traffic control plan required white striping and a two foot buffer
between the construction zone and traffic are other examples of factual allegations which are cited
throughout Johnson's Appellate Brief, but which were not properly before the trial court. The
allegations of missing barrels on the night of the accident also fall into that category. In short,
Johnson's Appellate Brief is replete with factual allegations never properly presented to the trial
court in connection with Johnson's opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
All of the "facts" stated in Johnson's Appellate Brief which were not properly before the trial
court should be completely disregarded for purposes of this appellate review, especially where
Johnson does not challenge that portion of the trial court's ruling in his Appellate Brief. Since the
trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 4-501 in disregarding pages 1-4 of Johnson's
Memorandum, this Court must focus its appellate review on those facts stated in UDOT's Summary
Judgment Memorandum (Add. 1), Summary Judgment Reply Memorandum (Add. 3), and that
portion of the oral argument transcript where the trial court walked through each of UDOT's stated
facts in an attempt to determine whether there were any material disputes. (R. 1195:6-17 (Add. 4)).
In doing so, it is clear that the trial court acted correctly in concluding that there were no disputed
facts that would have precluded summary judgment in favor of UDOT.
II.

THE CLAIM THAT UDOT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS DESIGN OF
THE TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN IS BARRED BY THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.

Although it may not be clear from Johnson's Appellate Brief, a major focus of Johnson's
claims against UDOT throughout this litigation, and a major focus of the summary judgment
pleadings and oral arguments to the trial court was the allegation that UDOT was negligent in its
design of the traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield project which specifically authorized the
use of barrels rather than concrete barriers as the principal means of traffic channelization throughout
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the construction project. UDOT contends that, even if its design of the traffic control plan, including
the decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers were deemed negligent, any claims against
UDOT based on that allegation must fail under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides that," [e]xcept as may otherwise be provided
in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suitfor any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function...."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1997) (emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three part test that is used to determine whether this grant
of governmental immunity is applicable to a specific situation, stating:
To determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (the Act), three questions must be answered: (1) Was
the activity undertaken by the entity a governmental function and therefore
immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity contained in Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-3? (2) If the activity undertaken was a governmental function, has
another section of the Act waived the blanket immunity? (3) If immunity has been
waived, does the Act contain an exception to that waiver resulting in a retention of
immunity against the claim asserted?
Keeganv. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995).
In the present case, the claims against UDOT arise out of UDOT's involvement in a highway
construction project. The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that "the construction and maintenance
of state highways can only be performed by governmental agencies." Id. at 620. Therefore, there
can be no question, and Johnson does not dispute, that any UDOT activity associated with the
Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed a "governmental function" which falls under the general
grant of immunity offered by the Governmental Immunity Act.
The next step is to determine whether any part of the Governmental Immunity Act operates
as a waiver to UDOT's general grant of immunity. UDOT acknowledges that such a waiver likely
exists in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 of the Governmental Immunity Act which states:
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Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located on them.
Since this case involves a claim for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a "defective, unsafe,
or dangerous condition of [a] highway," Section 63-30-8 likely operates as a waiver of UDOT's
claim of immunity.
Since UDOT's immunity appears to have been waived by § 63-30-8, the next step is to
determine whether any of the "exceptions to waiver set forth in § 63-30-10" are applicable to the
facts of this case. UDOT asserts that the "discretionary function" exception should apply to
Johnson's claim that UDOT negligently designed the proposed traffic control plan, including
UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels to channel traffic. If the discretionary function exception has
any significance, the Court must conclude that UDOT is immune from liability for any claims
alleging negligence in the design of the proposed traffic control plan.
The discretionary function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act states as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within
the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added).
Keegan is controlling in the present case because that case also involved claims against
UDOT, and the Utah Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment should have been granted
in favor of UDOT because certain UDOT decisions regarding a highway construction project were
immune from liability under the discretionary function exception. 896 P.2d at 625-26. In Keegan,
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a motorist was killed when his car climbed a concrete median barrier and collided with a bridge
support pillar. Id. at 619. The victim's estate brought a wrongful death action against UDOT,
arguing that UDOT negligently failed to maintain a concrete traffic barrier in a reasonably safe
manner. The plaintiffs in Keeean specifically alleged that, although the barrier had originally been
constructed in accordance with the prevailing safety standards, two subsequent surface overlay
projects had shortened the barrier's height, rendering it unsafe. Id. UDOT moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the decision to not raise the barrier during resurfacing was a discretionary act
that should be shielded from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act. Id- The trial court
denied UDOT's motion and a jury verdict was ultimately entered against UDOT.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the discretionary function exception and
concluded that UDOT's actions should have been deemed immune from suit as a matter of law. Id.
at 623-26. In reaching its decision, the Court looked at the reasoning behind the discretionary
function exception, stating:
Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is designed to
"shield those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of people
in a myriad of unforseen ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual
threat of which would make public administration all but impossible." In keeping
with this purpose, this court has distinguished between discretionary and
nondiscretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question involves
the formulation of policy or the execution of already-formulated policies. This court
has held that the discretionary function exception "should be confined to those
decisions and acts occurring at the 'basicpolicy-making level,' and not extended to
those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level... 'which concern
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation ojbroad policyfactors:'" The
reason for such a rule is plain, given the purpose of the discretionary function
exception: "Where the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed
to one of the branches of our tri-partite system of government, the courts have
refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety of those decisions."
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Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).8
In order to clarify and create some consistency in the application of the discretionary function
exception, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the following four-part test "to determine whether a
given decision or act qualifies under the discretionary function exception":
1. "Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?"
2. "Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would
not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or objective?"
3. "Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved?"
4. "Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged
act, omission, or decision?"
Id. at 624.
When this four-part test was applied in Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the
decision to not raise the concrete barrier fell within the scope of the discretionary function exception.
Id. First, the "decision involved a basic governmental objective: to wit, public safety on the roads."
Id. Second, "the decision was essential to the realization of that policy; it involved a determination
of not only the degree of safety that would be provided by various options considered, but also what

8

The Utah Supreme Court noted that, in other cases, it had found the discretionary
function exception applicable to "decisions concerning placement of railroad warning signs" and
"the design of a city flood control system." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citing Velasquez v. Union
Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 219, 469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970); Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832,
835 (Utah 1992); Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989).
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degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints."9 Id. Third, "the
decision involved the basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency involved," noting that
"studies of the plan, its cost, and the degree of safety it would provide were carried out by senior
engineers and circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id. Finally, the Court
concluded that UDOT had the authority to make this decision since the legislature has provided
UDOT with "general responsibility for statewide highway ... and transportation planning, research
and design, construction, maintenance, security and safety." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
63-49-4(1)).
Based on its application of that four-part test to the facts at issue in Keegan, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that, "[i]n essence, UDOT's decision involved just the sort of policy-driven
weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to protect"
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that:
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly fiscal matters.
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we will not
hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a difficult
balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of funding improvements.
Id. The Court concluded by stating:
UDOT's decision not to raise the concrete barrier during the surface overlay
projects was not an operational decision involving the negligent installation or
maintenance of a traffic device, but rather involved a policy-based plan, approved by
the [Federal Highway Administration], which resulted from a considered weighing
of the costs and benefits of certain safety and construction policies and wrhich
involved the exercise of UDOT's judgment and discretion. Accordingly, we hold that
the decision not to raise the concrete barrier was a discretionary act shielded from

9

The Utah Supreme Court noted that, prior to submitting the design plans to the Federal
Highway Administration for approval, a safety study was performed and the project design
engineer prepared a cost-benefits report that looked at the safety factors, the cost of removing and
replacing the barrier, and the added delays and inconvenience to highway users that would be
created by replacing the barrier. Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624.
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liability under section 63-30-10.
Id. at 626. Based on that conclusion, the trial court's denial of UDOT's motion for summary
judgment was reversed. Id.
UDOT contends that Keegan controls the resolution of the present case. In contrast to
Keegan, this Court's opinion in Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999) is an example
of a case where the facts could not support a summary judgment ruling. Trujillo involved a
construction project where a four lane divided highway - two eastbound lanes and two westbound
lanes - had been shut down on the eastbound side for resurfacing work. 986 P.2d at 755. To
accommodate the traffic traveling in both directions, eastbound traffic was channeled onto the
westbound side of the highway which was temporarily used to provide one lane of traffic moving
in each direction. Id. The eastbound traffic was separated from the westbound traffic by temporary
double yellow painted lines and the placement of plastic construction barrels spaced at 100-foot
intervals. Id. The plaintiffs in Trujillo were injured when a westbound vehicle veered into oncoming traffic and collided head on with the plaintiffs' motor home. Id. The plaintiffs brought
claims against UDOT and the contractor alleging that they were "negligent in the design,
supervision, and implementation of the traffic control plan," and specifically that they "negligently
failed to install concrete barriers to prevent crossover accidents in the area where the Trujillo's
accident took place." Id. at 756. The trial court dismissed the claims against UDOT as a matter of
law on the basis of the discretionary function exception. Id.
On appeal, this Court followed the same analysis used in Keegan in finding that UDOT had
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that its allegedly negligent acts
and decisions met the discretionary functions exception. The evidence before the Court established
that the "[p]lans for the entire . . . project were drafted, formulated, and approved in a series of
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meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one year." and that the participants included
"Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT maintenance, engineering, design, and
administrative personnel; and several city and county officials." jd. at 756. The Court also noted,
however, that "the record contains no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." Id. Based on
this lack of evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that UDOT had failed to meet its burden
of proving, as a matter of law, that its formulation of the traffic control plan at issue in Trujillo fell
within the scope of the discretionary function exception, and therefore, the grant of summary
judgment was reversed. Id. at 761-63.
While the present case and Trujillo are similar in that they both involve UDOT's decision
to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers, the similarities between the two cases end there.
UDOT contends that the facts surrounding this case fall squarely within the Utah Supreme Court's
holding in Keegan, and that Trujillo is easily distinguishable. It is important to note that Trujillo
made no attempt to limit, restrict, or modify the rule of law recognized by the Utah Supreme Court
in Keegan. . The outcomes of the two cases were different, however, because this Court concluded
in Trujillo that UDOT had failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial court to establish that its
decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were made at the policy making level, and therefore,
were within the scope of the discretionary function exception. In the present case, however, there
is an overwhelming amount of undisputed evidence establishing that UDOT's decisions concerning
the traffic control plan on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels
rather than concrete barriers, were singled out, separately analyzed, and made at the highest level of
a coordinate branch of state government. The policy discussions and policy making decisions made
by UDOT on the Layton-Clearfield Project, like the decisions in Keegan, were precisely the types
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of "policy-driven" decisions which are immune under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The undisputed facts before the trial court included evidence that prior to pursuing bids on
the Lavton-Clearfield Project. UDOT researched traffic control alternatives, and consulted with the
Federal Highway Administration regarding those alternatives. (R. 712-713 (Add. 1)). While the
proposed traffic control plan was initially prepared by UDOT's traffic engineers, the decision to use
plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers was ultimately considered and made by UDOT's upper
management. Specifically, that decision was made by UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre.
(R. 710-713 (Add. 1)). As the Region One Director, Mr. LeFevre was the individual who oversaw
all traffic related matters for the entire northern portion of the state. (R. 710-712. 717, 719 (Add.
1)). When considering whether to use plastic barrels or concrete barriers on the Lavton-Clearfield
Project, Mr. LeFevre weighed several key factors, including: (1) the safety of project workers and
the motoring public; (2) the costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and (3) the
overall impact on traffic congestion that would result from increasing or decreasing the project
completion time. (R. 712-713 (Add. 1)). As part of Mr. LeFevre's decision-making process, he
consulted with UDOT Deputy Director, Clint Topham, the chief traffic engineer for Utah who had
the final say on all transportation related decisions for the entire state of Utah. (R. 710-713 (Add.
1)). Mr. LeFevre also consulted with officials from the Federal Highway Administration about the
use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on similar projects in other states. (R. 712-713
(Add. 1)). Based on those consultations, and after considering all of the safety, cost, and time
factors, Mr. LeFevre decided that barrels, rather than concrete barriers, should be used in the
proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project.
After the contract for the project was awarded to Granite, the barrel versus barrier issue
resurfaced when Granite requested on several occasions that the contract be modified to include the
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use of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the construction zone. In at least two different
meetings, and in at least three different letters, Granite's representatives specifically asked UDOT
to authorize the use of concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels for greater project safety. (R. 727737, 739-740, 742-745, 747-748, 750-753, 767 (Add. 1)). Granite presented UDOT with different
proposals as to the estimated additional costs and time savings associated with the use of concrete
barriers. (R. 750-753, 765 (Add. 1)). It is important to note that Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project
Engineer overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project, agreed with Granite's safety concerns, and
recommended that UDOT approve the use of concrete barriers. (R. 755, 769 (Add. 1)). The
decision, however, was not Mr. Nichols' to make at the operational level of the project; rather, the
decision was for UDOT's policymakers to make.
Each of Granite's requests concerning the use of concrete barriers were forwarded to Dyke
LeFevre and other members of UDOT's upper management for consideration. (R. 755,762-763,769
(Add. 1)). On each occasion. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management considered and
weighed the safety considerations against the cost and time factors. (R. 712-714, 762-763 (Add. 1)).
In the end, Mr. LeFevre concluded that the safety and time factors did not outweigh the additional
costs associated with using concrete barriers, and therefore, Granite's proposals were rejected. (R.
712-714 (Add. 1)).
Johnson argues that UDOT's decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were not
"'essential to the realization' of a basic government objective." (Johnson Appellate Brief at pp. 2834). In doing so, Johnson attempts to focus the Court's attention on the narrow issue of barrels
versus barriers, and suggests that barrels and barriers are not things that are essential to
accomplishing basic governmental goals. The Utah Supreme Court did not adopt such a narrow
approach in Keegan. In fact. Keegan concluded that UDOT's decision making was essential to the
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realization of a basic government objective because "it involved a determination of not only the
degree of safety that would be provided by various options considered, but also what degree of safety
would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints." 896 P.2d at 624. UDOT's decisions
surrounding the traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the use plastic barrels
rather than concrete barriers, likewise involved an analysis of not only safety factors, but also time
and executive branch budgetary cost limitations that had to be weighed against the safety factors.
Johnson also attempts to unfairly characterize UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels as
solely a financial decision. UDOT does not dispute that cost was a significant factor in its original
decision to use barrels, and in its later rejections of Granite's proposed change orders. It is also
undisputed, however, that UDOT consulted with the Federal Highway Administration specifically
on the issue of using barrels rather than barriers on this type of project, and concluded that the project
could be done safely without the use of barriers. This analysis of the safety issues was completed
before the project was ever let out to bid, and did not need to be re-performed each time Granite
came forward with another change order request. While Johnson would have this Court believe that
UDOT's decision to stick with barrels was simply an attempt to save a few dollars, it is important
to remember that the issue being presented to UDOT by Granite's proposed change orders was
whether to approve an additional $500,000 for a project that was already costing the taxpayers of the
State of Utah more than $5,000,000. Once again, as noted by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan:
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly fiscal matters.
Every highway could probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we will not
hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a
difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the burden of funding
improvements.
896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The fact that cost played a significant role in UDOT's decision
to use barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project does not defeat UDOT's
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argument that this decision is protected under the Governmental Immunity Act.
It is also important to note that, even if UDOT did fail to give adequate consideration to
safety issues as Johnson has suggested, UDOT's actions should still be protected under the
discretionary function exception. That exception applies not only to the "exercise or performance
. . . [of] a discretionary function," but also "the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function"

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added). Thus, even if Mr. LeFevre or UDOT

somehow acted negligently by placing cost before safety, thereby failing to "exercise or perform a
discretionary function," Johnson's negligence claim would still be barred.
Johnson also attempts to argue that UDOT's decision to use barrels was not made at the
"policy-making" level. (Johnson's Appellate Brief at pp. 34-36). This argument ignores the
undisputed facts of this case. Johnson does not dispute that the final decision surrounding the use
of barrels was ultimately made by Mr. LeFevre. Instead, Johnson would have this Court believe that
Mr. LeFevre was just another operational level engineer. Mr. LeFevre, however, was the Region
One Director who retired from UDOT in 2000 after 39 years of service. (R. 1028, •[ 8). As the
Region One Director. Mr. LeFevre was not someone who was out working on the various
construction projects. To the contrary, Mr. LeFevre was the individual in charge of reviewing and
making policy and fiscal decisions for all highway related projects for the entire northern portion of
the State of Utah. The Utah Legislature has required that UDOT Region Directors such as Mr.
LeFevre be "qualified executivefs] with technical and administrative experience and training." Utah
Code Ann. § 72-1-205(2). The fact that Mr. LeFevre was faced with difficult policy and fiscal based
decisions on a daily basis does not somehow convert his responsibilities from the "policy-making
level" to the "operational level," as Johnson urges.
The undisputed facts surrounding UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete
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barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly establish that those decisions were policy-driven
decisions made by UDOT's upper management. Had those decisions been made at the "operational
level" by the UDOT personnel who were physically involved with the project on a daily basis, the
evidence suggests that UDOT would have accepted Granite's proposal to use concrete barriers. That
was not the case, however. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management, after duly considering
the competing safety, cost, and time factors involved, rejected Granite's proposals and the
recommendations of UDOT's own project engineer. There can be no question that these decisions
were policy-driven, and not operational. Therefore, this case falls squarely within the Utah Supreme
Court's holding in Keegan, and this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that UDOT's
decisions surrounding the proposed traffic control plan, including the decision to use plastic barrels
instead of concrete barriers, are shielded from liability under the discretionary function exception
of the Governmental Immunity Act.
III.

UDOT CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILING TO INSPECT,
MONITOR, OR SUPERVISE GRANITE'S WORK.

Johnson also alleges that UDOT was negligent in failing to properly implement the proposed
traffic control plan, and in failing to properly inspect or monitor Granite's implementation of the
traffic control plan. These arguments should likewise fail, as a matter of law, for several reasons.
First, UDOT was not responsible for implementing or monitoring the traffic control plan.
Johnson does note dispute the contractual requirements of the Layton-Clearfield Project that were
imposed upon Granite. The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly states that Granite was
the party responsible for furnishing all the labor and equipment necessary to "perform all work" on
the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the implementation of the traffic control plan throughout
the project. (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)). The contract expressly states that Granite "shall provide, erect,
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and maintain barriers, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and shall protect the
work and safety of the public."10 (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)). Thus, anv claims arising out of the alleged
failure to properly implement the proposed traffic control plan could only be brought against Granite.
There is no basis for imposing any duty or liability on UDOT in regards to the manner in which the
traffic control plan was actually implemented on the Layton-Clearfield Project by Granite.
Johnson incorrectly states in his Appellate Brief (p. 19) that the "the only evidence UDOT
submitted on this point was the contract between itself and Granite." In actuality, facts 21 and 22
in UDOT's Summary Judgment Memorandum cited to the deposition testimony of Randy Hunter,
and stated that, pursuant to the UDOT/Granite contract, "Granite was allowed to utilize the means
and methods of construction it desired in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in
the Layton-Clearfield Project,*' and was allowed to "select the means and methods by which the
proposed traffic control plan would be implemented and enforced." (R. 688 (Add. I)).11
Despite the plainly stated contractual obligations imposed on Granite, Johnson also contends
that UDOT had an independent duty to supervise or monitor Granite's work. UDOT contends that
there is no authority under Utah law that imposes a duty to inspect, monitor, or supervise the work
of an independent contractor. Even if such a duty did exist, however, the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act would again shield UDOT from any liability. That statute contains an exception
which states that a governmental entity cannot be held liable for "a failure to make an inspection or

10

The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project also required Granite to see that M[a]ll
barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices shall
meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices [MUTCD] for Streets and Highways and
Traffic Control provisions of this specification." (R. 721-722 (Add. 1)).
11

Johnson attempted to dispute these two facts in his Summary Judgment Opposition
Memorandum, but did so without any citations to the record as required by Rule 4-501. and thus,
the trial court viewed these facts as undisputed. (R. 867-868 (Add. 2)).
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by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1997) (emphasis
added).
UDOT contends that any claim that UDOT failed to monitor or supervise Granite's work on
the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed to be an allegation that UDOT either "fail[ed] to make
an inspection" or made an "inadequate or negligent inspection" of Granite's work and therefore,
would fall within the scope of the Section 63-30-10(4) exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.
In those cases where the Utah appellate courts have analyzed this "negligent inspection" exception,
it has been made clear that this exception is not designed to shield a governmental entity from an
inspection of its own work or property, but rather to shield governmental entities who are involved
with inspecting the property and work of third parties for purposes of ensuring public safety. See
e.g., Ilottv. Univ. of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d
265 (Utah 1995); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp, 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). That is precisely what
Johnson is alleging that UDOT failed to do in the present case.
Johnson claims that UDOT should be held liable because it allegedly failed to monitor
Granite's work or inspect the Layton-Clearfield Project for purposes of ensuring that Granite
complied with the traffic control plan, and ensuring that Granite's work on the project did not
endanger the public. Thus, while Johnson avoids using the word "inspection" to characterize his
claim, it is clear that Johnson is alleging that UDOT was negligent in inspecting the work of a third
party, independent contractor, Granite. Such a claim falls squarely within the scope of the "negligent
inspection"exception, and therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Johnson's claims against UDOT
based on those allegations should be affirmed.
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IV.

UDOT CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY
GRANITE'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE.

LIABLE

FOR

Johnson also seeks to impose liability on UDOT by claiming that Granite was acting as an
agent, servant, or employee of UDOT. and that the negligence of Granite, if any, should be imputed
to UDOT. There is absolutely no evidence, however, to suggest that Granite was an agent, servant,
or employee of UDOT. The undisputed facts of this case show that Granite was nothing more than
an independent contractor hired by UDOT to do the Layton-Clearfield Project.
The Utah courts have long recognized that "Utah adheres to the general common law rule that
'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by
an act or omission of the contractor or his servants!" Thompson v. Jess. 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah
1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937)).
Johnson does not dispute that Granite was an independent contractor hired by UDOT to perform the
Layton-Clearfield Project. Instead, Johnson relies on Thompson to argue that UDOT should be held
liable under the "retained control" doctrine. Thompson, however, does not support Johnson's
argument.
In Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court described the "retained control" doctrine as "a narrow
theory of liability applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an independent
contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care.*'
979 P.2d at 326. The Court adopted what it called the '"active participation standard,'' which
provides that "a principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent
contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of
performance of the contracted work." Id. at 327. The Court defined this standard by stating:
[T]o have "actively participated" in the contracted work, a principal employer must
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work.
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The degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal duty must involve either
the direct management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's
activities or the provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court also
noted:
It is not enough that [the employer] has merely a general right to order the work
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions
or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but
it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to
operative detail.
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. (1965)).
Applying the standard adopted by the Utah Supreme Court to the present case, it is clear that
the trial court was correct in concluding that UDOT cannot be held liable under the "active
participation" or "retained control" standard. The UDOT/Granite contract expressly states that all
work under the contract, including the implementation of the traffic control plan, was to be
performed by Granite. There was also undisputed testimony presented to the trial court establishing
that Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired in order to
complete the Layton-Clearfield Project, and was allowed to select the means and methods by which
the proposed traffic control plan would be implemented and enforced. (R. 688, 771-773 (Add. I)).12
While UDOT had its own personnel on site on a daily basis, those personnel were there to inspect
Granite's work, and to identify the sections of highway that needed to be replaced. As noted above,
however, even this limited involvement is not enough to subject UDOT to vicarious liability. There
is absolutely no evidence to suggest that UDOT's personnel were actively participating in or

12

As noted earlier, Johnson attempted to dispute these facts in his Summary Judgment
Opposition Memorandum, but did so without any citations to the record as required by Rule 4501, and thus, the trial court viewed these facts as undisputed. (R. 867-868 (Add. 2)).
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controlling the means or methods by which Granite went about its work. Therefore. Johnson's
reliance on the "active participation" or "retained control'* standard should be rejected.
Johnson also attempts to argue that UDOT should be held liable for Granite's alleged
negligence under the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk" doctrines that are found in Sections
416 and 427 of the Restatement (second) of Torts. It is important to note that the Utah courts have
never adopted these theories of liability. While the Utah Supreme Court did consider their
application in Thompson, the Court refused to apply these sections to claims involving an injured
employee of the independent contractor. 979 P.2d at 328-331. Johnson has failed to present any
authority suggesting that Utah law would apply the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk"
doctrines to a claim involving an allegedly dangerous condition created by an independent contractor
on a road construction project. Therefore, the Court should reject Johnson's claims that UDOT
should be liable for Granite's alleged negligence under the "inherently dangerous" or "peculiar risk"
doctrines.
Finally, Johnson attempts to argue on appeal that UDOT should be held liable under Section
418 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which deals specifically with highway construction
projects. This particular argument based on Section 418 was never made at the trial court level, and
therefore, was not preserved for appeal. As a result, this Court should conclude that Johnson has
waived any right to rely on Section 418 for the purpose of opposing UDOT's Motion for Summary
Judgment. It is also important to note that Section 418 has never been considered or adopted by the
Utah courts. Furthermore, even if Section 418 was recognized under Utah law, comment c. to
Section 418 makes it clear that "[n]othing in this Section is intended in any way to affect any
immunity which the State, a municipality, or other government may have from liability. The rule
stated here applies only where there is no such immunity." (Section 418 is attached as Addendum
42

6 to Johnson's Appellate Brief). Therefore, Johnson's reliance on Section 418 should be rejected.
In short, Johnson would have this Court hold that UDOT has a nondelegable duty to protect
the public from any dangerous condition on any public highway, regardless of whether the dangerous
condition was created by an independent contractor or other third party, rather than by UDOT. If
Utah law were to recognize such a duty, UDOT could potentially be held liable for ever}' motor
vehicle accident caused by an unsafe driver simply because UDOT failed to protect the public from
a dangerous condition (the unsafe driver) on the highway. UDOT contends there is no such duty
under Utah law. Johnson's avenue for relief from damages allegedly caused by an allegedly
dangerous condition created by Granite is his claim directly against Granite, something which he is
still free to pursue. Johnson is not entitled to recovery from UDOT, however, for Granite's alleged
negligence.
Since Utah law protects UDOT from being held liable for physical harm caused by the acts
or omissions of an independent contractor, this Court should court should affirm the trial court's
summary judgment ruling that UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UDOT respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's
summary judgment dismissal of Johnson's claims against UDOT.
DATED this 1 H

day of February, 2004.
STRONG & HANNI
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AttorneysTor Appellee/Defendant UDOT
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH,
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY,
JOHN DOES l-V,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT UDOT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Oral Argument Requested)

Civil No. 970700411
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT"), through counsel, submits the following memorandum of points and authorities
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and respectfully asks the Court to grant
said motion by dismissing all claims against UDOT as a matter of law.

INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a single vehicle accident during the early morning hours of
September 14, 1996. The accident occurred when plaintiffs southbound vehicle on
Interstate 15 near Layton, Utah, left the traveled portion of the highway and entered a
construction zone where the vehicle went into and out of several large holes where
sections of highway had been removed for replacement. Plaintiff alleges that this accident
and his alleged injuries were caused because UDOT and the project contractor, defendant
Granite Construction Company ("Granite"), were negligent in failing to make the highway
safe for vehicles traveling through the construction zone.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, UDOT contends that the claims against
UDOT should be dismissed as a matter of law for the following reasons:
1. UDOT's alleged negligence in designing and approving the proposed traffic
control plan is subject to the discretionary function exception of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act;
2. UDOT did not have any contractual duty to implement and monitor the proposed
traffic control plan, and UDOT cannot be held liable for any alleged failure to inspect,
monitor, or supervise Granite's work; and
3. UDOT cannot be held liable for any negligence attributable to an independent
contractor, Granite Construction.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
For purposes of UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT contends that the
following material facts are undisputed:
1.

Prior to September 26, 1995, UDOT let out for bid Project No. IM-15-

7(191)332, a highway construction project involving joint repair and slab replacement on
sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County (hereinafter referred to as the "Layton-Clearfield
Project"). (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fflj 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit 1).
2.

UDOTs bid specifications on the Layton-Clearfield Project included a

proposed traffic control plan. The proposed traffic control plan called for the use of plastic
road construction barrels, rather than concrete barriers, as the primary channeling devices
to be used to separate the motoring public from the actual construction area throughout
most of the Layton-Clearfield Project. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fl 7).
3.

The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic

throughout this project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT
organization. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, ffl[ 8-13).
4.

At all times relevant to this case, the organizational structure of UDOT

officials and employees involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project was, from top to bottom,
as follows:
(a) Clint Topham was UDOTs Deputy Director. As the Deputy
Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the State of Utah, and had
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the final say for all transportation related engineering decisions. The only
official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT hierarchy was the UDOT Executive
Director who reported directly to the Governor of the State of Utah.
(b) Dyke LeFevre was the Director of Region One. Within UDOT, the
entire State of Utah is divided geographically into four different regions.
UDOTs Region One covers the northern-most part of the state starting in
Farmington, and included the Layton-Clearfield Project area. Each of
UDOTs four regions are headed by a single Director who oversees all
transportation related matters for that particular region. As the Director of
Region One, Mr. LeFevre reported directly to UDOT Deputy Director, Clint
Topham.
(c) Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineer who oversaw
all road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported to Region
One Director, Dyke LeFevre, as to the status of these Region One projects.
(d) Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project and dealing directly
with Granite.
(Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, fflj 3-4, 8; a UDOT Organizational Chart is attached as Exhibit
2; a map of the state of Utah showing UDOTs different regions is attached as Exhibit 3).
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5.

The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers in

the proposed traffic control plan was made by Dyke LeFevre in consultation with Clint
Topham.

Several key factors were weighed as part of this decision, including the

following:
(a) The safety of project workers and the motoring public;
(lll:: •) The costs associated with using barrels versi is concrete barriers;
and
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the project. (A copy of relevant portions of the UDOT/Granite Contract for the LaytonClearfield Project is attached hereto as Exhibit 4).
8.

The formal contract between UDOT and Granite for the Layton-Clearfield

Project identified Granite as the "Contractor," and stated that "the Contractor agrees to
furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials not specifically
mentioned as being furnished by [UDOT] and to do and perform all work in the
construction of [the Layton-Clearfield Project] for the approximate sum of [$4,998,249.00]."
(See Exhibit 4)
9.

Incorporated as part of the formal contract between UDOT and Granite were

various attachments, one of which contained the following provision:
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The
CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect, and maintain barriers,
barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control
devices, and shall protect the work and safety of the public.
Highway sections closed to traffic shall be protected by
barriers and barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated
during darkness. Warning signs shall be provided to control
and direct traffic.
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations
where operations may interfere with the use of the road by
traffic, and at all intermediate points where the new work
crosses or coincides with an existing road. Warning signs
shall be constructed and erected in accordance with the traffic
control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades, lights, or other
protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed without
permission of the ENGINEER.
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary
signals and other protective devices shall meet the Manual on
6

Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways and
Traffic Control provisions of this specification.

(See Exhibit 4)
10.

Granite's construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project commenced in

approximately March of 1996. (Rick Parkin Deposition at p. 13, relevant pages attached
hereto as Exhibit 5)
11.

On or about February 21, 1996, prior to the commencement of the

construction work on the Layton-Clearfield Project, a pre-construction meeting was held
between representatives of UDOT and Granite to discuss work on the project. During that
meeting, representatives of Granite raised the possibility of using concrete barriers in lieu
of barrels in order to channel traffic through the construction site and to protect both
motorists and construction workers. (Preconstruction Conference Agenda, attached as
Exhibit 6; Ray Vlaovich Deposition at p. 35, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 7;
Chuck Lindsay Deposition at pp. 10-11, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Kent
Nichols Deposition at p. 10, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 9)
12.

At or about the time of the pre-construction meeting, Chuck Lindsay and

Grant Fowkes, on behalf of Granite, expressed concerns about appropriate traffic control.
Granite's representatives inquired as to whether they could use pre-cast concrete barriers,
rather than plastic barrels, to separate the construction area from the motoring public.
Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer, requested that Granite's representatives
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prepare and submit a written proposal regarding the use of concrete barriers.
(Preconstruction Conference Agenda at p. 8; Chuck Lindsay Depo. at pp. 10-11)
13.

On or about March 20, 1996, Chuck Lindsay, acting on behalf of Granite,

wrote a letter to Kent Nichols proposing the use of pre-cast concrete barriers to "channel
traffic and protect our workers, UDOT employees overseeing the project, and the traveling
public." Mr. Lindsay's letter noted that "traffic would be very close to [Granite's employees'
work] and they would be virtually unprotected without the concrete barrier." Mr. Lindsay's
letter indicated that the proposed use of concrete barriers would allow the construction to
proceed at a faster pace, thereby resulting in an estimated net savings of approximately
56 days of construction time. The net additional costs associated with the use of concrete
barriers were estimated by Granite to be approximately $540,475.00. (3/20/96 Letter
attached hereto as Exhibit 10)
14.

After receiving Granite's 3/20/96 written proposal, Kent Nichols wrote a

memorandum dated March 21,1996 to UDOT Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, P.E.,
and included with the memorandum a copy of Granite's proposal.

Mr. Nichols'

memorandum stated that he shared in Granite's concerns regarding the safety of this
project, and requested that Granite's proposal "be given serious consideration." (3/21/96
Memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit 11)
15.

On or about March 26,1996, a meeting was held between Granite and UDOT

representatives at UDOT's Region One office. During that meeting, Granite proposed a

8

new traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project, again requesting the use of precast concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels. The details of Granite's proposal were
formalized in a letter dated March 29, 1996 from Chuck Lindsay to Kent Nichols. Mr.
Lindsay's 3/29/96 letter requested that consideration be given for the new traffic control
plan for "the safety of our workers, UDOT employees, and the traveling public." Mr.
Lindsay's written proposal estimated that the net additional cost for the proposed changes
would be approximately $767,885. Granite's 3/29/96 proposal also stated that the
proposed changes would result in the project being completed 28 days earlier than
required under the original contract. (3/29/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 12)
16.

Kent Nichols received Granite's 3/29/96 proposal, and reviewed the proposal

with UDOT's Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. In a letter dated April 2, 1996, Kent
Nichols responded to Granite's proposal, stating that Dyke LeFevre had considered
Granite's cost breakdown and that Mr. LeFevre felt that "as [the proposal] stands he does
not feel that we could get approval." Mr. Nichols indicated that justification for the traffic
control plan could be made only if the additional costs for the proposal were below
$450,000 and would result in at least a 50 day reduction in the overall time needed to
complete the entire construction project. Mr. Nichols indicated that UDOT was "not closing
the door on this proposal" and requested that Granite review certain items in an attempt
to lower the price of the proposed traffic control plan changes and to determine whether
the project could be hastened because of the proposed changes.
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Mr. Nichols

acknowledged that the proposed change to the traffic control plan "has merit" and
indicated that he would "present a request for additional money to the Commission" if
certain criteria were met. (4/2/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 13)
17.

In a letter dated April 11,1996, Granite responded to UDOT's 4/2/96 letter,

stating that "in our judgment we cannot meet the criteria established by UDOT to justify a
change in the traffic control plan." Granite's letter indicated that with UDOT providing
certain equipment, the cost of the proposed traffic control plan changes could be lowered
to approximately $490,000, but that Granite could not promise any additional time savings
beyond 28 days. Granite's 4/11/96 letter concluded by stating that Granite "will proceed
with the original traffic control plan established by UDOT." (4/11/96 Letter attached hereto
as Exhibit 14)
18.

On or about July 2, 1996, after work had commenced on the Layton-

Clearfield Project, Chuck Lindsay once again wrote a letter on behalf of Granite to Kent
Nichols at UDOT asking for approval of the proposal to use pre-cast concrete barriers on
the Layton-Clearfield Project. (7/2/96 Letter attached hereto as Exhibit 15)
19.

On July 2,1996, after receiving Chuck Lindsay's 7/2/96 letter, Kent Nichols

forwarded a memorandum to his superiors, Stan Nielsen, P.E., Region One Construction
Engineer, and Dyke LeFevre, P.E., Region One Director. This memorandum, which was
also copied to Clint Topham, P.E., UDOT Deputy Director, voiced concerns about "serious
problems with control of traffic and providing safety for our contractor's workers as well as
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our own personnel." Mr. Nichols requested that his superiors review and give "serious
consideration" to pre-cast concrete barriers and traffic cross-overs in order to maintain
safety. (7/2/96 Memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit 16)
20.

Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the use of

pre-cast concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT management
personnel, including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and rejected the
proposal based upon the same cost-benefit considerations that motivated the prior
decisions to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers. (Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre,
H1J17-18)
21.

Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract for the Layton-Clearfield

Project, Granite was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired
in order to carry out the joint repair and slab replacement in the Layton-Clearfield Project.
(Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 11, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 17)
22.

Pursuant to the terms of the UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed the

contractor to select the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan
would be implemented and enforced. (Randy Hunter Deposition at p. 14)
23.

Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to the terms of

the UDOT/Granite contract, Granite could have provided pre-cast concrete barriers for the
Layton-Clearfield Project at its own cost, but chose not to do so. (Chuck Lindsay
Deposition at pp. 11-12; Affidavit of Dyke LeFevre, U 19)
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24.

Granite's 3/20/96,3/29/96, and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised concerns

over the speed limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that the speed limit
be reduced from 65 m.p.h. to 55 m.p.h. throughout the construction zone. (See Exhibits
10, 12, 15)
25.

While the posted speed limit in the construction zone at the time of the

September 14,1996 accident was 65 m.p.h., temporary orange advisory speed limit signs
had also been posted throughout the construction zone with an advisory speed limit of 50
m.p.h. The Utah Highway Patrol officer who investigated the accident stated in his
accident report and again during his deposition that these 50 m.p.h. advisory speed limit
signs were posted throughout the Layton-Clearfield Project at the time of the accident.
(Greg Lundell Deposition at pp. 38-39, relevant pages attached hereto as Exhibit 18. A
copy of the police report showing the posted speed limits and advisory speed limits at the
time of the accident is attached hereto as Exhibit 19)
26.

On or about September 14,1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle

accident within the confines of the Layton-Clearfield Project when his car left the traveled
portion of the highway and entered into the construction zone where it collided with one
or more holes created as part of the ongoing slab replacements. (Amended Complaint fflf
9-11)
27.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly

sustained in the 9/14/96 accident, and alleges that UDOT and Granite "were negligent in
12

one or more of the following particulars:"
(a)

"The defendants failed to adequately warn of the condition of the
roadway."

(b)

"The defendants failed to properly control freeway traffic in the area."

(c)

"The defendants failed to adequately barricade and/or provide a safe
lane of travel to the [plaintiff] and other motorists."

(d)

"The defendants failed to properly train, supervise, or otherwise
control their particular agents, servants, or employees in aspects of
traffic safety and construction zone traffic control."

(e)

"The defendants failed to comply with applicable regulations
concerning traffic control and construction zone safety for the type of
construction occurring in the area."

(f)

"The defendants specifically failed to use jersey barriers, flaggers, or
other appropriate warning devices, failed to provide a safe zone
between the lane of travel and the construction area, and failed to
adequately illuminate the dangerous condition."

(Amended Complaint, fl 12)
28.

Plaintiffs Amended Complaint also alleges that Granite was acting as "the

agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT and therefore, the negligence of Granite would be
imputable to UDOT. (Amended Complaint, ffl| 3, 13)
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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT SHOULD ALL BE DISMISSED AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The allegations of plaintiffs Amended Complaint against UDOT can be grouped into

the following three categories:
1. UDOT was negligent in designing a proposed traffic control plan
which used plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers to separate the
motoring public from the construction zone;
2. UDOT negligently failed to implement and follow the proposed
traffic control plan as it was designed, and failed to properly inspect or
monitor the construction zone during the ongoing construction to ensure that
the highway remained safe for the motoring public; and
3. Plaintiff alleges that Granite was acting as an agent of UDOT, and
therefore, UDOT would be liable for any negligence attributed to Granite.
As will be shown below, each of these claims must fail as a matter of law.
A.

UDOTs Design of the Traffic Control Plan Was a Discretionary
Function Subject to Protection under the Governmental Immunity
Act.

Regardless of whether or not plaintiff is correct in alleging that UDOT was somehow
negligent in designing the proposed traffic control plan or authorizing the use of barrels
rather than concrete barriers as the principal means of traffic channelization on the LaytonClearfield Project, any claims against UDOT based on those allegations must be dismissed
14

under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides that, "[e]xcept as may otherwise be
provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function

" Utah Code Ann. §

63-30-3 (1997) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a three part test
that is used to determine whether this grant of governmental immunity is applicable to a
specific situation, stating:
To determine whether a governmental entity is immune
from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
(the Act), three questions must be answered: (1) Was
the activity undertaken by the entity a governmental
function and therefore immunized from suit under the
general grant of immunity contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-3? (2) If the activity undertaken was a
governmental function, has another section of the Act
waived the blanket immunity? (3) If immunity has been
waived, does the Act contain an exception to that
waiver resulting in a retention of immunity against the
claim asserted?
Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618, 619-20 (Utah 1995).
In the present case, the claims against UDOT arise out of UDOTs involvement in
a highway construction project. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "the
construction and maintenance of state highways can only be performed by governmental
agencies." Id. at 620. Therefore, there can be no question that any UDOT activity
associated with the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed a "governmental function"
which falls under the general grant of immunity offered by the Governmental Immunity Act.
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The next step is to determine whether some part of the Governmental Immunity Act
operates as a waiver to UDOTs general grant of immunity. UDOT acknowledges that
such a waiver likely exists in Section 63-30-8 of the Governmental Immunity Act which
states:
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
Since this case involves a claim for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a
"defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of [a] highway," it would appear that Section 6330-8 operates as a waiver of UDOTs claim of immunity.
Because UDOTs immunity appears to have been waived by Section 63-30-8, the
Court must next determine whether any of the "exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 6330-10" are applicable to the facts of this case. UDOT contends that the "discretionary
function" exception, set forth in Section 63-30-10(1), would be applicable to any claims
arising out of UDOTs design of the proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield
Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers to
channel traffic. If the discretionary function exception is applicable, the Court must
conclude that UDOT is immune from liability for any claims alleging negligence in the
design of the proposed traffic control plan.
The discretionary function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act states as
16

follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment except
if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused]
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (emphasis added).
Keegan is particularly relevant to the present case because that case also involved
claims against UDOT, and the Utah Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment
should have been granted in favor of UDOTbecause certain UDOT decisions regarding
a highway construction project were immune from liability under the discretionary function
exception. 896 P.2d at 625-26. In Keegan, a motorist was killed when his car climbed a
concrete median barrier and collided with a bridge support pillar. Id. at 619. The victim's
estate brought a wrongful death action against UDOT, arguing that the state negligently
failed to maintain the concrete barrier in a reasonably safe manner, and alleging that,
although the barrier had originally been constructed in accordance with the prevailing
safety standards, two subsequent surface overlay projects had shortened the barrier's
height, rendering it unsafe. Id. UDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
decision to not raise the barrier during resurfacing was a discretionary act that should be
shielded from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. The trial court denied
UDOT's motion and a jury verdict was ultimately entered against UDOT.
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On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed the discretionary function exception
and concluded that UDOTs actions should have been deemed immune from suit as a
matter of law. Id. at 623-26. The Court began its analysis by looking at the reasoning
behind the discretionary function exception, stating:
Discretionary function immunity under section 63-30-10 is
designed to "shield those governmental acts and decisions
impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforseen
ways from individual and class legal actions, the continual
threat of which would make public administration all but
impossible." In keeping with this purpose, this court has
distinguished between discretionary and nondiscretionary
decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question
involves the formulation of policy or the execution of alreadyformulated policies. This court has held that the discretionary
function exception "should be confined to those decisions and
acts occurring at the 'basic policy-making level,1 and not
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the
operational level . . . 'which concern routine, everyday
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors.'" The
reason for such a rule is plain, given the purpose of the
discretionary function exception: "Where the responsibility for
basic policy decisions has been committed to one of the
branches of our tri-partite system of government, the courts
have refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety of those
decisions."
Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).1
In order to clarify and create some consistency in the application of the

1

The Court noted that, in other cases, it had found the discretionary function exception
applicable to "decisions concerning placement of railroad warning signs" and "the design of a city flood
control system." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (citing Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 219,
469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970); Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992); Rocky Mountain Thrift
v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989).
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discretionary function exception, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the following fourpart test "to determine whether a given decision or act qualifies for a discretionary function
exception":
1. "Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily
involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective?"
2. "Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the
realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective?"
3. "Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental
agency involved?"
4. "Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the
challenged act, omission, or decision?"
Id. at 624.
When this four-part test was applied to the facts in Keegan, the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that the decision to not raise the concrete barrier fell within the scope of
the discretionary function exception. Id. First, the "decision involved a basic governmental
objective: to wit, public safety on the roads." Id. Second, "the decision was essential to
the realization of that policy; it involved a determination of not only the degree of safety
that would be provided by various options considered, but also what degree of safety
would be an appropriate goal given time and cost constraints."2 Id. Third, "the decision

2

The Court noted that, prior to submitting the design plans to the Federal Highway
Administration for approval, a safety study was performed and the project design engineer prepared a
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involved the basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency involved," noting that
"studies of the plan, its cost, and the degree of safety it would provide were carried out by
senior engineers and circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id.
Finally, the Court concluded that UDOT had the authority to make this decision since the
legislature has provided UDOT with "general responsibility for statewide highway... and
transportation planning, research and design, construction, maintenance, security and
safety." Id. {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-49-4(1)).
Based on its application of that four-part test to the facts at issue in Keegan, the
Utah Supreme Court stated that, "[i]n essence, UDOTs decision involved just the sort
of policy-driven weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function
exception was meant to protect" Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624 (emphasis added). The
Court went on to state that:
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominantly
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made safer
by further expenditures, but we will not hold UDOT (and
implicitly, the legislature) negligent for having to strike a
difficult balance between the need for greater safety and the
burden of funding improvements.
Id. The Court concluded by stating:
UDOTs decision not to raise the concrete barrier during the
surface overlay projects was not an operational decision
involving the negligent installation or maintenance of a traffic
device, but rather involved a policy-based plan, approved by
cost-benefits report that looked at the safety factors, the cost of removing and replacing the barrier, and
the added delays and inconvenience to highway users that would be created by replacing the barrier.
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624.
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the [Federal Highway Administration], which resulted from a
considered weighing of the costs and benefits of certain safety
and construction policies and which involved the exercise of
UDOT's judgment and discretion. Accordingly, we hold that
the decision not to raise the concrete barrier was a
discretionary act shielded from liability under section 63-30-10.
Id. at 626. Based on that conclusion, the trial court's denial of UDOTs motion for summary
judgment was reversed. Id.
UDOT contends that the facts and ruling in Keegan should be controlling in the
present case. Plaintiff, however, may argue that Truiillo v. UDOT. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah
App. 1999), is applicable to this case. Although the facts at issue in Truiillo are arguably
similar to both Keegan and the present case, the evidence presented to the court in Trujillo
makes that case easily distinguishable from Keegan and the present case.
Truiillo involved a construction project where a divided highway which usually had
four lanes of traffic - two eastbound lanes and two westbound lanes - had been shut
down on the eastbound side for resurfacing work. 986 P.2d at 755. To accommodate the
traffic traveling in both directions, those vehicles traveling eastbound were channeled onto
the westbound side of the highway which was temporarily used to provide one lane of
traffic moving in each direction. Id. The eastbound traffic was separated from the
westbound traffic by temporary double yellow lines painted on the road, and the placement
of plastic construction barrels spaced at 100-foot intervals. Id. The plaintiffs in Trujillo
were injured when a westbound vehicle veered into the eastbound traffic and collided head
on with the plaintiffs' motor home. Id. The plaintiffs brought claims against UDOT and the
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contractor alleging that they were "negligent in the design, supervision, and
implementation of the traffic control plan," and specifically that they "negligently failed to
install concrete barriers to prevent crossover accidents in the area where the Trujillo's
accident took place." Id. at 756. The claims against UDOT were dismissed by the trial
court on a motion for summary judgment which argued that UDOT was shielded from
liability by the discretionary function exception. Id.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals followed the same analysis which had been
used by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan, and came to the conclusion that UDOT had
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, as a matter of law, that its allegedly
negligent acts and decisions qualified as discretionary functions. The evidence before the
court established that the "[p]lans for the entire .. . project were drafted, formulated, and
approved in a series of meetings and reviews over the course of approximately one year,"
and that the participants included "Federal Highway Administration representatives; UDOT
maintenance, engineering, design, and administrative personnel; and several city and
county officials." Id. at 756. The court also noted, however, that "the record contains no
evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically singled out for discussion,
review, or approval at any point in the approval process." Id. Based on this lack of
evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that UDOT had failed to meet its burden
of proving, as a matter of law, that its formulation of the traffic control plan at issue in
Trupillo fell within the scope of the discretionary function exception, and therefore, the grant
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of summary judgment was reversed. Id. at 761 -63.
UDOT contends that the facts surrounding this case fall squarely within the Utah
Supreme Court's holding in Keegan, and that Truiillo is easily distinguishable. It is
important to note that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Trujillo made no attempt to
limit, restrict, or modify the rule of law followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Keegan.
Instead, the analysis applied in Truiillo was the very same analysis that was applied in
Keegan. The only reason the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that summary judgment
was not appropriate in Trujillo was because UDOT had failed to present sufficient evidence
to the trial court to establish that its decisions surrounding the traffic control plan were
made at the policy making level, and therefore, within the scope of the discretionary
function exception. In the present case, however, there is an overwhelming amount of
undisputed evidence establishing that UDOT's decisions concerning the traffic control plan
on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the decision to use plastic barrels rather than
concrete barriers, were singled out, separately analyzed, and made at the highest level,
and that those decisions, like the decisions in Keegan, were precisely the types of "policydriven" decisions that are shielded under the discretionary function exception of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
Prior to pursuing bids on the Layton-Clearfield Project, UDOT researched traffic
control alternatives, including consulting with the Federal Highway Administration, before
preparing a proposed traffic control plan which included the use of plastic barrels as the
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primary channeling device. While that proposed traffic control plan was initially prepared
by UDOTs traffic engineers, the decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete
barriers was ultimately considered and made by UDOTs upper management. Specifically,
that decision was initially made by UDOTs Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre. As the
Region One Director, Mr. LeFevre was the individual who oversaw all traffic related
matters for the entire northern portion of the state. When considering whether to use
plastic barrels or concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, Mr. LeFevre weighed
several key factors, including: (1) the safety of project workers and the motoring public; (2)
the costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and (3) the overall impact
on traffic congestion that would result from increasing or decreasing the project completion
time. As part of Mr. LeFevre's decision-making process, he consulted with UDOT Deputy
Director, Clint Topham, the chief traffic engineer for Utah who had the final say on all
transportation related engineering decisions. Mr. LeFevre also consulted with officials
from the Federal Highway Administration about the use of plastic barrels rather than
concrete barriers on similar projects in other states. Based on those consultations, and
after considering all of the safety, cost, and time factors, Mr. LeFevre decided that barrels,
rather than concrete barriers, should be included in the proposed traffic control plan for the
Layton-Clearfield Project.
After the contract for the project was awarded to Granite, the barrel versus barrier
issue resurfaced when Granite requested on several occasions that the contract be
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modified to include the use of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the construction
zone. In at least two different meetings, and in at least three different letters, Granite's
representatives specifically asked UDOT to authorize the use of concrete barriers rather
than plastic barrels for greater project safety. Granite presented UDOT with different
proposals as to the estimated additional costs and time savings associated with the use
of concrete barriers. It is important to note that Kent Nichols, the UDOT Project Engineer
overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project, agreed with Granite's safety concerns, and
recommended that UDOT approve the use of concrete barriers. The decision, however,
was not Mr. Nichols' to make at the operational level of the project; rather, the decision
was for UDOTs policymakers to make.
Each of Granite's requests concerning the use of concrete barriers were forwarded
to Dyke LeFevre and other members of UDOT's upper management for consideration. On
each occasion, Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management considered and weighed
the safety considerations against the cost and time factors. In the end, Mr. LeFeFevre
concluded that the safety and time factors did not outweigh the additional costs associated
with using concrete barriers, and therefore, Granite's proposals were rejected.3
The undisputed facts surrounding UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather
than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly establish that those
3

It is Important to note that UDOT never prohibited Granite from using concrete barriers rather
than plastic barrels. UDOT's decisions were simply that UDOT would not modify the contract to pay the
additional costs associated with using the concrete barriers. Granite's representatives acknowledge that
Granite could have used concrete barriers throughout the project if Granite wanted to absorb the
additional costs.
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decisions were policy-driven decisions made by UDOTs upper management. Had those
decisions been made at the "operational level" by the UDOT personnel who were
physically involved with the project on a daily basis, the evidence suggests that UDOT
would have accepted Granite's proposal to use concrete barriers. That was not the case,
however. Mr. LeFevre and other UDOT upper management, after duly considering the
competing safety, cost, and time factors involved, rejected Granite's proposals and the
recommendations of UDOTs own project engineer. There can be no question that these
decisions were policy-driven, and not operational. Therefore, this case falls squarely
within the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Keegan, and this Court should rule, as a matter
of law, that UDOTs decisions surrounding the proposed traffic control plan, including the
decision to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers, are shielded from liability under
the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.
B.

UDOT Was Not Responsible for Implementing the Proposed Traffic
Control Plan, and Is Immune from Liability for Any Failure to Monitor
Granite's Work.

Plaintiff has also alleged that UDOT was negligent in failing to properly implement
the proposed traffic control plan, and in failing to properly inspect or monitor Granite's
implementation of the traffic control plan. These arguments should likewise fail, as a
matter of law, for several reasons.
First, UDOT was not responsible for implementing or monitoring the traffic control
plan. The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project clearly states that Granite was the
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party responsible for furnishing all the labor and equipment necessary to "perform all work"
on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the implementation of the traffic control plan
throughout the project. The contract expressly states that Granite "shall provide, erect,
and maintain barriers, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and shall
protect the work and safety of the public."4 Thus, any claims arising out of the alleged
failure to properly implement the proposed traffic control plan could only be brought
against Granite. There is no basis for imposing any duty or liability on UDOT in regards
to the manner in which the traffic control plan was actually implemented on the LaytonClearfield Project.
In light of this plain contract language, plaintiff also contends that UDOT had a duty
to inspect or monitor Granite's work. Even if that were true, the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act would again shield UDOT from any liability. That statute contains an
exception which states that a governmental entity cannot be held liable for "a failure to
make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection" Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1997) (emphasis added).
UDOT contends that any claim that UDOT failed to monitor or supervise Granite's
work on the Layton-Clearfield Project must be deemed to be an allegation that UDOT
either "fail[ed] to make an inspection" or made an "inadequate or negligent inspection" of

4

The contract for the Layton-Clearfield Project also requires that Granite was to see that "[a]ll
barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices shall meet the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices [MUTCD] for Streets and Highways and Traffic Control
provisions of this specification."
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Granite's work and therefore, would fall within the scope of the Section 63-30-10(4)
exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. In those cases where the Utah appellate
courts have analyzed this "negligent inspection" exception, it has been made clear that this
exception is designed to shield governmental entities who are involved with inspecting the
property and work of third parties for purposes of ensuring public safety. See e.g., llott v.
Univ. of Utah, 12 P.3d 1011 (Utah App. 2000); Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 898 P.2d 265
(Utah 1995); Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp, 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). That is precisely
what plaintiff is alleging that UDOT failed to do in the present case.
Plaintiff claims that UDOT should be held liable because it allegedly failed to
monitor Granite's work or inspect the Layton-Clearfield Project for purposes of ensuring
that the work on the project did not endanger the public. Such a claim falls squarely within
the scope of the "negligent inspection"exception, and therefore, plaintiffs claims against
UDOT based on those allegations must be dismissed as a matter of law.
C.

UDOT Cannot Be Held Liable for Any Negligence Attributable to Granite
or Granite's Employees.

Plaintiffs final basis for attempting to impose liability on UDOT is a claim that
Granite was acting as "the agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT, and that the negligence
of Granite, if any, should be imputed to UDOT. There is absolutely no evidence, however,
to suggest that Granite was an "agent, servant, or employee" of UDOT. The undisputed
facts of this case show that Granite was nothing more than an independent contractor
hired by UDOT to do the Layton-Clearfield Project.
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The Utah appellate courts have long recognized that "Utah adheres to the general
common law rule that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his
servants"' Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999) (emphasis added) {quoting
Gleason v. Salt Lake City. 74 P.2d 1225,1232 (Utah 1937)). Since there is no evidence
to suggest that Granite was anything more than an independent contractor on the LaytonClearfield Project, and since Utah law protects UDOT from being held liable for physical
harm caused by the acts or omissions of a contractor, this Court should rule, as a matter
of law, that UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence.5

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant UDOT respectfully asks this Court to grant
its Motion for Summary Judgment by dismissing the claims against UDOT with prejudice
and as a matter of law.
DATED this \(g

day of October, 2002.
STRONG & HANNI

^ ^ - - ^ t e p h e n l j . Trayner
H^ScotfJacobson
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT
It should also be noted that, if Granite were somehow deemed to be an agent or employee of
UDOT for purposes of this case, then the Utah Governmental Immunity Act would also apply to any
claims or allegations against Granite.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Ik

day of October, 2002, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT UDOT's MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Erik M. Ward, Esq.
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS

635 25th Street

Ogden, UT 84401

4495.008

30

m
x
X

5
H

Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
H. Scott Jacobson, #8469
STRONG & HANN1
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT
Nine Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7080

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DYKE LEFEVRE

V.

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH,
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY,
JOHN DOES l-V,

Civil No.: 970700411
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

'SS

I, DYKE LEFEVRE, being first duly sworn, do state as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of all the information set forth in this affidavit.

2.

Prior to retiring in 2000, I worked for approximately 39 years in various

positions at the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDO"T).
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For management purposes, UDOT has divided the entire state of Utah into

four geographical regions. Each of these Regions are headed by a single "Director" who
is responsible for overseeing all transportation related matters for that particular Region.
(A map of Utah showing these different regions is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit 1).
4.

From 1989 to 1990, and again from 1995 until retirement in 2000, I was the

Director of UDOTs Region One, which included the northern-most part of the state,
starting in Farmington. As the Region One Director, I was personally in charge of all
transportation related matters for that geographical region.
5.

During my tenure as Region One Director, it was decided that certain joint

repair and slab replacement work needed to be done on portions of Interstate 15 running
through Region One in the Layton/Clearfield area. This particular project was identified by
UDOT as Project No. IM-15-7(191)332 (hereinafter the "Layton-Clearfield Project").
6.

At some point prior to September 26,1995, the Layton-Clearfield Project was

let out for bid, and the contract for the project was later awarded to Granite Construction.
7.

UDOTs initial bid specifications that were given to prospective contractors

for the Layton-Clearfield Project included a proposed traffic control plan which called for
the use of plastic barrels as the primary channeling devices to separate the motoring public
from the construction zone throughout most of the Layton-Clearfield project.
8.

Throughout the various phases of the Layton-Clearfield Project, several levels

of UDOT personnel were involved in the decisions, design, supervision, and actual
completion of the work, including the following individuals:
-2-
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(A)

Clint Topham was involved as UDOT'S Deputy Director.

As the

Deputy Director, Mr. Topham was the chief engineer for the entire
state of Utah, and had the final say on all transportation related
engineering decisions. Mr. Topham was the immediate supervisor to
each of the Region Directors, including myself, at the time of the
planning, development, and completion stages of the LaytonClearfield Project. The only official above Mr. Topham in the UDOT
hierarchy was the UDOT Executive Director, who reported directly to
the Governor of the state of Utah.
(B)

Stan Nielsen was the UDOT Construction Engineerwho oversaw all
road construction projects in Region One. Mr. Nielsen reported
directly to me as to the status of all Region One construction projects,
including the Layton-Clearfield Project.

(C)

Kent Nichols was the UDOT Project Engineer who was assigned
directly to the Layton-Clearfield Project, and who was specifically
responsible for monitoring the completion of the project. Mr Nichols1
responsibilities included supervising other UDOT engineers and
inspectors who were involved with the Layton-Clearfield Project on a
daily basis, and coordinating the project with Granite Construction, the
general contractor who was ultimately selected to complete the
Layton-Clearfield project.
•>
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(An organizational chart showing the UDOT hierarchy from the Executive Director down
to the Region Directors is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit 2.)
9.

In addition to the above-identified individuals, the Region One safety and

design engineers worked together with officials of the Federal Highway Administration
(uFHAn) to develop a proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield Project.
10.

While the basic design of UDOTs proposed traffic control plan for the Layton-

Clearfield Project was a standard plan that was used on nearly all highway construction
projects, the decision to use plastic construction barrels rather than concrete barriers as
the primary means of traffic channelization throughout the project was something which
underwent substantial scrutiny, and was ultimately decided by UDOTs upper management
and FHA officials.
11.

All facets of the proposed traffic control plan, including the use of plastic

barrels rather than concrete barriers, were reviewed and ultimately approved by the FHA.
12.

Prior to the Layton-Clearfield Project, I had discussions with FHA officials

concerning the use of plastic barrels for channelization on similar jobs in other states, and
these discussions led me to believe that the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield
Project would be an appropriate means of channeling traffic in a manner that was safe for
both the motoring public and the construction zone workers.
13.

The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers in

the proposed traffic control for the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after
consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham.
-4~
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14.

Several factors were considered in my decision to use plastic barrels rather

than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, including the following key factors:
(A)

The safety of project workers and the motoring public throughout the
construction zone;

(B)

The financial costs associated with using plastic barrels versus
concrete barriers; and

(C)

The impact on the public and traffic congestion by increasing or
decreasing the overall time to complete the project.

15.

My duties as the Region One Director required me to balance the safety

factors, cost factors, and other factors on every project, including the Layton-Clearfield
Project, in order to ensure that the projects were completed as safely as possible and as
fast as possible, and to ensure that all of this was accomplished with the limited funds
available.
16.

After considering each of the above-stated factors, and after consulting with

Clint Topham and FHA officials, I concluded that plastic barrels were the most appropriate
option for the Layton-Clearfield project.
17.

After the contract for the Layton-Clearfield project was awarded to Granite

Construction, several requests were made by Granite Construction for additional funding
from UDOTfor the purpose of using concrete barriers rather than plastic barrels to channel
traffic throughout the construction zone. Granite Construction's requests included written
proposals that were forwarded to me, and which outlined the additional financial costs and
-5-
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time savings that would be associated with the use of concrete barriers.
18.

In response to Granite Construction's subsequent proposals regarding the

use of concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, I considered the same safety,
cost and time factors that had been considered previously, and ultimately I concluded that
the safety and time considerations could not justify the additional financial costs that UDOT
would be forced to incur if it accepted Granite's proposals.

As a result, Granite

Construction's proposals were rejected.
19,

Although UDOT rejected Granite Construction's requests for additional

funding for concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's contract with Granite
Construction which prevented Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at Granite
Construction's own expense.
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day of October, 2002.

4^r^
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UJ£B£/^

)

:ss

On this / ^ day of October, 2002, before me personally appeared Dyke LeFevre,
known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person who executed the foregoing
document.

Notary Public
PATRICIA A. HOESEL
NOTAM PUBLIC • STATl of UTAH]
W WORTH WALL AVEKUC
O60GN.UT 04112
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968243

THIS AGREEMENT, made and executed in Four (4) original counterparts this m
day of
(H(UMJJ^
A.D. 1995 between the Utah Department of Transportation, hereinafter called "Department," first
party, and Gibbons and Reed Company hereinafter called "Contractor," second party.
WITNESSETH, That for and in consideration of payments, hereinafter mentioned, to be made by the Department, the
Contractor agrees to furnish all labor and equipment; to furnish and deliver all materials not specifically mentioned as being furnished
by the Department and to do and perform all work in the construction of Joint Repair and Slab Replacement in Davis County, State
of Utah, the same being that section of South Layton to SR-193 identified as 1M-15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19 approximately 5.852
miles in length for the approximate sum of Four Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Nine and
00/100 Dollars ($4,998,249.00).
The Contractor further covenants and agrees that all of said work and labor shall be done and performed in the best and most
workmanlike manner and in strict conformity with the plans, and specifications. The said plans and specifications and the notice to
contractors, instruction to bidders, the proposal, special provisions and contract bond are hereby made a part of this agreement as
fully and to the same effect as if the same had been set forth at length herein.
In consideration of the foregoing premises, the Department agrees to pay to Contractor in the manner and in the amount
provided in the said specification and proposal.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have subscribed their names through their proper officers thereunto duly
authorized as of the day and year first above written.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Attest:

L^hjd.
Y'j'L^

Directo/of Transportation - First Party

Gibbons and Reed Company

by.

ou

William C Dorey, Senior V i c e P r e s i d e n t
Title'

PROCESSED BY

APPROVED

P|U|g;pM

Director of Finance

HF FINANCE

22-225800
Utah Contractor License Number
FUNDS AVAILABLE

/0-Z7~<?£
Budget Officer

Date

^%\

107.4 Federal Aid Participation: When any Federal laws, rules, or regulations are in
conflict with any provisions of a federally assisted contract, the Federal requirements shall
prevail, take precedence, and be in force over and against any such conflicting provisions.
If there is Federal participation in the cost of the Contract work, the work shall be under
the supervision of the DEPARTMENT but subject to the inspection and approval of the
proper officials of the United States Government Inspections made by authorized Federal
representatives shall not make the United States Government a party to the Contract and
will not interfere with the rights of the contract parties.

107*5 Public Convenience and Safety: Construction shall be conducted so obstructions
to traffic are minimized. The safety and convenience of the public and the protection of
persons and property shall be provided as specified under Subsection 104.6: Maintenance
of Traffic. The safety provisions of all laws, rules, codes, and regulations applicable to the
class of work being performed shall be followed.
107.6 Barriers, Barricades and Warning Signs: The CONTRACTOR shall provide, erect,
and maintain barriers, barricades, lights, signals, signs and other traffic control devices, and
shall protect the work and safety of the public. Highway sections closed to traffic shall be
protected by barriers and barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated during darkness.
Warning signs shall be provided to control and direct traffic.
The CONTRACTOR shall erect warning signs at locations where operations may interfere
with the use of the road by traffic, and at all intermediate points where the new work
crosses or coincides with an existing road. Warning signs shall be constructed and erected
in accordance with the traffic control plan. Signs, barriers, barricades, lights, or other
protective devices shall not be dismantled or removed without permission of the
ENGINEER.
All barriers, barricades, warning signs, lights, temporary signals and other protective devices
shall meet the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways and
Traffic Control provisions of this specification.

107.7 Not Used:
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

CRAIG JOHNSON, a minor by
and through his guardian
ad litem, Tonni Carpenter,

CIVIL NO. 970700411 PI
DEPOSITION OF:
RICK PARKIN

Plaintiff,
Held June 14, 2000
vs .
REPORTED BY:
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS &
REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-V,
Defendants.

Deposition of RICK PARKIN, taken on behalf of
the Plaintiff, at 849 West Hillfield Road, Layton,
Utah, commencing at 9:00 a.m. on June 14, 2000,
before RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in
and for the State of Utah, pursuant to Notice.
* * * *
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PARKIN,

EXAM BY WARD

A

Sure .

Q

The answer?

A

Yes.

Q

Was the full complement of workforce there

when you arrived or did the workforce grow over time?
A

It grew over time.

Q

Do you know why?

A

Yes.

j

I mean, when a project just gets

going, yo u got a couple guys getting -- things start
slow, and as you progress into the project and then
you get into the meat of the project, you know, you
gear up with - - I think we had forty something people
at one

point.

Q

Okay.

So the project started effectively

;

in March?
A

It was around the last week of March, I

|

believe.
Q

And when did it end?

When was it

completed ?
A

We didn't complete until 1997, about

August.
Q

And do you know how that timetable matches

the contract timetable?
A

It was planned to complete in —

calendar year, 19 -- the year 1996.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

within one

However, due to
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PRECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCE AGENDA
FEBRUARY 21. 1996
9-30 A.M.
Region One Conference Room
169 North Wall Avenue
Ogden. Utah
PROJECT NO:
PROJECT Name:
CONTRACTOR:

Project No. IM-15-7C19D332
SOUTH UrrON TO SR-193 JOINT REPAIR & SLAB REPLACEMENT
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY

INTRODUCTIONS OF UDOT PERSONNEL
Project Engineer:
Field Engineer:
Chief Inspector:
Traffic Control:
E.E.O. Officer:
Survey:
Survey
Sampling & Testing
Office Manager:
Region Constr. Eng.:
Region EEO Officer*
Civil Rights Office:
Region Design Eng :

Kent A. Nichols
Kevin Griffin
Philip Paskett
Philip Paskett
Susan Peterson
Everett Ovard
Don Carter
Dennis Berglund
Jim Cottrell
Stan Nielsen
Lloyd Hunt
Charles K. Larson
Bruce Swenson

UDOT MAILING ADDRESS HAS BEEN CHANGED TO:
PO BOX 12580
OGDEN. UTAH 84412
Phone
399-5921
PROJECT OFFICE LOCATION:
3544 Lincoln Place, Suite "E"
Ogden, Utah 84403
Phone* 621-6162
FAX: 627-3014
INTRODUCTION OF CONTRACTORS PERSONNEL
Grant Fowkes. Project Superintendent
John Egbert, General Manager
Chuck Lindsay. Project Engineer
J. Lynn Walker, Operations Manager
Ethel Taylor Ogden Office, Shoulder Work/Paving & Roadway Ex.
Brad Sweet. Ogden Office. Engineer
Gary Siddoway. Ogden's Operations Manager
Ray Korth. Ogden*s General Manager
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PAGE TWO
CONTRACTORS HAILING ADDRESS & PHONE NO.
Gibbons & Reed Company
1111 Brickyard Road
P 0 Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
Phone: 486-2411
FAX: 487-1603
SUBCONTRACTOR'S
DONNA CLARK, NORTHEAST TRAFFIC. TRAFFIC CONTROL & FLAGGING
Phone No's: 774-0292 & 540-1765
CONTROL OF WORK
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The Project is to be completed in 140 WORKING DAYS. Time charges will be
made on a working day basis. Delays caused by weather will be taken into
consideration, a percentage will be computed or at least 0.15 will be
charged.
Project Bid Price is $4.998.249.00.
The contract was awarded on
Contractor received the notice to proceed OCTOBER 26. 1995
Normally time charges begins 10 days from the notice to proceed starting
but. because of winter weather conditions, time charges will start March
1. 1996 according the specifications.
The Contractor will begin work when weather permits.

PARTIAL ESTIMATES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Monthly estimates will close on the Saturday after four week of work
performed.
Estimates to Contractors with assigned estimate closing dates WILL HAVE
PRIORITY over any additional estimates.
All estimates will close a minimum of two (2) working days prior to
estimate preparation by the Project Engineer in order to obtain all the
necessary information and documentation for pay quantities.
Estimates found to be in error, either by the Project Engineer or the
Contractor, will be adjusted IN FULL on the next estimate date.
Estimates WILL BE delayed for payment if the Contractor's or any
Subcontractor's payrolls or Monthly EE0 Reports are not received within
the prescribed time period. The Estimate WILL NOT be paid until payrolls
and monthly EE0 Reports are current and ^re found acceptable by the
Project Engineer.
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Page Three
SUBCONTRACTS
The following provisions will be required on each subcontract submitted:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Five (5) copies of the subcontract properly signed by both parties must be
submitted to the project engineer before the subcontractor can begin work
on the project.
Attach UDOT form R-872 to all five copies of each Subcontract
Agreement.
A copy of both Contractors licenses are to be attached to the agreements.
DBE subcontractors items are not to be completed or performed by the Prime
or any other subs. UDOT will not pay for the work.
Subcontractors are not to perform any work on the project until the
subcontract's agreements have been submitted and approved by the Project
Engineer.
Percentage of work sublet is found by dividing the contract amount into
the total of the contract unit bid prices, not the prices paid to the
subcontractors. The total amount of work sublet cannot exceed 502 of the
contract.
List of subcontractors are:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

A-CORE INC
BIDWELL MAINTENANCE
EVERLAID GROUTING
FLASHER BARRICADES
HIKIAU & ASSOCIATES
J.O. MCNEIL CONST CO.
MARK RITE LINES OF MONTANA
NORTHEAST TRAFFIC CONTROL
PAVEMENT SPECIALIST

SAWCUTTING
CRACKSEAL & RESEALING
SLAB JACKING & FLOWABLE FILL
TEMP. STRIPE. REMOVAL & PLOWABLE MARKERS
PERM. SIGNS & DELINEATORS
PRECAST CQNC. BARRIER
EPOXY PAINT STRIPE
TRAFFIC CONTROL & DEVICES
SURFACE GRINDING

DISADVANTAGE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (see Appendix A)
Item (A) Contract Goals, paragraph 2 states the following:
Project Office received the letter from Gibbons and Reed requesting substitution
for Pacheco Corp to insert Bidwell Maintenance. Project Office faxed a copy to
UDOT Civil Rights Office to obtain their opinion. Their response is no
substitutions only if Pacheco cannot reform, which no work has begun, so it is
not possible to tell until they begin work on the job.
Project EEO Officer. Susan Peterson asked the Comractor (Chuck Lindsay) what
they have decided to do. Chuck stated that they would let it go with Pacheco.
Percentages for bidding purposes shall be calculated using dollar values and
quantities as shown in proposals received for this project, and percentages for
compliance shall be based on final estimate invoice quantities. Overruns or
underruns individual contract items may required adjustments in predetermined DBE
percentage for project if those items were not related to DBE performance.
The contract goals are 12X for DBE participation.
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PAGE FOUR
The D8E Letter of Commitment is on file with both The Civil Rights Office and the
Project Engineer's Office. PERCENT IS 11.09.
The Prime Contractor is not to assist a DBE subcontractor in any way. by lending
or leasing equipment or employees. The DBE is to lease or rent equipment from
a bona fide rental company. The DBE is to be independent from any other
business. Prime Contractor or other subcontractors.
PAYROLL REQUIREMENTS
Payrolls are to be received by the project engineer within 7 days following the
date of payment. The contractor is responsible for the timely submission of any
and all subcontractor payrolls.
U.S.D.Q.T. LABOR COMPLIANCE MANUAL
Payrolls and Records - A certified copy of each weekly payroll must be submitted
by the prime contractor and each subcontractor within 7 days after the regular
payment date thereof. Payrolls must be complete.
Delay in submittal of payrolls will result in delay in processing payment
estimates. The prime contractor is responsible for the submittal of payrolls by
subcontractors.
All basic records pertaining to the payrolls, including time cards, must be
preserved for a period of 3 years after completion of the contract.
Subcontracts - (see p.10 of UDOT Labor Compliance Manual). The prime contractor
is responsible for the subcontractor's adherence to labor compliance regulations.
The UDOT has no direct contract with the subcontractors and will resolve all
labor compliance matters with the prime contractor. This can result in the prime
contractor being responsible for restitution of wages due for the violation of
one of the subcontractors. Required labor provisions (FHWA 1273) as well as wage
rates must be physically attached to each subcontract. (This is referred to on
Form R-872).
Laborers and mechanics employed by the prime contractor and subcontractors are
covered by the contract provisions, but employees of material suppliers are not.
Employees Working in More that One Classification - The contractor must record
on the payroll those cases where an employee works in more that one
classification. When an employee works in more that one work classification,
they must be paid separate wage rates. However, the contractor may pay the
higher of the two rates if desired.
OVERTIME - All hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week must be paid at one and
half time the basic wage rate. The term "basic wage rate" means the straight
time hourly rate actually being paid Fringe benefits are not paid at one and
a half times the rate, when an employee works in more that one classification
for the week and works over 40 hours, his overtime is figured on a "weighted
average" - unless the employer can prove that he has informed each employee prior
to the employee going to work, how overtime will be paid, (see sample attached).
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Page Five
The Contractor is to provide the Project Engineer's Office with this
documentation regarding overtime payment. The employees of the contractor or
subcontractor must be informed before the project begins in writing how they will
be paid for the overtime they have worked.
WEIGHTED AVERAGE OVERTIME - SEE EXAMPLE
Donna Clark. Northeast Traffic Control had questions regarding the weighted
average and asked for information to be sent to her.
If you or any of your subcontractors have any questions regarding payrolls,
contact
Susan Peterson
Phone: 621-6162
This can help you alleviate the expense of submitting Supplemental Payrolls with
required corrections.
Be alert to any and all Wage Rate Modifications regarding this contract. It is
the contractors responsibility to obtain the necessary information of any
classification not listed in the proposal form the governing union/agency
involved. This information must be submitted to the project engineer and
attached to the Certified Payroll when it appears for the first time.
A copy of Plate No. 24 (attached sheet 5) will help in payroll preparation.
EEO REQUIREMENTS
Project EEO Officer is: SUSAN PETERSON
The contractor's company EEO Officer is

Phone: ( 801 ) 621-6162
.

1.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN- Gibbons and Reed Company have ^r\ approved plan on
file with Civil Rights only one copy is required. Another copy is required
to be placed on the project bulletin board. Gibbons and Reed submitted
their plan at the meeting.

2.

INTERVIEWS OF RANDOM WORKERS will be taken at least monthly to determine
the actual wages paid, the proper classifications, and familiarity of the
workers with the contractor's EEO policy and officer. If the Contractor
places the Employees' Fringe Benefits in an approved plan, each employee
is to have knowledge of the worth of the program.
U.S.D.O.T. LABOR COMPLIANCE MANUAL p. 30 & 31
508-5
Interviews of Contractors' and Subcontractors8 Employees:
Systematic spot interviews are to be conducted by the project engineer
with the employees of the contractor or subcontractors on the job to
establish that the minimum wage and other labor standards of the
contract are being fully complied with and that there is no
misclassification of labor or disproportionate employment of
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Page Six
apprentices, etc. STATEMENTS HADE BY AN EMPLOYEE. WHETHER ORALLY OR
IN WRITING. MUST BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL SO AS TO AVOID DISCLOSING
THE EMPLOYEE'S IDENTITY TO HIS EMPLOYER WITHOUT THE EMPLOYEE'S CONSENT.
COMPLAINTS MUST BE TREATED CONFIDENTIALLY.
DISSEMINATION OF EEO POLICY-MONTHLY EEO MEETINGS
The letter EEO-1. was submitted to the Contractor restating the Provisions
of this contract requiring the contractor to conduct meetings with his
supervisory and office employees BEFORE THE WORK STARTS ON THE PROJECT, and
not less than once very six (6) months, at which time your EEO policies and
their implementation will be reviewed and explained. A copy of the minutes
MUST be submitted to the project engineer's office within five--(£)-days
following the meeting. Susan requested that the Contractor notify her of
the meetings, that she can document them. The subcontractor may attend the
rime's EEO Meetings or conducted their own. However, the meetings need to
e consistently held during the duration of the project.
MONTHLY EEO MEETINGS shall be given on the project site each month.
a.

The contractor shall invite UDOT's project
representative to attend these meetings.

b.

Copies of these minutes shall be submitted to the project engineers
office which is to have the employees signatures attached to the
minutes for proof of attendance.

4. PROJECT BULLETIN BOARD

engineer

or his

(Letter EEO-2).

Location of the EEO Bulletin Board will be determined after the project has
started, they will inform the project office of it's location. The contractor
was informed that the bulletin board must be accessible 24 hours a day and cannot
be place inside a trailer.
The following information must be constantly displayed and accessible on a
bulletin board at the project site;
1.
2.
3.

Contractor's EEO policy.
Wage Rates (as found in the contract proposal).
WH-Publication 1921. Notice to employees working on federal or
federally funded construction projects.
4.
Equal Opportunity is the Law (Bi-lingual).
5.
Form PR-809. Wage Rate Information (Bi-lingual).
6.
State of Utah. Utah State and Federal Laws Guaranteed Equal
Opportunity Employment (Bi-lingual).
7.
Penalty poster, PR-1Q22
8.
Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of company and/or project
EEO and Safety officers.
9.
Emergency phone numbers (hospital. Doctor. Sheriff. Etc)
Lloyd Hunt the District EEO Officer will present the Contractor with the above
mentioned posters.
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Page Seven
5.

MONTHLY EEO REPORT Submittal of the Form PR-1391 see the attached letter
EEO-3 and the attached forms. Susan requested of the Contractor to close
out the month on the 25th. that they can be submitted in a timely manner.
She reminded them they are due in the Civil Rights Office on the 6th of the
Month.

6.

HARASSMENT. INTIMIDATION AND COERCION A STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT IS TO
BE SIGNED BY ALL THE CONTRACTOR'S AND SUBCONTRACTOR'S WORKING ON THE
PROJECT SITE that these situations will not be tolerated. A SAMPLE IS
ATTACHED. THIS IS TO BE SENT TO THE PROJECT OFFICE TO BE PLACED ON
FILE. Susan informed the Contractor that the roster would be checked
against the payroll to make sure all employees have signed this
statement.

7.

Training - the contract has setup 4.000 hours of training (see letter EED-5)
wherein we need a letter from the Contractor stating what trades will be
utilized and how many trainee etc. Mr. Nichols asked the Contractor if he
has thought about this. The response what yes. and they will be submitting
a letter. Susan complemented the Contractor on his performance on the
Antelope Drive project where they exceeded the goal.

TRUCK HAULING REGULATIONS - LETTER PREVIOUSLY SENT TO THE CONTRACTOR
This regulation mostly applies to owner-operators, if they are hired to work on
the job all the information is to be sent to the project office prior to working
on the project. (Vehicle Registration, Fuel Permits etc.) Susan informed the
contractor to make sure all truck drivers have registration and legal drivers
licenses as well.
ACCIDENT PREVENTION PLAN
Required are 5 copies. 24 HOUR EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE TO BE INCLUDED
IN THE SAFETY PLAN.

SAFETY MEETINGS - WEEKLY
The contractor shall submit to the project engineer a copy of his weekly safety
meeting minutes. Said copy shall show the employees signatures of those
attending. The Contractor was requested to invite the project inspectors (Phil
Paskett) that they also could document the meetings.
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Page Eight
TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS
Any change other than those in the Traffic Control Plan must be approved ahead
of that phase of construction by the project engineer.
The contractor Grant Fowkes stated that he had major concerns about controlling
the traffic especially during the peak hours which really restricts their time
between Monday thru Friday and the fact that there is nothing between the
individuals out there doing the work and the live traffic, which makes us awfully
nervous. Since this job was bid the speed limited has been increased from 55 MPH
to 65 MPH. so we are wondering about precast concrete barriers? For us to be as
efficient and productive as possible we are looking at working Saturdays and
Sundays because we won't be dealing with peak hours traffic. Even with that on
Saturday and Sunday it will only have one lane open for the motoring public which
will create major traffic congestion problem. He stated that they will be
working two shifts, day and night shift. -2 ten hour shifts. Stan Nielsen asked
if there would be some nighttime operations. Grant answered yes, therefore they
would like to put of barricades to protect the workers.
Kent Nichols requested that Grant put this proposal in writing and couple things
that you have stated the shifts, days working in and the amount of area that you
plan to be working in at any given time.
Grant stated that they are planning to propose to close off the full length of
the project.
Stan Nielsen made comments about the mobile barrier used down by Lagoon the
mobile transporter machine if that would be something they could used.
Grant stated that there is also problems in using barricades: one. is the off
and on ramps and the other, is when you put traffic over onto the shoulder and
that lane, then you are restricted to 2 ten foot lane verses 10 to 12 ft lane so
that also could propose a problem also.
There was a discussion about the various problems of closing off lanes and
problems with the bridge decks. They discussed stretching out the project may
cause problems. Contractor stated that if they closed down the full 6 miles they
could do the job quicker and more cost effective.
Kevin Griffin stated the best interest of the public was considered in the design
they intended that the Contractor as they were starting their full depth test for
slab replacement would leave that section either barrelled off or barrier
protected until it has cured its 7 to 8 day strength, then put traffic back on
it. Then only have the section closed off which is needed for the curing
purposes for the curing period for that time. That is what was originally in the
traffic control plans.
There was more general discussion on the traffic flow problems of bottle necking
and proposing to work the weekends which -also causes problems with the union
labor agreements for the contractor. Kent concluded by requesting Grant Fowkes
to make a formal proposal for the change in traffic control plans for his
approval.
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Page Nine
MATERIALS
UDOT Minimum Sampling And Testing Requirements.
Concrete mix designs must have a history of breaks attached.

LIST OF SUPPLIERS:
Contractor had a problem with bid item no. 60 ASPHALT CEMENT AC20R VISCOSITY
GRADED ASPHALT, which requires PBA-50 that is not available. Contractor was
requested to write a letter if is not changed on the plan sheet. Kent will check
with Charles Mace. Materials Engineer.

The contractor submitted a list of Suppliers as follows:
Concrete:

unknown

Asphalt: AC-10
PBA-50
SS-1H PHILLIPS
LIME CONTINENTAL
AGG. G&R SO OGDEN PLANT
MISCELLANEOUS CONCRETE PRODUCTS: ?
ATTENUATORS:

INTERWEST SAFETY

8RIDGE EXPANSION JT: WABO EXPANDEX JOINT EXPANSION SYSTEM
WATSON BOWMAN ACME
PIPE CULVERT:

AMCOR

SPECIAL PROVISIONS & PUNS:
Ray Korth representing Gibbons and Reed ask a question of Kent Nichols about the
outside shoulders, there is a place in there that restricts having that open to
3.000' at any one time and are you going to holds us to that. Mr Nichols
responded that he would have to look at n . because it could be detrimental to
the whole project and he didn't know what the real reason was for it. Mr Korth
further explained that all they going to do is take off 3 1/2" of asphalt and of
couple of inches of gravel and putting asphalt back. It wasn't their intent to
take out the whole thing and leaving "the whole thing open, they would like to
work progressively. Mr. Nichols asked Mr. Korth to give him a breakdown on what
they would like to do and he take a look at it and advise him of his discission.

nni'Via
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Page Ten
Mr. Korth stated that another problem is the inside shoulders are only five feet
wide which presents another problem he asked Mr. Nichols to entertain the idea
of excavating the shoulders out and pulverize it and place the waste material in
the median. Mr, Nichols said he would entertain that idea. Mr. Korth stated
that their objective is to get the job done because that is going to be a slow
process. The outside shoulders is alot more material and placing wasted
materials in the median. Phil Paskett interjected that putting the material in
the median would effect the water system because that is where all the drainage
goes. Mr. Nichols stated that they would have to look at the depth because you
would be mixing it this some other materials, but we would have to look at it and
then make a discission,
Mr. Korth had a another question on the outside shoulder materials and asked if
there was a possibility that they could stockpile the removed asphalt in a couple
of the interchange areas. Mr. Nichols asked them to submit a proposal and he
would present it to the powers to be and then he would informed them of the
discission. Mr. Korth stated that there are two or three probable locations.
Mr. Nichols responded that they would look at each separate location if it was
possible. Mr. Korth asked if was UDOT's intent to redhead the shoulders and if
it would be alright for them to use the concrete as control. He also stated they
would like to use a lazer to control the cross slopes, it would make less work
for UDOT. Mr. Nichols agreed that they could use it. Mr. Korth stated that they
need to check on a mix design for the shoulders and inform the state of his
findings.
Mr. Stan Nielsen cautioned the Contractor when saw cutting the joints to be
careful with the runoff and not blow the joints off towards the traffic.
Phil Paskett. UDOT Inspector had a concern about the epoxy and sealant materials
to be pretest and approved before placing into the project because there is such
a variety that have been pretested but not pre-approved.
Grant Fowkes stated that their vendor should have all the testing and approval
done, and they plan to stay with one type of material. He also asked about the
specifications for those that do the epoxy injection are to have two years of
experience and they do not intend to sub that out. They have personnel in their
own company that could do the procedure. Mr. Nichols stated that they need to
produce a letter and then he would look at it and give them a determination.
Grant Fowkes asked about the delamination of the bridge deck and entertain the
idea of shotcrete for the repairs on the bent caps in those areas where the rebar
is exposed yerses the use of epoxy injection. They have receive alot of
information from the World of Concrete on cleaning, blasting and preparing of the
concrete. They attended technical seminar in Las Vegas. Mr. Nichols asked them
to prepare a letter that they could submit to UDOT'S Structures Division.
CHANGE ORDERS
No comments or questions were made.
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Page Eleven
PARTNERING:
Mr. Nichols siated that he would assume this would be a continuation of their
last job on Antelope Drive and he suggested a half of day conference may be
appropriate. After the discussion, it was agreed that no additional partnering
sessions would be held.
PERFORMANCE RATING:
Stan Nielsen. Region One Construction Engineer, informed the Contractor of the
rating system and complimented them on their past performances. Mr. Nichols
stated that he nominated Grant Fowkes and did receive the award.
CIVIL RIGHTS - DBE COMMITMENT
Charles Larson. Civil Rights Manager made the comment regarding the request of
substitution mentioned earlier that they are very reluctant to make changes only
when the DBE is unable to perform. He stated that the Federal Highway's
Administration is of the same opinion, therefore they would not agree to a change
order, only when the circumstances prove that the DBE is unable to perform.
START DATE:
Grant Fowkes stated that they anticipated starting the first of April. Mr.
Nichols stated that was fine as long as the temperatures were high enough.
Standard Specification state time charges will begin on March 1st. Ray Korth
stated that they were do the shoulder work. Mr. Nichols stated that they would
look at the charges if preparatory work is done only partial time would be
charged. Mr. Korth stated that they would be prepared to lay asphalt on the
first of April. Mr. Nichols stated that he would work with on the time charges.
Phil Paskett requested that the Contractor get the mix design in for approval
some of them take as long as six weeks.
MEETING ADJOURNED AT 10:35 A.M.
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1

Q

Did you in this case?

2

A

I believe at the beginning of the project we

3

discussed the use of jersey barrier or K-rail, as I'm

4

accustomed to calling it in California.

5

of the project that discussion was had from UDOT and

6

Granite Construction Company personnel at the outset of

7

the work.

At the beginning

8

Q

And UDOT didn't want to do it?

9

A

I think it was--I wasn't actually in the

10

meeting that they had.

It was a pre-conference meeting,

11

pre-construction conference.

12

but I know that it was discussed.

13

that it was decided that we wouldn't use it.

I wasn't at that meeting,
And my recollection is

14

Q

Are jersey barriers more expensive to use?

15

A

Than?

16

Q

Barrels.

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

So if the plan came back to use barrels and

19

then Granite wanted to switch to jersey barriers, then by

20

necessity it would mean an increased cost to UDOT,

21

wouldn't it?

22

A

Correct.

23

Q

When did you first find out about this

24
25

accident?
I

A

It was in the early morning hours, Monday, that
35
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1

Q.

And did you in the preconstruction meeting

2

go through the traffic control plan so that everybody

3

understood that concept of more lanes open during peak

4

hours than non-peak hours?

5

A.

Yes, we did.

6

Q.

Was there any discussion at that time that

7

you recall about the use of Jersey barriers versus

8

barrels as protective devices to use when you had

9

those open holes?

10

A.

There was discussion.

I can't remember if

11

it was in the preconstruction meeting or if it was

12

with Kent Nichols before or after.

13

Q.

After you got started?

14

A.

I think there was discussion before we got

15

started.

16

Q.

Can you tell me what you recall about that

17

discussion?

18

A.

I remember Grant Fowkes and I approached

19

Kent Nichols.

20

there was even discussion in the preconstruction

21

meeting or not.

22

And like I say, I can't remember if

We told him that working behind the barrels,

23 I we thought, was unsafe for the workers, especially
24 | without a reduced speed limit, and -- you know, had
25 1 several discussions.

And he said, Well, give us a

** KAPRICE GUNN, RPR, CSR **
Depomax Reporting Services, LLC
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1

proposal of what you 'd like to do different; then,

2

because 1the job was set up - - bid that you have the

3

barrels, and you had to work behind them, so that they

4

can be easily moved.
And then p rior job s, like this one, they'd

5
6

used Jersey barrels there --

7

Q.

By "they," you mean?

8

A.

Other cont ractors, other projects.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

And this one was new where -- working behind
So we maLde several proposals to

11

barrels like that.

12

the state, and the response was always that they

13

didn't h ave the mone y to do it with Jersey barriers.

14

And they 'd keep comi ng back and saying, Is th ere

15

anything you can cut ?

16

to where we couldn't go any lower.

17

it's not acceptable, and you'll have to do it the way

18

the job is set up.

19

Q.

And they tried to get it down
And they said, No,

So it was an issue of the state's - - they

20

didn't d isagree that you -- it would be appro priate to

21

use Jersey barriers; they just thought it was too much

22

money?

23

A.

Right.

24

Q.

And in talking to somebody from the state,

25

they sai d they didn'-c tell you you couldn't use jersey
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1

barriers; they just said they wouldn't pay for it.

2

Does that ring a bell?

3

A.

4

option.

5

Q.

Yeah, as a contractor, we probably had that

Did that get discussed among the Granite

6

management, that, hey, the state's not willing to pay

7

for this, but we better do it anyway?

8
9

A.

The job was bid that way, and that's

the way we pursued with the job.

10
11

No.

Q.

Had you had training in the development of

traffic control plans prior to this project starting?

12

A.

I did have a card at the time saying that I

13

could act as a traffic control supervisor.

I had gone

14

through training with the state, with an agency.

15

Q.

16

state does?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Anything besides that?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Do you know how to read a traffic control

22

A.

Yes, I do.

23

Q.

Okay,

L e t me g i v e you a t

least

applicable

to our s i t u a t i o n .

This

21

That's the -- is that a one-day course the

plan?

24

that's

25

was

provided

by

the

state

as

a copy

of

the
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1
2

Q

So Chuck Lindsay was the second guy and Jim

Keyes was the third guy?

3

A

Right.

4

Q

Anybody else?

5

A

They were the basic key guys on the job.

6

Q

And when did you initiate or when did they

7

initiate the contact?

8

to discuss generally how things were going to occur?

9

A

Was it before construction started

Well, we have a pre-construction conference

10

after we know who is going to get the bid and after the

11

bid is awarded and a notice to proceed is received.

12

we have a pre-construction conference and discuss those

13

things.

Then

14

Q

Who comes to the pre-construction conference?

15

A

We invite the contractor.

We invite his

16

subcontractors that he wants to bring.

17

to him.

18

UDOT, materials people.

19

invite the traffic engineering people.

We then have people from various departments in

20

Q

21

their job?

22

A

That would be up

We invite the safety people.

What are traffic engineering people?

We

What is

Why do they get invited?
We have several, but we have a traffic engineer

23

in the region and I don't know all his duties.

24

I have a problem, I go to him.

25

total duties.

Whenever

But I can't speak for his

10
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SINCE 1915

1111 Brickyard Read
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429

Utah Department of Transportation
P.O. Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412

March 20,1996

Telephone (801) 486-2411
Fax (801) 487-1603

Attention: Kent Nichols
Re: Project No. IM - 1 5 - 7 (191) 332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to S R - 1 9 3

Kent:
As discussed in the preconstruction conference for this project, we would like to
propose the use of precast concrete barriers to channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT
emloyees overseeing the project and the traveling public. These barriers would be used in lieu
of the plastic drums and channelizing devices on the traffic control phases in the plans and
specifications. The speed limit in this section of 1-15 has been raised from 55 MPH, at the time
of bid in September 1995, to 65 MPH. Our concern is for the safety of our workers and UDOT
employees. Traffic would be very close to their work and they would be virtually unprotected
without the concrete barrier.
Attached is a rough sketch of how we propose to place the barriers in three phases and
use asphalt crossovers in the median at the south end of the project and end approximately at
station 660+00 at the north end. From station 660+00 northward to the end of the project, work
would be accomplished with drums and traffic control as outlined in the drawings and
specifications. This would be required due to the excessive elevation difference between the
northbound and southbound lanes at that portion of the project.
The barrier footage was calculated by installing barrier through the entire project
northbound and southbound. In Phase II and Phase III approximately 18,500 If of barrier would
be removed to allow an area approximately 1320 foot in length at each offramp and another
1320 foot at each onramp. The traffic would be channeled through the on and off ramps with the
use of plastic drums. UDOT's traffic engineers will need to specify what might be needed at
these locations. We would propose message boards at each end of the project to advise the
motoring public that some phases will have an express lane that will not have an exit
throughout the entire project and that they will have to travel in mandatory lanes to be able to exit
1-15 between Kaysville and Clearfield.
In evaluating this plan, we would change our schedule from the one proposed at the
preconstruction meeting, ie., working Saturday through tuesday double shift; to working seven
days per week behind the protection of the concrete barrier. This would reduce the calendar
weeks that traffic control would be restricting lanes from 35 weeks to 20 weeks. A savings of
105 days However, it would take much longer to set, move and remove the concrete barrier.
We estimate an additional 40 days that would need to be added to the contract time. There
would still be a net savings of 56 days that traffic would not be disrupted, provided that the repair
quantities do not overrun. Using concrete barrier would eliminate the problems with peak traffic
hours by providing two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times.

Attached is a breakdown of the estimated cost to change to concrete barriers on this
project. It has been assumed that all the concrete barrier is stockpiled and available at UDOTs
District 1 Yard. We also request, whether this proposal is accepted or not, that throughout this
project the speed limit be reduced to 55MPH, as it was when the project was originally bid. If
you have any questions please call me at 231-5780 We need a decision as soon as possible so
we can advise our subcontractors and suppliers when work will begin on this project.

GIBBONS £ REED

COMPANY

1111 BRICKYARD ROAD
POST OFFICE BOX 30429
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84130-0429
TELEPHONE 801 486-2411 FAX 801 487 1603
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2-Z&-96,

COST PROPOSAL - CONCRETE BARRIER

CONCRETE BARRIER1. LOAD, HAUL & INSTALL
2. MOVE BARRIER ONSITE
(ONE LANE)
3. REMOVE & STOCKPILE
AT DIST. 1 YARD

56.500LF @ 2.75

$ 155,375.00

56,500LF@1.75

$

56,5000 LF @ 2.75

98,875.00

$ 155,375.00

SUBTOTAL

$ 409,625.00

2000 TON® 16.00
650 TON @ 23.00
1400CY @ 8.00

$
$
$

32,000.00
14,950.00
11,200.00

SUBTOTAL

$

58,150.00

1. MESSAGE BOARD

7200 HR@ 20.00

$

144,000.00

1.CZ ATTENUATORS
( Rental Units )

5 EACH @ 20,500.00

$

102,500.00

$

714,275.00

CROSSOVERS:
1.UTBC (APPROXIMATE)
2. ASPHALT (APROX.)
3. EXC. CROSSOVERS

MESSAGE BOARDS:

"CZ" ATTENUATORS

TOTAL

DELETED & REDUCED BID ITEMS:
1. ITEM # 36 - TRAFFIC SUPERVISOR
2. ITEM # 39 - DRUMS
3. ITEM # 42 - ADV. WARNER
4. ITEM # 43 - STRIPE REMOVE
5. ITEM # 44 - TEMP. STRIPE
6. ITEM # 45 - TR4UCK MOUNTED
ATTENUATOR

(30) DAYS @ 300.00
(120,000) DD@.50
(8,000) HR@ 6.00
(60,000) LF @ 0.08
(73,000) LF @ 0.25
(450) DD @ 75.00

REDUCED ITEM TOTAL

NET CHANGE FOR
CHANGE ORDER
CONTRACT TiME ADDITIONAL - 40 DAYS

( 9,000.00)
( 60,000.00)
{ 48,000.00)
(
4,800.00)
( 18,250.00)
( 33,750.00)

($173,800.00)

$ 540,475.00
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Memorandum

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region One

DATE: March 21,1996
TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Dyke LeFevre, P.E.
Region One Director

Kent Nichols
Project Engineer
Project No. IM -15-7(191 )332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
Attached you will find a proposal from Gibbons and Reed Company to use precast barrier to
channelize traffic and provide protection for the project workers, department personnel, and the
traveling public.
Based on this proposal the contractor would start his operations in the median area. The inside
lane on both the northbound and southbound lanes would be closed off with barrier and the
drainage modifications, shoulder work, and concrete repair on the inside lanes would be
completed.
The northbound traffic would then be moved onto the inside lanes with the inside lane of the
southbound lanes being used as an 'express' lane for the north bound traffic. Openings for the
various off ramps would be provided. The concrete rehabiiition on the two outside northbound
lanes and outside northbound shoulder work would proceed.
When the work on the northbound lanes was complete the south bound traffic would be shifted
into the median area and work on the two outside southbound lanes and outside southbound
shoulder would be completed.
The estimated cost to use control plan would be $714,275.00. The cost savings through
reduction in the amount of some bid items together with elimination of some items be
approximately $173,800.00. The estimated additional cost would be $540,475.00.
There is an overwhelming feeling among the people who will be involved in the contract that
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and
recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration.

Attachment: 4 sheets
cc: Region File
Project File
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction
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EED company SINCE 1915
1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429
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Telephone(801)486-2411

March 29, 1996
Fax (801) 487-1603

Utah Department of Transportation
P. O. Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412
Attention: Kent Nichols
Re:

Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193

Dear Kent:
Following discussions in Tuesday's meeting at UDOT's District One office, we
propose the following traffic control plan for this project. We propose to start the project
using the outside shoulder phasing as per the contract drawings. During this phase the
outside shoulders on the entire project will be excavated and replaced with asphalt. Once the
asphalt shoulders are replaced, precast barrier would be hauled from stockpiles at the District
One yard and installed per the attached drawing. Phasing the work with precast barriers
allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. This would eliminate the need
for peak and off-peak work requirements on the 1-15 portion of the work and allow us to
work more hours to complete the project. The traffic crossovers would be located at the
same locations as proposed in our March 20, 1996, letter. The work north of station
6604-00 would be completed behind drums.
This project allowed a contract completion of 140 work days. Starting the project on
April 15, 1996, and allowing 140 work days @ 5 days per week would complete the project
November 4, 1996, after subtracting the holidays during this period. Using the precast
barrier option we can complete the work by October 7, 1996, a savings of 28 days. This
savings means 28 less days that UDOT would not have inspectors on the project and 28 less
days the traveling public would be subjected to constricted traffic flow.

/

n

Utah Department of Transportation
March 29, 1996
Page Two
Attached is a breakdown of the cost associated with this proposal. There would be a
considerable cost savings if UDOT had the three CZ Attenuators in stock. This savings
would be $78,000.00. An additional savings of $67,200.00 could be recognized if the
crossovers could remain in the median for future projects to the north or to the south of this
project. Temporary striping will be paid for at the contract unit price. We have not allowed
for drainage in the median at the crossover locations.
If this proposal is approved, we will commit to a final completion date of September
30, 1996. In the event we do not complete the work by this date, we would expect
liquidated damages of $2,070.00 per calendar day, per section 108.9 of the 1992 Standard
Specifications. We would expect any weather related shutdown of the work to be added to
this completion date on a day for day basis. We would also expect a bonus of $2,070.00 per
calendar day for each day we complete prior to September 30, 1996.
As we have mentioned in other letters, our concern on this project and the reason for
this proposal is the safety of our workers, UDOT employees and the traveling public. We
also request that the speed limit throughout this project be reduced back to the 55 MPH
speed limit as it was at the time this project was bid regardless of whether or not you accept
this proposal.
Please review this plan and proposal and let us know your intent as to a decision by
April 3, 1996, so we can plan our work and our subcontractors. If you have any questions,
please call Grant Fowkes or myself.
Sincerely,
GIBBON & REED COMPANY
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COST PROPOSAL - CONCRETE BARRIER
CONCRETE BARRIER.
1. LOAD, HAUL S INSTALL
2. MOVE BARRIER ONSITE
(ONE LANE)
3. REMOVE & STOCKPILE
AT DIST. 1 YARD

56.500LF @ 2.75

$ 155,375.00

56,500LF@1.75

$

56.500LF @ 2.75

$ 155,375.00

SUBTOTAL

$ 409,625.00

98,875.00

CROSSOVERS:
1. 10" GRANULAR BORROW 6760 TON @ 10.00
2. 8" UTBC (APPROXIMATE) 5410 TON @ 16.00
3. 6" ASPHALT (APROX.)
4050 TON @ 23.00
4. EXC. CROSSOVERS
8400 CY @ 8.00

$
$
$
$

67,600.00
86,560.00
93,150.00
67,200.00

SUBTOTAL
$ 314,510.00
MESSAGE BOARDS:
1. MESSAGE BOARD

5500 HR @ 20.00

1.CZ ATTENUATORS

3 EACH @ 26,000.00

$

110,000.00

$

78,000.00

$

18,000.00

$

930,135.00

"CZ" ATTENUATORSATTENUATORS:
240 DD @ 75.00
1. TRUCK MOUNTED
( 2 - used at on ramps to save purchase of
2 - C Z Attenuators)
TOTAL

DELETED & REDUCED BID ITEMS:
LITEM #36-TRAFFIC SUPERVISOR (35) DAYS @ 300.00
2. ITEM # 39 - DRUMS
(120,000) DD @ .50
3. ITEM # 42 - ADV. WARNER
('8,000) HR @ 6.00
4. ITEM # 45 - TRUCK MOUNTED
(450) DD @ 75.00
ATTENUATOR
5. ITEM # 28 & 29 (DELETE) & USE BARRIER IN TRAFFIC
CONTROL THEN RESET 800LF AFTER USE.
REDUCED ITEM TOTAL

NET CHANGE FOR
CHANGE ORDER

( 10,500.00)
( 60,000.00)
( 48,000.00)
( 33,750.00)

(

10,000.00)

($162,250.00)

$ 767,885.00
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Stale oi' Utah
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Michael O. Leavitt
Governor
Thomas R. Warne
Execuctive Director
Dyke M. LeFevre, P.E.
Region One Director

REGION ONE
169 North Wall Avenue
PO.Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412-2580
(801)399-5921
Fax:(801)399-5926

Commission
Glen E Brown
Chairman
Todd G. Weston
James G. Larkin
Ted D. Lewis
Hal M. Clyde

April 2, 1996
Gibbons & Reed Company
1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah
84130-0429
Att: Chuck Lindsey
Subject: Project No. IM-15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
Change in Traffic Control Plan
Dear Chuck:
I have reviewed the cost break down in your letter of March 29, 1996 with Dyke LeFevre,
Region One Director and, as it stands he does not feel that we could get approval from the
Commission.
In order for us to justify the proposal for a change in the traffic control plan using user cost
data, the net cost of the change would have to satisfy two conditions: 1) be in the range of
$450,000 or below, and 2) time savings must be at least a 50 days time saving, which is what we
discussed during our initial conversations on this proposal.
We are not closing the door on this proposal and request that you review the following items
for possible adjustment:
1. Concrete Barrier, (load, haul, install, move, and return to Region One yard). We believe that
the cost of this item could be reduced. During one of our conversations I suggested that we
consider Force Account on this item, and most likely a lump sum item would be more
acceptable to our management people.
2V Crossovers, We would suggest that you review the prices for Granular Borrow and
Untreated Base Course material. We believe that the cost to install this material in the crossovers would less expensive than in the shoulder areas.

Page 2
April 2, 1996
3. Message Boards, Could be eliminated but the advanced waniers would remain as originally
bid.
4. "CZ" Attenuators, We are looldng into the possibility of buying the attenuators and using
them on other projects if we can get a change approved.
We believe that this change has merit and will present a request for additional money to the
Commission if the above criteria are met.
Respectfully;

*

Kent A. Nichols,
Project Engineer
cc: Region One File
Dyke LeFevre, Region One Director
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OIBBOnS & REED CDITIPHny SINCE 1915
1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 0429

Utah Department of Transportation
P O Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412

April 11, 1996

Telephone (801) 486 2411
Fax (801) 487-1603

Attention Kent Nichols
Re Project No IM- 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No 19
South Layton to SR-193
Dear Kent
We have reviewed UDOT correspondence dated April 2, 1996 and in our judgement
we can not meet the criteria established by UDOT to justify a change in the traffic control
plan
The net cost of the change itemized in our letter dated March 29, 1996 could be reduced
to approximately $ 572,832 by reducing the cost of 5410 ton of 8" UTBC to $ 12 70 per ton,
leaving the crossovers in place and eliminating the message boards If UDOT were to provide the
CZ Attenuators another $ 78,000 could be eliminated
However, Gibbons and Reed Company can not reduce the time savings beyond the 28
days or alter the other conditions proposed in its letter dated March 29, 1996
At this point, Gibbons and Reed will proceed with the original traffic control plan
established by UDOT We lemain available to continue discussions concerning this matter.

Sincerely,
GIBBONS & REEDJGOMPANY

^hup&f Lindsay
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oiBBons & HEED compnny

SINCE »«
1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429

Utah Department of Transportation
P.O. Box 12580

July 2,1996
Telephone (801) 486 2411

Ogden, Utah 84412

Fax (801) 487-1603

Attention: Kent Nichols
Re: IM-15-7(191)332, 1-15 South Layton to SR-193

Kent:
We have had numerous close calls on this project with vehicles coming into the work
zone. Last early this morning we had a vehicle go through the drums on the south end of the
project on the north bound lanes and drove into and through a full depth slab replacement that
had just been excavated. Minutes before we had workers installing dowels in this area. We
were fortunate not to have workers in the area at the time of the accident. The traffic control
plan along with the speeds people are driving on 1-15 have put our people and UDOT employees
in jepordary every night. This has been a concern of ours before this project ever started and
have made recommendations to change the traffic plan to a safer situation with barrier. We
have also asked for the speed limit to be reduced to 55 MPH, which was the speed limit at the
time this job was bid, which we were told could not be done. Safety of workers has been ignored
and dollars has been the guiding factor.
We request that the peak hour schedule be adjusted one hour earlier in the mornings
and a half an hour longer in the afternoon to allow us to work strictly days starting Monday July
8,1996. By shifting our workers to a daytime operation we will avoid the traffic problems we are
experiencing at night and it will be less confusing for the traveling public during night time hours.
Please let us know as soon as possible as to the changes in off peak hour work hours.
We do plan to change our night crew to days beginning Monday.

^
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Memorandum

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region One
DATE: July 2,1996

TO:

Dyke LeFevre, P.E.
Region One Director

THRU:

Stan Nielsen, P.E.
Region One Construction Engineer

FROM:

Kent Nichols
Project Engineer

SUBJECT:

Project No. IWI -15-7(191 )332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
As you are aware we have had serious problems with control of traffic and providing safety for
our contractors worker as well as our personnel. The traffic is traveling the posted speed limit
which is 65 M.P.H. and this adds to our anxiety level. It must be noted that at the time the
contract was advertised and awarded the speed limit was 55 M.P.H. I believe that it is in our
best interest to post the speed limit back down to the 55 M.P.H. for the duration of this project.
Early this morning we had workmen installing dowels in a section of full depth repair.
Fortunately they left the site of the work to get more dowels, shortly after they left the site a car
knocked down two barrels and was into the work zone. The car ran into the full depth hole and
the momentum of the vehicle was arrested almost completely by its impact with the open face
of the concrete slab. The vehicle did have sufficient momentum to carry it out of the hole but it
came to rest on top of the of the slab on the edge of the hole. There is no doubt that we would
have had people killed but for the fact they were temporarily out of materials.
Because of the type of work we are doing, that is small partial depth repairs, the work is slow
and tedious. And it is made even slower by the fact that we are doing the work at night. With
the near miss that we had last night the contractor is formally requesting that we make the
following minimum changes: that, 1) the restricted peak time hours in the morning be reduced
by one hour in the morning and the peak time hours in the afternoon be reduced by one half
hour (preferably one hour), and 2) the speed limit be reduced to 55 M.P.H. as discussed above.
The contractor feels that he must work in the daylight hours to make the job site safer.
There is an over-whelming feeling among the people who are involved in the contract that
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and
recommend that the proposal to use precast barrier and cross-overs be reviewed and given
serious consideration.
The contractor has hand delivered a letter, copy attached, which echos my sentiments with
regards to the conditions on the project.
This letter will be followed by a Change Order, specification change, to reduce the peak hour
restrictions. The contractor is going to be hard put to complete this project on schedule if some
way isn't found to increase productivity.
Attachment: 1 sheet
cc: Region File
Project File
Clint Topham, P.E., Deputy Director
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
•

*

*

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Civil No. 970700411 PI

Plaintiff,

Deposition of:

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS
Sc REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-V,
Defendants.

RANDY S. HUNTER
Judge Thomas L. Kay

ORIGINAL

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th
day of June, 2000, commencing at the hour of 8:55 a.m.,
the deposition of RANDY S. HUNTER, produced as a witness
at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action before the above-nam^d Court, was
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Publig in and
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward &
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah.

5 2 5 WELLS FARGO PLAZA
/®»l
1 7 0 SOUTH MAIN STREET /%Z®
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 4 1 0 1
(801) 3 2 8 1 188 / 1-800 D E P O M A X
FAX 3 2 8 - 1 1 8 9

1

Q

Slab replacement.

2

A

Replacing a slab of concrete.

3

Q

How do you--I assume UDOT sets out the criteria

4
5
6
7
8

Tell me what that entails.

for how the contractors are to do that.
A

Is that correct?

The design plans here illustrate how the work

should be done or what work should be done.
Q
replaced?

Who decides what concrete is going to be
UDOT or the contractor?

9

A

UDOT.

10

Q

So that would have already been decided before

11

the contractor bid it, wouldn't it?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And so I guess what I'm asking, Mr. Hunter, is

14

is there a method that's described; for instance, do you

15

tell the contractor, "Come out and take out the concrete

16

in this spot, put rebar in, pour it new, and then move on

17

to this spot"?

18

concrete in that six-mile stretch and replace it all"?

19

How much direction is given to the contractor?

20

A

Or do you just say, "Take out all the

These plans are provided to the contractor as

21

to the work we want done.

22

the selection of the contractor.

23

Q

Means and method is totally at

Are there any written guidelines to the

24

contractor as to between--I think you said it was mile

25

post 332 is the start and where was the end again?

Mile
11

for the whole project?
A

Correct.

Q

So is it fair to say that the traffic control

plans in Exhibit 1 are the plans for traffic control that
were in effect at the site of the accident?
A

That is not fair to say.

Q

Tell me why I was provided these then.

A

These are a portion of the package which is put

out for bid that illustrates how UDOT would contemplate
the project being developed.
The contractor is in total charge of the means
and methods of his construction and can certainly change
those at any time.
Q

Were there change orders to the traffic control

plan on that project?
A

I do not know.

Q

How would we find that out?

A

You-have got those people coming in for

deposition today.
Q

Doesn't the State have to approve any changes?

A

Yes.

Q

Well, so is it fair to say then that absent

any change orders that may have existed for this
location, this would be the plan in effect at the
accident site?
14
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STATE OF UTAH. LAYTON DEPARTMENT
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CIVIL NO 970700411 PI
DEPOSITION OF:
GREG LUNDELL

Plaintiff,

vs.

EXHIBITS
Exhibit No.
Marked Discussed
1 Tuo photos
13
13
2 Accident field sketch forn
22
19
3 Tuo photos
28
28

Held November S. 1999

STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION. GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS &
REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I - V.

REPORTED BY:
RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR

Defendants.

Deposition of GREG LUNDELL. taken on behalf of
the Plaintiff, at 849 Uest Hill Field Road. Suite
202. Layton, Utah, cormencing at 1:40 p n on
Novenber 5, 1999. before RENEE L. STACY. Certified
Shorthand Reporter. Registered Professional Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
pursuant to Notice.
RENEE L- STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1186
PAGE 4

PAGE 2

1
LUNDELL, EXAM BY UARD

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

ERIK M UARD
Attorney at Lau
GRIDLEY. UARD & SHAU
635 25th Street
Ogden. UT 84401

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

SCOTT U., CHRISTENSEN
Attorney at Lau
PLANT. QALLACE. CHRISTENSEN
b KANELL
136 East South Tenple
Suite 1700
Salt Lake City. UT 84111

RENEE L. STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1186

1
2
3
4
5
B
7
8
9
10
11

Novenber 5. 1999
1:40 p.n.
PROCEEDINGS
GREG LUNDELL
called as a witness at the instance and request of
the Plaintiff, having been first duly suorn, uas
exanined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. UARD:
Q
Could you give your nane, who your enployer

12

is and what — let's start with that.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A
r n Greg Lundell. I work for the Utah
Highway P a t r o l as a p a t r o l o f f i c e r .
Q
May I c a l l you Greg?
A
Sure
Q
Thank you. Greg, how long have you worked
for the Utah Highway Patrol?
A
I've vorked with the Utah Highway Patrol
about eight years
Q
So — this is *99. You would have started
probably in '91?
A
*92-ish.
Q
'92' Okay.
A
March
REKEE L. STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 326-1188

/
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11-5-99. GREG LUNDELL
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PAGE 37

LUMDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN
Q

1
2

LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

So that was an additional barrel to the

1

left of the channelization barrels?
A

3

That second one. just looking at the

Q

And you have an additional speed underneath

2

the posted speed of 50 niles an hour; is that

3

correct ?

4

picture, it appears to be a different color or fresh

4

A

Right

5

concrete, and it was routine for then to place a

5

Q

What did you intend by that?

6

barrel over the new stuff so their workers wouldn't

6

A

They did post advisory speed Units through

7

run over it

7

this project that were posted at 50

8

Q

8

orange advisory speed, but they still had the 65

9

speed Unit signs as well

9

And on the right-hand side of Exhibit l. is

that a base still upon a barrel?

10

A

I think it's just a black —

well —

the

11

bases are —

12

the barrel —

13

Q

Okay

13

A

Yes and no

14

A

—

14

Q

U h a f s the yes part of it?

IS

Q

Now, in order for this — based on your

yeah, tt would appear to be a base with
you're looking towards the —
edge

1

16

reconstruction of the accident, would it have

17

required this car to leave the travel portion, the

18

narked travel lane to strike the hole, the first

19

hole?

20
21

A

Yeah

Q

Now. in your accident report forn, you

22

indicated on the second page of it —

23

you another question first

24

like at the tine of this accident?
A

25

10

I don't recall

oh

Let ne ask

What was the weather
I think it was —

I nean,

RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 326-1186

Q

They were the

Fron a law enforcenent perspective, at 4:30

11

in the norning in a construction zone, is 70 niles an

12

hour an appropriate speed?

1S

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A
Is it appropriate? It would depend on what
you think your abilities to drive are
Q
Do you think it's a safe speed to be
traveling in that left-hand lane?

A

No

Did you ever have an opportunity to speak
the driver of the vehicle about what happened?
A
Briefly, yes
Q
At the scene?

Q
Wlttl

A

Yes

Q

And what did he tell you at the scene?
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1186
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PAGE 40

PAGE 38
LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

1

it was 4:00 in the norning so I think it was a clear

1

2

night or sonething

2

next thing he knew, he hit one of the holes and lost

3

control

3

Q

The reason I'n wondering

4

A

The boxes are narked, but I couldn't tell

5

—

4
5

you which box shows the weather

A

Q

He said he was just driving along, and the

Nou, you indicated that you had sone

concerns about using concrete barriers

The reason i'n wondering is it looks like

6

A

Yes

7

there's water in the botton of these bases, and the

7

Q

Uere the plastic channel control devices,

8

weather in the picture —

9

photographs were taken

6

Q

and I don't know when these

8
9
10

were those typical lane chanelizations in
construction that you'd see on the freeways four
nonths before then?

10

A

I don't know, either.

11

Q

These color photographs.

11

A

12

A

I don't know

12

Q

Uere there both Jersey barriers and —

13

A

Prior to this project, on the project prior

13

I do not believe there was

any water on the night of the accident.

No

14

Q

That's what I was wondering

14

to this one in the south end in Centerville, they

15

A

They were dry

15

actually had a wall divider

Q

On the second page of your report you

16

16
17

indicated that the est mated travel speed of the

17

18

Johnson vehicle was 70 niles an hour, correct?

Q

Nou. if they use Jersey barriers, those

would have to be placed to tie left of the traffic

18

sean if you're looking at t*e right-hand picture in

19

A

Yes

19

Exhibit 1

20

Q

And the posted speed was what?

20

21

A

Posted speed was 65

22

Q

Nou

as I understand it, that's —

Q

And they would have had to have been placed

22

to the right of the sean on the left-hand picture of

the posted speed is the naxinun

23

Exhibit 1

23

naxinun speed —

speed under best conditions, correct?
A

Yes

the

24
25

21

correct?

A

Yes
RENEE L STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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correct?

24

A

Yes

25

Q

Nou, uould there have been roon enough for
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1186
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STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT UDOT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

CRAIG JOHNSON,

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS & REED
COMPANY, and JOHN DOES I - V,

Case No. 9707004L
Judge Thomas Kay

Defendants.

Plaintiff submits the following memorandum in opposition to ix *• •> d •»•
-' '•.!• • • • • ; .

vp.m \ :<••<

'>i--uini I.II Niiminan Judgment:
FACTS

1.

On or about September 14, 1996, (he plaintiff was seriously injured when his vehicle,

traveling approximately 65 mph, dropped into a 12 inch pavement cut-out on 1-15. See deposition
of Trooper Greg Lundell, pg. 31-38 - Exhibit 1; and accident photos - /\////'// 5.
2.

Dek-inkint >iaie u( i uili, I 'i,ill Department of Transportation ("UDOT") hired

Defendant Granite Construction Company of Utah ("Granite") to perform construction on the section
of I - 1 J ("herein alter ""! awon-t l> ;•'!'•" : i
motion for summary
3.

••

' •; un- :

••iimuea. .Vi-(/'<

judgment.

' : l)01'"s original traffic control pi.in was designed wlini willi a ^Sniph spivd hnnl

De>j >.: .-t .i.iiri. -..ii'ieenons. uie.s|.vcii Imui was 65 mph when the plaintiff was injured.

Seegranite

letter date 3/20/96 and 7/2/96- Exhibit 2.
4.

\ " ':

• :! : u.-.

piaiiLJiledforawhitesolidlinetbllowedby a two foot buffer

zone before the placement of plastic barrels in order to properly separate the temporary travel lane
from the 12 ma

••!•

• .

>'<'Traffic* • >."

'

-

••

.:nesare

open) - Exhibit 3; and deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg. 29 -31 - Exhibit 4.
5.

UDOT's traffic control plan was not followed:
a.

White stripping was not used between the second lane of travel and the
construction cut-outs. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5.

b.

M,!

There was

"^ * ^'weentlv 1 •" • "

the contrary, some of the barrels were placed inside the cut-outs . See picture
- Exhibit 5.
c.

< la the night of the accident, there were missing barrels. See deposition of
Trooper Greg Lundell, pg. 18 - Exhibit 1.

6.

UlJU - persoi n lei w< :M*e si ipervisinj i oi i the project <i :•

>\ere aware Granite was

not meeting the requirements of the traffic control plan. UDOT took no corrective action. See
deposition of UDOT Project Engineer, Kent Nichols, pg. 51 - Exhibit 4; and deposition ofPaskett,
pg. 58 - Exhibit 6.
7.

Although the Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete

barrier^ (< > i l n i ' d r o i t t s t i ncln HI I I i

I he im ifm in; 1 puhl

if t\w\v i i \ e r a M > nn h dn>|i 111 Tin p a x c n i t ' t t l

next to travel lanes, UDOT's Regional One Manager, Dyke LeFevre (herein after "LeFevre") decided
to use plastic barriers, a much cheaper alternative. See deposition ofPhil Paskett, pg. 11-12 - Exhibit
6; see also deposition of < yke LeFevre, pg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7.
8

LeFevre, who had only recently been hired as the Region One Manager, did Ilot

consi lit any of his I JDOrl si iperiol s oi tl ic FT I A regai ding his ii litial < lecision to i ise plastic barriei s
rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfieid Project. LeFevre admitted his decision to use
2

plastic barrels was no different than the tviv oU*.-i --. .inn !».•.. 4:<^ - v?

u

.CMIIICU

there was

ilothing special about his decision 011 this project, and in fact, it was part of his daily duties for
UDOT. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 3, andpg. 91 - 92, andpg. 102-103 - Exhibit 7.
9.

LeFevre •

•

ajr-oneoi itheLayton ( icarhcld project to perform a safety study

on the use of plastic barrels rather than the MUTCD mandated concrete barriers. See deposition of
LeFevre, pg. 60, In 15 - In 21 - Exhibit 7.
10

UDOT plans do not identify the individual who designed the Layton-Clearfield traffic

control plan. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 86-87 - Exhibit 7.
11.

LeFevre < -in m »l IVUICIIIIKT n ho originally recommended the use of plastic barriers

but admits it could have been a lower level employee. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 88-89 - Exhibit
7.
12

In March, shortly after the project had commenced, Granite contacted UDOT's project

engineer requesting a new traffic control plan which used concrete barriers. See letters dated
3/20/96, 3'21'VO, mnl 3 29 96 - Exhibit ;:
13.

Granite's proposal for a new traffic control plan was denied by UDOT's Project

Engineer, Kent Nichols, unless » nnipromises were nudi

I in I ,i\ inn-Clearfield, was Nichols first

project with pavement cut-outs. See letter dated 4/2/96 - Exhibit 2; and deposition of Nichols, pg,
47 - Exhibit 4.
14.

Ii

J:_-

-..-J 'C proposed a "change order" to the existing traffic control plan,

requesting the plastic barrels be replaced with concrete barriers and the speed limit be reduced to the
intended 55 in.r !'• (irunite- M , i^ang sal«M> \ >--\h I - -

l

*»• 'jot i engineer sent the change

order request, with a letter encouraging LeFevre to approve Granite's request; copies of the letter
were sent to other supervisors as well but there is no evidence they were
Seet

. i\

Lv^ . -

•'. • In fed 7/2/96- ! w,.m/2.
15.

There was never a formal response to the proposed change order but UDOT has
3

acknowledged it is the Project Engineer's responsibility to resi
i - . i l / -

»(

/*^

,>.N- ) s '

/• \ ninii

.m<jc on h •: - \ t v ae/h •* .•//. m

7,

I)()'JT"s traffic control plan required that during phase four of the Layton Clearfield
Project, when :•; •••niffs accident occi n i o :1, t! iei e shoi i.l( I have only one open lane of travel in order
to provide distance between the construction cut-outs and the motoring public.
Provision, Supplemental
I xlnh'

Specification

108.4.2.6 - Exhibit 8; and Traffic Contn

See

Special

p

Lr

').
17

f e e t I"-.:

The pavement cut-outs during phase four were 12 inches deep; some were o\vv;i 1 on
' ••-» "**lt

••

I 8.

x

"

-;- • •

' •'

MM >T's field engineer and/or inspector, gave Granite the authority to open two lanes

of traffic during phase four when Granite' s workers \ w * n
M•• • in

\ K- ;.:;k

»t n i 1111 • n MI h i o 11, i 111 < 11 < > i I I 11 ( 1111

i :...,*•.. iiie motoring public was allowed to drive adjacent to the cut-outs with

no barriers preventing their vehicles from entering the gapping holes. See deposition
Keyes, pg. JV» </'
19.

J M«- ?

itn

/ \h, \

ofJimmie

i

The FHA "Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and

Maintenance Work Zones" state that "any dropoff is coi=

.iiir.-iix i-u- -;..tse greater than

?. iin.'lies, left overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential".
Accordingly, the FHA set forth five recommendations as mitigating measures

\\ :>--n .m.-r.

M;

I A\ lon-( T-jiilirlil (iiun'i I. I l|)( )»I t.nlt (1 In follow any of the recommended guidelines pertaining to
pavement dropoffs. See memorandum from US. Dept. of Trans., FHA , dated December 1, 1986 Exhibit 11.
20.

V\ : -,/f was traveling in the second lane of travel, which was opened by IJDO T

during phase four of the construction in violation of their own traffic control plan, when plaintiff's
\ cliiiTr ™ s lire dropped ii><" • '
25-26 - Exhibit

1

nidi reir hurl ion ci it ot it. See deposition of Trooper Lundell, pg.

i,
4

Ii\

In addition to Plaintiffs foregoing statement of facts, which dispute the facts alleged in
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff individually disputes UDOT's "undisputed
facts'" by UDOT's paragraph numbers. Plaintiffs disputes Fact Nos. 3,5,6,20,21,22,23,24,
and 26 as follows:
UDOT's Alleged Fact #3:
The decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to channel traffic throughout this
project area was made by the uppermost officials in the UDOT organization.
Plaintiff disputes this conclusion because it is inconsistent with the evidence. There is no evidence
any of the "uppermost officials" were involved in the decision. After UDOT drafted his affidavit,
LeFevre testified he made the specific decision and does not recall discussing with his superiors. See
deposition of LeFevre, pg. 91, In 13 - pg. 92, In 7 - Exhibit 7.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #5:
The final decision to include plastic barrels rather than concrete barrier in the proposed
traffic control plan was made Dyke LeFevre in consultation with Clint Topham. Several Key
factors were weighed as part of this decision, including the following:
(a)

The safety of project workers and the motoring public;

(b)

The costs associated with using barrels versus concrete barriers; and

(c)

The impact on traffic congestion by increasing or decreasing the overall time
to complete the project

Plaintiff disputes this fact based on LeFevre's deposition which was taken following his affidavit.
UDOT compiled portions of LeFevre's affidavit to form the above misleading statement. LeFevre
testified that he was "not sure he talked to [Topham] specifically about the barrels" in fact, he
"probably [did] not" when he made the decision to eliminate concrete barriers from the proposed
traffic control plan. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 91, In. 13 -pg. 92, In. 7 - Exhibit 7. The only
discussion LeFevre had with Topham occurred after a change order had been requested; during the
5

execution and operation of the already formulated traffic control plan. Moreover, Topham did not
mutually consult on the change order. On the contrary, he left the decision unilaterally to LeFevre
based solely on the costs involved. LeFevre, and others, have testified LeFevre rejected the change
order based on the costs. See deposition of LeFevre, pg. 98 -100 - Exhibit 7.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #6:
As part of UDOT's decision making process, Dyke LeFevre consulted with the Federal
Highway Administration about the use of barrels rather than concrete barriers as channeling
devices
Plaintiff disputes this statement based on the deposition testimony of LeFevre. UDOT's statement
implies the FHA was consulted on using plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. On the
contrary, the FHA was not consulted on the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project
during the initial decision or as part of the change order requested by Granite. See deposition of
LeFevre, pg. 98, In 16 - In 21 - Exhibit 7.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #20:
Following receipt of Mr. Nichols' 7/2/96 memorandum concerning the use ofpre-cast
concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield Project, upper UDOT management personnel,
including Region One Director, Dyke LeFevre, reviewed and rejected the proposal based
upon the same cost-benefit consideration that motivated the prior decision to use plastic
barrels instead of concrete barriers.
Plaintiff disputes this entire statement. There is no evidence that the July change order was reviewed
by upper management. Furthermore, evidence illustrates it was a financial consideration which
motivated the rejection. See deposition of Griffin, pg. 48, 50, In 17- 23 - Exhibit 12; and LeFevre,
pg. 99 - Exhibit 7; also see letter dated 4/2/96 denying concrete barriers based on costs- Exhibit 2.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #21:
Pursuant to the terms ofUDOT/Granite contractfor the Layton-Clearfield Project, Granite
6

was allowed to utilize the means and methods of construction it desired in order to carry out
the joint repair and slab replacement in the Lay ton-Clear field Project.
Plaintiff disputes Granite had exclusive authority. Granite could only utilize the means and methods
which satisfied the extensive, detailed traffic control plan put forth by UDOT. UDOT supervised
controlled the means through financial approval/disapproval and the methods through UDOT
personnel. Only UDOT had authority to alter the traffic control plan which dictated the specific
methods of construction.
UDOTs Alleged Fact #22:
Pursuant to the terms ofthe UDOT/Granite contract, UDOT allowed the contractor to select
the means and methods by which the proposed traffic control plan would be implemented
and enforced.
Plaintiff disputes Granite had the authority to select implementation and enforcement. UDOT
required their inspector, project engineer, etc. be involved at every level of execution. UDOT had
the authority to instruct Granite personnel.
UDOTs Alleged Fact #23:
Granite's own personnel have acknowledged that, pursuant to he terms of the UDOTGranite contract, Granite could have providedpre-cast concrete barriers for the LaytonClearfield Project at is own cost, but chose not to do so.
Plaintiff disputes the implication that Granite was liable for not using concrete barriers. Although
UDOT gave Granite the authority to implement the change order if Granite would bear the costs,
UDOT has acknowledged they never expected Granite would cover the costs of the concrete barriers.
See deposition ofPaskett, pg. 43-44 - Exhibit 11.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #24:
Granite's 3/20/96, 3/29/96 and 7/2/96 letters to UDOT also raised concerns over the speed
limit throughout the construction zone, and requested that the speed limit be reduced from
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65 rn.p.k to 55 m.p.k throughout the construction zone.
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's implication that the 55 mph reduced speed was Granite's creation. On
the contrary, UDOT's traffic control plan was designed with a 55 mph speed limit but the speed limit
was unilaterally increased to 65 mph prior to commencement of the project.
UDOT's Alleged Fact #26:
On or about September 14, 1996, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident
within the confines of the Lay ton-Clear field Project when his car left the traveled portion of
the highway and entered into the construction zone where it collided with one or more holes
created as part of the ongoing slab replacements.
Plaintiff disputes UDOT's factual description of the accident. UDOT's statement that plaintiffs
vehicle left the traveled portion of the highway implies plaintiffs vehicle left the lane of traffic. This
is a highly disputed fact. UDOT failed to mark off their construction zone from the temporary lane
of traffic and thus plaintiff contends his car was actually inside the white dotted traveling lane when
his vehicle's tire dropped into the deep construction cut-out. See pictures attached as Exhibit 5.
ARGUMENT
I.

DISPUTED FACTS PREVENT UDOT'S DISMISSAL
A motion for summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) Moreover, determining whether an act of
alleged negligence qualifies as a discretionary function is "a fact-intensive inquiry that, by its very
nature, is not particularly amenable to summary judgment". Trujillo v. UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah
App. 1999) citim Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) and Rocky Mountain
Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City 784 P2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989).
This case is particularly fact intensive since there are multiple acts of alleged negligence by
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UDOT. Plaintiff has illustrated disputed facts as to how the decision was made to use plastic barrels
on the Layton-Ciearfield project, and by whom. The deposition testimony of UDOTs former
Regional Manager is contrary to the alleged "undisputed" facts made in UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Further, there are disputed facts pertaining to UDOT's refusal to follow

recommendations presented by Granite. Moreover, there is contradicting testimony from UDOT and
Granite employees regarding the anticipated speed limit, the responsibility of mis-placed plastic
barrels, the failure to provide white line delineation and failure to implement mandatory buffer zones.
A jury could determine one or more of these factual disputes was an operational act of negligence
by UDOT. The case is set for ten days of trial with over 15 witnesses due to disputed facts which
must be determined before liability can be assessed. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment fails
to address any of the disputed factual issues of this case, other than their decision to use plastic
barrels. Each negligence allegation, including the decision to use plastic barrels, involves disputed
material facts which are within the province of the jury. In accordance with the disputed facts
enumerated in pg. 1 - 8 of this memorandum, UDOT is precluded from summary judgment as a
matter of Utah law.
II.

UNDER SECTION 63-30-98, UDOT'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS WAIVED
AND THERE IS NO APPLICABLE EXCEPTION TO THEIR WAVIER OF IMMUNITY
Plaintiff stipulates with UDOT's assertion that this case satisfies the first two prongs of the

three prong test developed by the Utah Supreme Court for determining whether the governmental
immunity act is applicable to a particular action. First, the construction of the Layton-Ciearfield
Project is a governmental function under the Governmental Immunity Act. Second, under Section
63-30-08, UDOT's governmental immunity is waived since this action is the result of an injury
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of a highway. Plaintiff disagrees with UDOT's
application of the third prong of the test. The third prong of the test examines whether there is an
exception to the government's waiver. UDOT alleges their actions were discretionary and thus they
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qualify for the discretionary exception enumerated under Section 63-30-10(1). Plaintiff contends
UDOT's actions were not discretionary and UDOT does not qualify for any exception. Plaintiff
maintains UDOT is liable for the plaintiffs injuries because UDOT created an unsafe and dangerous
condition on 1-15.
A.

Dyke LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete barrels was not a
broad based discretionary policy decision

Plaintiff alleges UDOT was negligent for using plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers.
The Manual Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete barriers to protect the
motoring public when performing construction cut-outs deeper than 2 inches. UDOT's personnel
testified they are trained to follow the MUTCD. On the Layton-Clearfield project MUTCD was not
followed. The initial decision to use, less expensive, plastic barrels was made by Dyke LeFevre,
UDOT's regional one manager. UDOT alleges the decision was discretionary. Under Trujillo v.
UDOT, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah App. 1999), LeFevre's decision to use plastic barrels versus concrete
barrels does not qualify as a discretionary function.
In Trujillo, the plaintiffs were injured in a highway construction zone without concrete
barriers. The plaintiffs alleged UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers
was negligent, as well as UDOT's failure to follow the traffic control plan and consider corrective
action recommended by the contractor. The trial court granted UDOT's motion for summary
judgment based on the "discretionary" exception. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding UDOT's actions and decisions were not discretionary.
In the Trujillo case, UDOT relied on Keegan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995); the
same case UDOT is relying on in the present action. In Keegan, UDOT resurfaced a highway three
times. Each time they resurfaced, they formulated a new traffic control plan and presented the
revised plan to the FHA. When resurfacing, UDOT had to consider whether to raise the height of
the concrete barriers. UDOT engaged in extensive measures, involving a significant number of
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senior officials to formulate a broad based policy decision pertaining to the height of previously
installed concrete barriers. First, UDOT hired a safety studies engineer to perform a study of
accident rates in the area where the concrete barrier was erected. Second, the engineer compared
those rates with other roads and compiled his various findings to create a comprehensive safety study
report. The safety studies engineer concluded that leaving the barrier at it's current height would not
adversely affect safety. Third, UDOT hired an engineer to perform a written cost-risk analysis based
on the findings of the safety report. Fourth, UDOT's senior officials debated the issues presented
by the expert reports. Fifth, UDOT presented the proposal to the FHA before carrying through with
further re-surfacing. The court found UDOT's decision process was the "result of serious and
extensive policy evaluation, judgment and expertise in numerous areas of concern", id at 625 citing
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, 842 P.2d 832,835 (Utah 1992). In the case at hand, UDOT failed
to undertake the same extensive policy evaluation which was utilized in Keegan. UDOT's actions
in this case are virtually identical to UDOT's actions inTruiillo.
In Trujillo, UDOT alleged it's decision to use plastic barrels was made after weighing the
relative risks and benefits. UDOT presented evidence of discussions between the project design
engineer and UDOT's region one design engineer. UDOT also presented evidence that the plans and
specifications were approved through a multi-level process; UDOT implied the decision was
considered above the regional level. UDOT maintained they were not required to consult written
studies and relied on Keegan, for the proposition that highway median design and lane separation
are discretionary functions. The court disagreed. The court found the discussions between the
project engineer and the regional one manager, along with the alleged higher-level discussions, did
not rise to the immunized policy-making level. Unlike the facts of Keegan, UDOT did not hire
engineers to study the safety concerns. UDOT did hold meetings with multiple high level policy
makers. UDOT did not have written evidence of policy considerations, nor did not they submit the
particular issue to the FHA. The court held the discretionary exception did not apply.
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Similar to Trujillo, UDOT did not undertake intense scrutiny in this case. As in Trujillo, the
decision was made between the project manager, who had never worked with concrete slab
replacement and traffic before, and the regional one manager, who had been recently hired to the
position. In Trujillo, a low-level unqualified employee designed the traffic control plan. In this
case, UDOT's plans do not even identify the designer. Also similar to Trujillo, UDOT alleges a
higher level of scrutiny took place but fails to establish the assertion with evidence. UDOT's motion
for summary judgment implies LeFevre's affidavit proves he consulted Clint Topham in making the
initial decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. On the contrary, in LeFevre's
deposition following UDOT's submission of his affidavit, LeFevre admitted he had general
discussions about the traffic control plan but he does not recall any specific discussions on the
concrete barrier issue. This is identical to the facts in Trujillo, wherein UDOT illustrated the
approval of the traffic plan underwent a multi-level decision process but their was no evidence, only
suggestions, that the concrete barrier issue was discussed at the higher level. UDOT's actions in this
case fit squarely under the Trujillo case.
The evidence illustrates the decision to use plastic barrels did not involve multiple high level
officials and supplemental studies resulting in a broad based policy decision. On the contrary,
LeFevre admitted his decision to use plastic barrels was no different than the type of decisions he
makes every day. He testified there was nothing special about his decision on this project, and in
fact, it was part of his daily duties for UDOT. Under Keegan, the discretionary function exception
"does not extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level . . . which
concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of board policy factors." _Id. at 623 citing
Carrol v. State, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972). The decision in this case was a typical operational
decision, made by a regional manager after input from his project manager. Topham and Nielson
approved the entire traffic control plan as a matter of procedure, but there is no evidence they were
involved with the decision to use plastic barrels. Similarly, the FHA approved the entire project but
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there is no evidence they took part or even consulted on the use of plastic barrels in the LaytonClearfield project. Moreover, there is no undisputed evidence that anyone, even LeFevre, undertook
extensive evaluation of policy issues. It was only eight years after the decision that LeFevre alleges
he privately weighed policy issues before making the decision. This is not enough to invoke the
discretionary exception. Identical to Trujillo, UDOT's decision to use plastic barrels on the LaytonClearfield project, in opposition to the MUTCD guidelines, does not rise to the level of policy
making discretion.
1.

UDOT's rejection of Granite's change order was part of the execution of the traffic
control plan and was clearly operational.

If the court where to find the original decision to use plastic barrels in violation of MUTCD
was discretionary, the subsequent rejection of Granite's change order requesting barriers wras still
non-discretionary.

In Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished discretionary and non-

discretionary decisions on the basis of whether the decision in question involved the formulation of
policy or the execution of an already-formulated policy, id at 623 citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d
517 , 5919 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, if the court were to find LeFevre's original decision (made
before Granite became involved in the project) was a policy making decision, then clearly UDOT's
decision to reject Granite's change order was an execution of that already-formulated policy. An
execution of an already-formulated policy is non-discretionary. The execution of the traffic control
plan was operational. Granite was complaining of the practicalities involved in the execution of the
traffic control plan and Granite, as well as UDOT's project manager believed the safety concerns
warranted replacing the plastic barrels with concrete barriers. The change order was rejected due to
financial concerns. UDOT admitted they would have approved the change if Granite would have
beared the expense.
The change order was requested based on the daily operational problems Granite was having
with the Layton-Clearfield project; there was no high level consideration or evaluation of broad
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policy factors as required to be considered a discretionary function. Although LeFevre claims to
have had a conversation with Topham about Granite's request, LeFevre testified Topham left the
decision to LeFevre based on costs. The change order was not put in front of the FHA. Once again,
there was no intensive review. The only written communication regarding the change order took
place between Kent Nichols, UDOT's project engineer, and Granite. Thus, UDOT has failed to
illustrate the rejection of Granite's change order was a basic policy-making level decision and UDOT
is precluded from governmental immunity.
B.

UDOT's decision to open a second lane of traffic, in conflict with UDOT's traffic
control plan, was an operational decision which is not subject to immunity

UDOT's traffic control plan for the Layton-Clearfield project indicated only one open lane
of travel during phase four of the construction because of the cut-outs in the road. Utilizing only
one lane would have prevented vehicles from traveling directly adjacent to the open cut-outs.
Plaintiff was injured when traveling in a second lane which should have been closed. Granite's
engineer testified he was given the authority to open the second lane by UDOT's project engineer
and/or inspector.
UDOT's decision to open a second lane of travel, in violation of their traffic control plan was
unarguably an operational decision. It was made by a low-level UDOT employee. There is no
evidence the employee consulted upper management or weighed any policy factors. Thus, UDOT's
operational decision to open a second lane is not subject to the discretionary exception. This act, in
and by itself, precludes UDOT's dismissal, notwithstanding LeFevre's decision to forego concrete
barriers.
C.

UDOT's failure to properly execute it's traffic control plan was operational

UDOT's traffic control plan specified precautions that need to be implemented anytime two
lane of travel were open on the Layton-Clearfield Project. UDOT's traffic control plan required the
two travel lanes to be separated from the construction cut-outs by a solid white line, with a two foot
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buffer zone followed by plastic barrels. The precautions were not implemented. Not only was
plaintiff traveling in a lane which was intended to be closed, but it was a lane which was not
delineated by a white line, a buffer zone or consistent plastic barrels as required by the traffic control
plan.

UDOT was aware of the traffic control plan violations but failed to take corrective action.

UDOT' s personnel worked on the construction project daily. UDOT's agents were hired to supervise
and assist Granite in executing UDOT's traffic control plan. UDOT negligently failed.
UDOT alleges their negligent supervision amounts to "negligent inspection" under Section
63-30-10(4). This exception holds the government immune from "failure to make an inspection or
by making an inadequate or negligent inspection". Yet, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified in
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, (Utah 1993) that this exception "most frequently
arises when the entity undertakes inspections to assure compliance with building, fire, electric and
other safety codes." Ld at 997.
In Ericksen, a governmental construction inspector was inspecting the work of contractors
on city property.

The Utah Supreme Court distinguished between code-compliance inspections

where a government employee inspects the property of a third party versus when a government
employee is inspecting his own employer's property, not for code-compliance, but for compliance
with contractual specifications. Id at 997-998. This distinction was reaffirmed in Nixon v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995). The court found inspection of contractual obligations did not
qualify for the exception under Section 63-30-10(4).

Similarly, UDOT's project inspector was

inspecting his own employer's property for compliance with contractual specifications, i.e. traffic
control plan. Moreover, UDOT had more than just an "inspector" working on the Layton-Clearfield
project. UDOT engineers and personnel worked on the project daily to assist in proper execution
of the traffic control plan. There is no immunity for negligent supervision and negligent execution
of a traffic control plan. UDOT's actions on the project site do not qualify under any exception and
UDOT could be found liable under Utah law.
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D.

A jury could find UDOT exercised authority over Granite and determine UDOT is
liable for Granite's negligence

UDOT relies on Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) to assert is not liable for
Granite's negligence. However, there are several circumstances in which a jury is allowed to find
an employer vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Plaintiff relies on
Thompson to assert UDOT is liable under all, or one, of the following:
1.

UDOT is liable under the active participation standard

"Under the 'active participation' standard, a principal employee is subject to liability for
injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or
asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work. Thompson at 327 citing
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973). In Thompson the Supreme Court relied on the
Arizona case of Lewis v. N.J. Riebe Enterprises, Inc., 825 P.2d 5, (AZ 1992) for promulgating their
adoption of retained control liability, under the "active participation" standard:
"In Lewis, the general contractor interfered with the subcontractors's method of performing
the work and instructed that a quicker but less safe method be implemented. A worker was
injured as a direct result of the dangerous condition created by the general contractor's
method. The court concluded on the basis of these facts, that the general contractor exercised
sufficient control over the means use in performing the contracted work to subject it to
retained control liability." Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 at 328 (Utah 1999)
Similarly, UDOT interfered by having Granite open two lanes of traffic even though it was clearly
a less safe method. The plaintiff was injured as a direct result of that dangerous condition created
by UDOT's direction. Accordingly, UDOT exercised sufficient control over Granite to subject
UDOT to retained control liability.
2.

UDOT is liable for the failure to provide concrete barriers under Section 413 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts

Section 413 of the Restatement states:
"Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to
Contractor"
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
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recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical
harm to other unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer
(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precaution, or
(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such
precautions.
UDOT has implied that if the jury determines concrete barriers was the appropriate
precaution, Granite is liable since UDOT later informed Granite they could use concrete barriers if
Granite paid the expense. On the contrary, if the jury find it was negligent not to use concrete
barriers than UDOT could be found vicariously liable for failing to provide in the contract that
Granite use the special precaution, i.e. barriers.
3.

UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 416 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts

Section 416 of the Restatement of Torts, states:
"Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions"
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others
unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them
by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precaution, even
though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.
Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah 1999)
UDOT hired Granite to perform work which created a peculiar risk of harm to the public.
UDOT's attempted to dictate some special precautions in the contract, i.e. white lines, buffer zones,
barrel placement, etc. However, UDOT can still be held liable for the physical harm to the plaintiff
as a result of Granite's failure to take such precautions. Assumably, this explains why UDOT had
several personnel overseeing the project; UDOT needed to ensure the special precautions of the
traffic control plan were implemented. However, UDOT's personnel failed to properly supervise and
implement those precautions. Under Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's
failure to use reasonable care.
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4.

UDOT is vicarious liable for Granite under Section 427 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts

Section 427 of the Restatement of Torts states:
"Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work"
One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to other
which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate, when making the contract, is subject
to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take
reasonable precautions against such danger. Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 329 (Utah
1999)
Similar to Section 416, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's negligence.
Section 427 illustrates that, with or without special precautions, an employer can be held liable for
an independent contractor when the work is inherently dangerous to others. With the large number
of vehicle traffic on 1-15 and the anticipated 12 in. deep, 105 ft long and 12 ft wide cut-outs, UDOT
had reason to know the work was inherently dangerous. UDOT is unable to escape their liability
by transferring all negligence to Granite.
CONCLUSION
Multiple disputed facts prevent UDOT from prevailing on summary judgment. Moreover,
none of UDOT's actions in this case were protected by the discretionary exception of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Also, UDOT can be held vicariously liable for the actions of Granite.
Based on the foregoing issues, plaintiff respectfully requests the court deny UDOT's motion for
summary judgment.
DATED this /2

day of November, 2002.

/^KKpWARJ§\
Attorney for Plaintiff
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I
I

If they were working or not?
A

If they were working.

3

Q

If they were working, they would close it

A

Correct.

6

Q

If they weren't working, they would open it

up and have two travel lanes?

want to try different kinds of things besides the
barrels out there?

6

A

Yes

7

Q

What kinds of things would you have

A

Correct.

8

Q

And if they had two travel lanes, the

9

A

We discussed a barrier, concrete barrier

Q

Are those the things they call Jersey

10

11

where the hole is?

II

11

18

17

Now, would there — well, as you look at

A

Correct

13

Q

As I look at the hole in that picture, it

both of those pictures, both on the left-hand side

II

14

looks to me like it's at least a foot deep.

and the right-hand side, there's a barrel only on one

II

15

ever have occasion to notice how deep they were?

side of the hole. Do you know why there wouldn't be
barrels on both sides of the hole?

19

121

Yes.

barriers?

12

18

20

A
Q

suggested?

1

13

1

4

II

14

I

||

Did you ever make any suggestions to either

5

inside travel lane would be directly adjacent to

15

Q

DOT or to the construction company that they night

10

12

so they could call and have them replaced.

3

1

down to one travel lane?

98

1

1
2

5
7

1

j

2
4

1
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|

16

II

17

actually measured then.

18

inches deep.

A

I don't know.

j

Q

A

Q

Did you

I looked at then, but I don't think I ever

Okay.

They'd be a good 12 to IB

Did you ever see that as you would patrol

||

19

where the barrels would not be on both sides of the

|

20

the three lanes of traffic.

I wonder if I could have you draw

hole?

|

21

a couple of the concrete replacenent holes, and then

Make one of then — put

22

A

I don't recall.

||

22

draw the barrels in, just illustrative of how they

23

Q

Okay.

11

23

would be placed when there were two lanes of traffic

24

sone —

II

24

used.

25

or the construction company employees coning along

||

25

I make nyself clear?

But it would sinply be a natter of

do you know whether it was the UDOT employees

RENEE L. STACY, CSR. RPR
(801) 32U-1186
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Could you do that on this piece of paper?
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Did
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and moving the barrels back and forth?
A

1

It was someone with the construction

2

company that would do the barrels.
Q

Okay.

3

And is it correct to assume that you

4

A

You just want like a hole where they

I

don't know where they would have had a hole.
Q

It doesn't natter.

illustrative.

It's just

Draw three lanes of traffic — and you

5

would, at tines, visit with either the construction

5

can use this picture.

6

people or the UDOT people?

6

have to be to scale.

Draw in a hole.

It doesn't

I'n just really looking for —

7

A

Yes.

7

so that ue have something that shows how the barrels

8

Q

Both?

8

were placed.

9

A

Mainly with the UDOT people.

10

Q

Did you have conversations with them about

11

this area?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

9

You know, I think I'n

10

going to object as far as drawing in holes.

11

he can certainly, based on his experience, tell you

I think

where the lanes — where the barrels were when he saw

12

A

Yes.

12

13

Q

what were the kinds of things that you

13

then in reference to the traffic channelization, but,

14

discussed?

14

you knou, beyond that, I think he's already testified

15
16

A

We let them know when ue had accidents and

where they were at.

We would oftentimes call them to

15

that, you know, the holes he doesn't renenber

16

specifically.
Q

(BY MR

WARD)

17

let them know if we had barrels out in the road that

17

18

ue had moved back, or if we had a problem, we would

18

Picture for reference.

19

call them and advise them what we saw

19

use your own drauing.

20

21
22
2

3

Q

So like sometimes when somebody might hit a

barrel and knock it out or —
A

20
21

Someone would hit a barrel and we would

22

cone along and move it out of the road, or sometimes

23

A

Well, you can use the
Just put in — well, you can

I dreu one fron that night.

Would that

suffice as far as uhere the holes were at?
Q

Sure.

But, see, you don't have the barrels

Placed there, that I saw.

24

people would wipe out a whole row of them and we'd

24

A

That's correct.

2

call and let DOT know that they'd been knocked down

25

Q

So if you could just use that same drawing

5

RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1186

IB

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC. (801) 328-1188
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SHEET 4

LUNDELL. EXAM BY HARD
1

MR

WARD

2

MR

CHRISTENSEN

3

I probably have one. too

Q

5

3

be bigger than the hole on the left side of Exhibit
1?

Can you show us off that drawing where Mr

5

A

Yes

6

Q

Okay

7

first nade contact with any hole?
A
Q

Okay

the diagram

diagram, the smallest hole

13
14

10

It appears to be, according to your

Yes

Q

Now, do you know what part of his car or

A
Q

And was that hole the sane as, you know, in

terms of depth, as the other holes?

20

A

Yes

21

Q

So the holes where they would replace the

22

concrete weren't always uniform?

23

uniform in depth, but they night be longer or wider,

24

depending on how much concrete had to be replaced?

25

A

They might be

Yes
RENEE L STACY, CSR. RPR
(801) 328-1188

CHRISTENSEN

Object

To the extent

that calls for speculation on the part of the

14

witness. I'm going to object
Q

(BY MR

UARD)

And maybe there's no way to

know

I don't know
A
It was going in a southbound direction
Q
Okay Do you start to see debris in these
holes or things coming off the car?
A
Yes
Q
Uhat happens when he goes into the third
hole?
A
As far as — I know he went through the
third hole and came out of that one as well And the
vehicle itself, just by looking at it, it would
RENEE L STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

11

Q

LUNDELL

So as you tried to put together how this

2

accident happened, you think his left front tire went

3

into that first small hole?

EXAM BY UARD

1

appear that it rolled at some point due to the damage

2

on the vehicle

3

(Discussion off the record )

4

A

Yes

4

(Uhereupon Deposition Exhibit No

5

Q

Then what happened?

5

A

After going into that hole, the vehicle

6

27
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY UARD

1

which

Did he appear to have control of the car?
MR

25

PAGE 26

He went

13

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that hole

18

Q

15

I believe his left front tire went into

It cane out of that second hole

would be the third one on the diagram

11

wheel made contact with that?

16

A

further down and again went into another hole

12

A

What happened after his car went

into the second hole?

8
9

So that would be on the bottom of

11

19

7

He first nade contact with the first hole

12

17

Johnson's car

that's shown on the diagram on the bottom

10

So the second hole, going UP from the

bottom of the diagram, that his car went into, would

4

Johnson's — where you believe Mr

8

Q

2

(Discussion off the record )

6

15

1

This is the last one I've

got

4

9

LUNDELL. EXAM BY UARD

6

3 was

marked for identification )
Q

You don't really know whether or not he

7

came out of that one and I believe the whole car went

7

went through hole number three all tires on the

8

into the second hole that's shown there

8

ground or if he rolled through hole number three or

9

whatever happened?

9
10

Q

And that looks like about the biggest hole

you have drawn on there

Is that right?

10

A

Correct

Q

Okay

11

A

Looks like it

11

12

Q

Now, once again, looking at that Deposition

12

ask if that depicts his automobile as it came to rest
on the freeway after the accident

Let me show you Exhibit No

13

Exhibit 1 that I gave you, right there in front of

13

14

you, that hole that you have drawn, although it's not

14

MR

15

the same diagram, would it be bigger or smaller than

15

Picture of Exhibit No

16

that hole that's shown on the left side of Exhibit 1?

17

MR

CHRISTENSEN

18

MR

UARD

19

MR

CHRISTENSEN

MR

UARD

20
21

24
25

The left side of Exhibit 1
No

I'm sorry

THE WITNESS
WARD)

16

MR

17

THE UITNESS

18

I mean which hole?
The second — where

he says the whole car went into it

22
23

Which one?

Q

(BY MR

Yeah

A

I think that would be smaller than the

UARD)

Yes
And isn't it true, officer,

20

occurred?
A

I was driving northbound and saw the dust

22

from an accident

23

the vehicle there

25

RENEE L STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

(BY MR

Yes

that you were actually driving by when this accident

24

second hole on the diagram

Q

UARD

You mean the bottom

3?

19
21

These two?

CHRISTENSEN

3 and

26

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, INC

Q

or a dust, and stopped and found

Uas the dust in front of you or in your

rearview mirror?
RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 328-1186
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD

LUNDELL. EXAM BY WARD

1

A

It was ahead of ne

1

foundation

2

Q

So Is it fair to say you were one of the

2

Q

(BY MR

3

A

I don't know how they would cover these

4

large holes

3

first people on the scene?

4

A

I was the first one on the scene

5

Q

You were the first one on the scene

6

5

And

6

what did you find when you arrived?
A

7

was in the vehicle or out of the vehicle

9

was out

9

the rebar

10

11

It was actually blocking the southbound leftnost lane

11

12

that was open to travel

feet long, I don't know that you could put a steel
plate over it

14

an anbulance

14

15

A

Oh, yes

15

Q

And got hin sat down sonewhere or laid down

IB

A

Yeah

Ue —

I do renenber having hin on

19

the ground and looking that he had sone injuries,

20

particularly to his legs

21

Q

22

hin nedically stable or taken care of, you then

23

proceeded to investigate the accident?

How long did you say?
Fifty-six

16

A hole was 56 feet long?

17

Correct

18

I didn't realize that

19

how long was the first hole he went into?

20

Is it correct to assune that once you got

Q

I think if they had sone snaller sized

12

Q

sonewhere?

A

holes that would work, but when their holes are 56

13

13

16

A

Wow

Okay

Just over 34 feet long

Twelve- to IB-inch hole, 34 feet long?

22

Right

23

And the next one uas 56 feet long?

A

Yes

24

Correct

25

Q

Is that when you went back and started to

25

How about the hole after that?

r

Well,

21

24

RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 328-1186

steel

would have forned a barrier so that the tire could

vehicle with substantial danage to it in the road

17

if they had, oh

have went over the hole and not down into it and into

10

Is it fair to assune you nust have called

Well, for instance

Plates they could have set on top of the rebar. that

8

I think he

But what I found was this particular

You can answer

7

I don't recall where the driver was, if he

8

Q

WARD)

RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 326-1188
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY WARD

LUNDELL, EXAP BY WARD

1

deternine which hole the car first went into and that

1

2

type of thing?

2

3

A

Yes

4

Q

Did you —

A

The third one wouid have been about 12

feet, five inches long

3

Q

4

A

Yeah

see, if you nade note of it or if you recall, that

5

Q

How long was it?

6

led you to believe he hit that first snail hole with

6

A

Ten feet, five inches

7

his tire?

7

Q

The other accidents you said you saw during

5

what, in particular, did you

8

A

We found a tire track in it

8

9

Q

Did it appear to be fresh?

9

10

A

Yeah, it appeared fresh

There were sone

at the end of these holes uhere

11

narkings ~

12

the rebar, there was danage to the rebar where he

they have

13

would have cone out of the hole

10

And then is there a fourth hole?

the tine construction was gc ng on there where cars'
tires had gone into these hc*es, did they differ in
any way fron the way this one happened?

11

A

I'n not sure I understand the question

12

Q

Well, in other words, was it basically

13

sonebody driving along where their tire would drop

14

Q

Okay

14

into the hole and that would cause the car to lose

15

A

Which would lead ne to believe that the

15

control or careen off or sor-ethmg like that?

16

vehicle had traveled through it, and that was

16

17

substantial sized rebar that was danaged

17

18

Q

So if a tire went into those holes, not

19

only did they have to deal with the depth of the

20

hole, there was rebar sticking out, huh?

21
22

19

Q

Do you know of anything that prevented the

24

holes?

Q
A

CHRISTENSEN

Objection

RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
{801) 328-1188

25

Lack of

30

I don't recall ar- -ollovers prior to
MR

WARD

Scott

can I see the traffic

control plan for just a secc^d?

24
MR

Had you seen any rollovers like this

this

22
23

We had several the* had driven into the

resulting fron their tire gc ng into the hole?

20
21

Yes

contractor or UDOT fron placing covers over the

25

18

A

23

A

holes and sustained sone frcnt-end danage, yes

MR

CHRISTENSEN

I don't know that I

brought it
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

LUKDELL, EXAM BY WARD
1
2
3

Q

(Discussion off the record )

1

you brought with you. One of them shows the base of

(BY MR WARD)

2

a barrel

Did you ever see a traffic

3

control plan for that area, trooper?

4

A

I did not

4

5

Q

So you don't really knou whether or not the

5

Is that what that is?

A

That would appear to be a base, yes

Q

And that base is actually in one of the

holes; is that correct?

6

placement of the barrels corresponded with the

6

A

Yes

7

traffic control plan developed for that area?

7

Q

And the other photograph appears to be just

a

8

A

I don't know

Q

Were you ever told anything by either UDOT

a close-up view of that

9

A

Yes

10

or the contractor as to why they did not use your

10

Q

Does that appear to you to be the result of

11

suggestion or the other trooper's suggestion of a

11

12

Jersey barrier versus just using barrels?

12

A

On the base?

13

Q

Yeah

A

Generally, if you strike these barrels, the

9

13

MR CHRISTENSEN:

To the extent that

something or someone moving the barrel into the hole?

14

indicates that there were other troopers that nade

14

15

that sane suggestion. I'n going to object to it as

15

1G

nischaractenzing this witness's testimony

16

the bases, so I don't know if that base had been on

17

the road or knocked in

17
18

Q

I misunderstood

I thought

A

19

I had made that to UDOT, yes. Others, I

don't know

21

Q

I apologize

Was there ever any response

22

to you as to why they didn't use a Jersey barrier

23

there rather than just these plastic barrels?

24
25

18

you said you and others had made that suggestion.

19
20

(BY MR. WARD)

A

It was my understanding that it was a UDOT

decision and part of it was money
RENEE L. STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 32b-118d

bases will stay on the ground and the barrels P O P off

Q

I couldn't answer that.

In Exhibit 2, I think it was, you drew in

some typical barrels, if I understand correctly.

20

A

21

Q

Correct.
And those were on the seam —

22

A

Correct.
— of the concrete, not in any of the

23

Q

24

excavations?

25

A

I know they had had barrels in some of the
RENEE L. STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1188
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

1

Q

It's cheaper to use the barrels?

1

2

A

Yes

2

night had any barrels particularly in the hole or

3

not.

3

MR

WARD:

4
5
6

Okay.

That's all I have.

EXAMINATION

5

Trooper Lundell, I have a couple of

7

questions I'd like to ask you about

8

evidence of any brake marks or skid marks before the

9

vehicle apparently went into the lowest hole on your

10
11
12

Did you see any

A

I didn't see any, no.

Q

A

Yes, correct

7

Q

And it's not uncommon to have these barrels

9

A

That's correct.

Q

And there are time when, if it's just a

11

glancing blow, the entire barrel and base will move,
won't they?

Did you see any evidence that, in order to

12

get into that first hole, that the car had to strike

13

14

one of the traffic control barrels?

14

15

A

I know there was a barrel that had been

hit, but where it was placed, I don't know

moved by vehicles striking them, is that —

10

13

16

A

Routinely, if that barrel is hit. it will

disconnect and leave the base in the road.

15

There's

Deposition Exhibit 1 shows some of the

barrels on the seam, correct?

6
8

field diagram?

It's possible
Q

4

BY MR CHRISTENSEN:
Q

holes, but I don't know if this particular area that

Q

Have you seen occasions -- for example, on

16

the left-hand photograph of Exhibit 1 seems to show

17

that one, and there's one in the hole as well

17

one of the barrels that has been moved and it appears

18

someplace

18

to be on its base. Is that correct?

19
20

Q

Right

I'm using your photographs, if you

A

19

don't mind, because I noticed there appeared to be a

20

I see one sitting in the road

You mean

this other one?

21

couple of — let me show you two of these

21

Q

Yeah, this one to the left

22

Photographs

22

A

It would routine for them when they poured

23

just a moment.

There might be more if you'll give me

23

new concrete that they would place a barrel at the

24

A

Sure.

24

beginning so they wouldn't drive over the fresh

25

Q

There appear to be two of the photographs

25

concrete until it cured

RENEE L STACY, CSRA RPR
(801) 326-118«

RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1188
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LUNDELL. EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN
!
2

Q

1

So that was an additional barrel to the

left of the channelization barrels?

3

A

That second one. Just looking at the

3

correct?

4

A

Right

5

Q

What did you intend by that?

A

They did post advisory speed linits through

picture

5

concrete, and It was routine for then to place a

6

barrel over the new stuff so their workers wouldn't

6

7
8

run over it
Q
And on the right-hand side of Exhibit 1, is

7

this project that were posted at 50

8

orange advisory speed

9

that a base still upon a barrel?

9

speed linit signs as well

A

I think it's just a black — well —

the

11

bases are — yeah, it would appear to be a base with

12

the barrel — you're looking towards the

—

10

Q

Fron a law enforcenent perspective, at 4 30

11

in the norning in a construction zone, is 70 niles an

12

hour an appropriate speed?

Q

Okay

13

A

Yes and no

14

A

— edge

14

Q

What's the yes part of it?

Q

Now. in order for this — based on your

A

Is it appropriate?

15

reconstruction of the accident, would it have

15
16

17

required this car to leave the travel portion, the

17

18

narked travel lane to strike the hole, the first

18

19

hole?

20
21

A

Yeah

Q

Now. in your accident report forn. you

22

indicated on the second page of it — oh

23

you another question first

24

like at the tine of this accident?

25

A

I don't recall

What was the weather
I think it was —

I nean,

RENEE L STACY. CSR. RPR
(801) 326-1186

It would depend on what

you think your abilities to drive are
Q

Do you think it's a safe speed to be

traveling in that left-hand lane?

19

A

No

20

Q

Did you ever have an opportunity to speak

21

Let ne ask

They were the

but they still had the 65

13

16

r

And you have an additional speed underneath

the posted speed of 50 niles an hour, is that

4

10

it appears to be a different color or fresh

Q

2

with the driver of the vehicle about what happened?

22

A

23

Q

Briefly, yes
At the scene?

24

A

Yes

25

Q

And what did he tell you at the scene?
RENEE L STACY, CSR. RPR
(801) 326-1186
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LUNDELL, EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN

1

it was 4 00 in the norning so I think it was a clear

1

2

night or sonething

2

next thing he knew, he hit one of the holes and lost

3

control

3

Q

The reason I*n wondering

4

A

The boxes are narked, but I couldn't tell

5
6

~

you which box shows the weather

5

Q

He said he was just driving along, and the

Now

you indicated that you had sone

concerns about using concrete barriers

The reason I'n wondering is it looks like

6

A

Yes

there's water in the botton of these bases, and the

7

Q

Were the plastic channel control devices

8

weather in the picture — and I don't know when these

8

were those typical lane channelizations in

9

photographs were taken

9

construction that you'd see on the freeways four

7

Q

4

A

10

A

I don't know, either

10

11

Q

These color

11

A

No

12

A

I don't know

12

Q

Were there both Jersey barriers and —

A

Prior to this project, on the project prior

13
14

photographs,
I do not believe there was

any water on the night of the accident
Q

13

That's what I was wondering

14

to this one in the south end m Centerville, they
actually had a wall divider

15

A

They were dry

15

1G

Q

On the second page of your report you

16

17

indicated that the est mated travel speed of the

18

Johnson vehicle was 70 niles an hour, correct?

19

A

nonths before then?

17

Yes

Q

Now

if they use Jersey barriers

those

would have to be placed to the left of the traffc

18

sean if you're looking at the right-hand picture in

19

Exhibit 1, correct?

20

Q

And the posted speed was what?

20

A

Yes

21

A

Posted speed was 65

21

Q

And they would have had to have been placed

22

Q

Now, as I understand it. that's —

the

22

to the right of the sean on the left-hand picture of
Exhibit 1 correct?

23

naxinun speed — the posted speed is the naxmun

23

24

speed under best conditions, correct?

24
25

25

A

Yes
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 326-1188
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A
Q

Yes
Now. would there have been roon enough for
RENEE L STACY. CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1111 Brickyard R
Post Office Box 30
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0

Utah Department of Transportation
P.O. Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412

March 20,1996

Telephone (801) 486-2
Fax (801) 487-1

Attention: Kent Nichols
Re: Project No. IM - 1 5 - 7 (191) 332 and Pin No. 19
South L a y t o n t o S R - 1 9 3

Kent:
As discussed in the preconstruction conference for this project, we would like to
propose the use of precast concrete barriers to channel traffic and protect our workers, UDOT
emloyees overseeing the project and the traveling public. These barriers would be used in lieu
of the plastic drums and channelizing devices on the traffic control phases in the plans and
specifications. The speed limit in this section of 1-15 has been raised from 55 MPH, at the time
of bid in September 1995, to 65 MPH. Our concern is for the safety of our workers and UDOT
employees. Traffic would be very close to their work and they would be virtually unprotected
without the concrete barrier.
Attached is a rough sketch of how we propose to place the barriers in three phases and
use asphalt crossovers \n the median at the south end of the project and end approximately at
station 660+00 at the north end. From station 660+00 northward to the end of the project, work
would be accomplished with drums and traffic control as outlined in the drawings and
specifications. This would be required due to the excessive elevation difference between the
northbound and southbound lanes at that portion of the project.
The barrier footage was calculated by installing barrier through the entire project
northbound and southbound. In Phase II and Phase III approximately 18,500 If of barrier would
be removed to allow an area approximately 1320 foot in length at each offramp and another
1320 foot at each onramp. The traffic would be channeled through the on and off ramps with the
use of plastic drums. UDOTs traffic engineers will need to specify what might be needed at
these locations. We would propose message boards at each end of the project to advise the
motoring public that some phases will have an express lane that will not have an exit
throughout the entire project and that they will have to travel in mandatory lanes to be able to exit
1-15 between Kaysville and Clearfield.
In evaluating this plan, we would change our schedule from the one proposed at the
preconstruction meeting,ie., working Saturday through tuesday double shift; to working seven
days per week behind the protection of the concrete barrier. This would reduce the calendar
weeks that traffic control would be restricting lanes from 35 weeks to 20 weeks. A savings of
105 days. However, it would take much fonger to set, move and remove the concrete barrier.
We estimate an additional 40 days that would need to be added to the contract time. There
would still be a net savings of 56 days that traffic would not be disrupted, provided that the repair
quantities do not overrun. Using concrete barrier would eliminate the problems with peak traffic
hours by providing two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times.

Attached is a breakdown of the estimated cost to change to concrete barriers on this
project. It has been assumed that all the concrete barrier is stockpiled and available at UDOPs
District 1 Yard. We also request, whether this proposal is accepted or not, that throughout this
project the speed limit be reduced to 55MPH, as it was when the project was originally bid If
you have any questions please call me at 231-5780. We need a decision as soon as possible so
we can advise our subcontractors and suppliers when work will begin on this project.

Memorandum

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS PORTATI Of
Region One
DATE: March 21,1996

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Dyke LeFevre, P.E.
Region One Director

Kent Nichols
Project Engineer
Project No. INI -15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
Attached you will find a proposal from Gibbons and Reed Company to use precast barrier to
channelize traffic and provide protection for the project workers, department personnel, and the
traveling public.
Based on this proposal the confractor would start his operations in the median area. The inside
lane on both the northbound and southbound lanes would be closed off with barrier and the
drainage modifications, shoulder work, and concrete repair on the inside lanes would be
completed.
The northbound traffic would then be moved onto the inside lanes with the inside lane of the
southbound lanes being used as an 'express' lane for the north bound traffic. Openings f o r the
various off ramps would be provided. The concrete rehabilition on the two outside northbound
lanes and outside northbound shoulder work would proceed.
When the work on the northbound lanes was complete the south bound traffic would be shifted
into the median area and work on the two outside southbound lanes and outside southbound
shoulder would be completed.
The estimated cost to use control plan would be $714,275.00. The cost savings through
reduction in the amount of some bid items together with elimination of some items be
approximately $173,800.00. The estimated additional cost would be $540,475.00.
There is an overwhelming feeling among the people who will be involved in the contract that
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration. I share that feeling and
recommend that this proposal be given serious consideration.

Attachment: 4 sheets
cc: Region File
Project File
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction
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1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0429
Telephone (801) 486-2411

March 29, 1996
Fax (801) 487-1603

Utah Department of Tianspoitation
P. O. Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412
Attention: Kent Nichols
Re:

Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19
South Lay ton to SR-193

Dear Kent:
Following discussions in Tuesday's meeting at UDOT's District One office, we
propose the following traffic control plan for this project. We propose to start the project
using the outside shoulder phasing as per the contract drawings. During this phase the
outside shoulders on die entire project will be excavated and replaced with asphalt. Once the
asphalt shoulders are replaced, precast barrier would be hauled from stockpiles at the District
One yard and installed per die attached drawing. Phasing die work with piecast barriers
allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times. This would eliminate the need
for peak and off-peak work requirements on the 1-15 portion of the work and allow us to
work more hours to complele the project. The traffic crossovers would be located at the
same locations as proposed in our March 20, 1996, letter. The work north of station
660+00 would be completed behind drums.
This project allowed a contract completion of 140 work days. Starting the project on
April 15, 1996, and allowing 140 woik days @ 5 days per week would complete the project
November 4, 1996, after subtracting the holidays during this period. Using the pLecast
barrier option we can complete the work by October 7, 1996, a savings of 28 days. This
savings means 28 less days that UDOT would not have inspectors on die project and 28 less
days the traveling public would be subjected to constricted traffic flow.

Utah Department of Transportation
March 29, 1996
Page Two

Attached is a breakdown of the cost associated with this proposal. There would be a
considerable cost savings if UDOT had die three CZ Attenuators in stock. This savings
would be $78,000.00. An additional savings of $67,200.00 could be recognized if the
crossovers could remain in the median for future projects to the north or to the south of this
project. Temporary stiiping will be paid for at the contract unit price. We have not allowed
for drainage in the median at the crossover locations.
If this proposal is approved, we will commit to a final completion date of September
30, 1996. In die event we do not complete the work by this date, we would expect
liquidated damages of $2,070.00 per calendar day, per section 108.9 of die 1992 Standard
Specifications. We would expect any weather related shutdown of the work to be added to
diis completion date on a day for day basis. We would also expect a bonus of $2,070.00 per
calendar day for each day we complete prior to September 30, 1996.
As we have mentioned in other letters, our concern on diis project and the reason for
diis proposal is the safety of our workers, UDOT employees and the traveling public. We
also request diat the speed limit throughout diis project be reduced back to die 55 MPH
speed limit as it was at the time this project was bid regardless of whether or not you accept
diis proposal.
Please review diis plan and proposal and let us know your intent as to a decision by
April 3, 1996, so we can plan our work and our subcontractors. If you have any questions,
please call Grant Fowkes or myself.
Sincerely,
Gimom

& REED COMPANY

Lindsay
CL:sp
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Apiil 2, 1996
Gibbons & Reed Company
1111 Brickyard Road
Post Office Box 30429
Salt Lake City, Utah
84130-0429
Att: Chuck Lindsey
Subject. PiojectNo IM-15-7(191)332 andPinNo. 19
South Layton to SR-193
Change in Traffic Control Plan
Dear Chuck:
I have reviewed the cost bieak down in your letter of March 29, 1996 with Dyke LeFev.e

' " * StanC'S ^ d06S "^ ^ that WG C0Uld «* »

Co>2°2

^

In o.der lor us to justify the p.oposal for a change in the uaffic control plan using user cost

U 0 000

,T

, ^ a " 8e W ° Uld ^

t0

« * * tW° C0nditi0ns- D b e j« *» -ng of

$450,000 o, below, and 2 time savings must be at least a 50 days time saving, whichls w hat we
discussed during our initial conversations on this proposal.

4::s,S'edoor on ",is proposai and • « * " - i t e *» ™»«» «*»*, i,™
1 Couc.ele Barrier, (load haul, inslall, m 0 V e, and return lo Region One yard) We believe that
the cos. of this , em could be reduced. During one of our conversations I sur-geste to ve
consrc er borce Account on this item, and most likely a lump sum item would be „ „
acceptable to our management people
2 Crossoveis Wc would suggest that you review the p.ices for Granular Boirow and
Untieated Base Course material. We believe that the cost to install tins material in the cross
overs would less expensive than in the shoulder areas.

or

Page 2
April 2, 1996
3. Message Boards, C o u I d be eliminated

Respectjiilly;

Kent A. Nichols,
Project Engineer
cc: Region One File
Dyke LeFevre, Region One Director

ta t h e

advanced wamers would

remai„

as „ r i g i n a l l y

1111 Brickyard Roe
Post Office Box 304<
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-04$

Utah Department of Transportation
P.O. Box 12580
Ogden, Utah 84412

April 11, 1996

Telephone (801) 486-241
fax(801)487-16C

Attention: Kent Nichols
Re: Project No. IM - 15 - 7(191) 332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
Dear Kent:
We have reviewed UDOT correspondence dated April 2, 1996 and in our judgement
we can not meet the ciiteria established by UDOT to justify a change in the traffic control
plan.
The net cost of the change itemized in our letter dated March 29, 1996 could be reduced
to approximately $ 572,832 by reducing the cost of 5410 ton of 8" UTBC to $ 12.70 per ton,
leaving the crossovers in place and eliminating the message boards. If UDOT were to provide the
CZ Attenuators another $ 78,000 could be eliminated.
However, Gibbons and Reed Company can not reduce the time savings beyond the 28
days or alter the other conditions proposed in its letter dated March 29, 1996.
At this point, Gibbons and Reed will proceed with the original traffic control plan
established by UDOT. We lemain available to continue discussions concerning this matter.

Sincerely,
GIBBONS & REEDJCGMPANY

I*

leeoris & HEEU comnmj SN
I CE W
1111 Brickyard Roc
Post Office Box 304'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 04<

Utah Department of Transportation
P.O. Box 12580

July 2, 1996
Telephone (801) 486 24

Ogden, Utah 84412

Fax(801) 487-16C

Attention: Kent Nichols
Re: IM-15-7(191)332, 1-15 South Layton to SR-193

Kent:
We have had numerous close calls on this project with vehicles coming into the work
zone. Last early this morning we had a vehicle go through the drums on the south end of the
project on the north bound lanes and drove into and through a full depth slab replacement that
had just been excavated. Minutes before we had workers installing dowels in this area. We
were fortunate not to have workers In the area at the time of the accident. The traffic control
plan along with the speeds people are driving on 1-15 have put our people and UDOT employees
in jepordary every night. This has been a concern of ours before this project ever started and
have made recommendations to change the traffic plan to a safer situation with barrier. We
have also asked for the speed limit to be reduced to 55 MPH, which was the speed limit at the
time this job was bid, which we were told could not be done. Safety of workers has been ignored
and dollars has been the guiding factor.
We request that the peak hour schedule be adjusted one hour earlier in the mornings
and a half an hour longer in the afternoon to allow us to work strictly days starting Monday July
8,1996. By shifting our workers to a daytime operation we will avoid the traffic problems we are
experiencing at night and it will be less confusing for the traveling public during night time hours.
Please let us know as soon as possible as to the changes in off peak hour work hours.
We do plan to change our night crew to days beginning Monday.

Memoranaum

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region One

DATE: July 2,1996
i< TO:

Dyke LeFevre, P.E.
Region One Director

THRU:

Stan Nielsen, P.E.
Region One Construction Engineer

FROM:

Kent Nichols
Project Engineer

SUBJECT:

Project No. INI -15-7(191)332 and Pin No. 19
South Layton to SR-193
As you are aware we have had serious problems with control of traffic and providing safety for
our contractors worker as well as our personnel. The traffic is traveling the posted speed limit
which is 65 M.P.H. and this adds to our anxiety level. It must be noted that at the time the
contract was advertised and awarded the speed limit was 55 M.P.H. I believe that it is in our
best interest to post the speed limit back down to the 55 M.P.H. for the duration of this project.
Early this morning we had workmen installing dowels in a section of full depth repair.
Fortunately they left the site of the work to get more dowels, shortly after they left the site a car
knocked down two barrels and was into the work zone. The car ran into the full depth hole and
the momentum of the vehicle was arrested almost completely by its impact with the open face
of the concrete slab. The vehicle did have sufficient momentum to carry it out of the hole but it
came to rest on top of the of the slab on the edge of the hole. There is no doubt that we would
have had people killed but for the fact they were temporarily out of materials.
Because of the type of work we are doing, that is small partial depth repairs, the work is slow
and tedious. And it is made even slower by the fact that we are doing the work at night. With
the near miss that we had last night the contractor is formally requesting that we make the
following minimum changes: that, 1) the restricted peak time hours in the morning be reduced
by one hour in the morning and the peak time hours in the afternoon be reduced by one half
hour (preferably one hour), and 2) the speed limit be reduced to 55 M.P.H. as discussed above.
The contractor feels that he must work in the daylight hours to make the job site safer.
There is an over-whelming feeling among the people who are involved in the contract that
safety of the workmen is not being given adequate consideration, i share that feeling and
recommend that the proposal to use precast barrier and cross-overs be reviewed and given
serious consideration.
The contractor has hand delivered a letter, copy attached, which echos my sentiments with
regards to the conditions on the project.
This letter will be followed by a Change Order, specification change, to reduce the peak hour
restrictions. The contractor is going to be hard put to complete this project on schedule if some
way isn't found to increase productivity.
Attachment: 1 sheet
cc: Region File
Project File
Clint Topham, P.E., Deputy Director
Tom Smith, P.E., Engineer for Construction
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
•

*

*

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 970700411 PI

vs.

Deposition of:

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS
& REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-V,

KENT A. NICHOLS
Judge Thomas L. Kay

COPY

Defendants,

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 12th
day of June, 2000, commencing at the hour of 2:10 p.m.,
the deposition of KENT A. NICHOLS, produced as a witness
at the instance and request of the Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action before the above-named Court, was
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Gridley Ward &
Shaw, 849 West Hillfield Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah.

5 2 5 WELLS FARGO PLAZA
/0|^
170SOJTF M A l N - l R f - L T , l J P
oALi

L.r^t

i_ C

f

U"A'i

& 4 I O !

( 8 0 1 ) ^328 1 1 8 8 / 1 8 0 0 DEPChvlAX
TAX 3 2 8 1 1 8 9

(Witness reviewed document.)

1
2
3
4

A

The three-foot section applies to the work that

apparently would have occurred on the outside shoulder.
Q

Okay.

And does the two-foot buffer section

5

apply to the work that occurred on the center lane,

6

inside?

7

A

That's true.

8

Q

And that buffer is after the barrels?

9

In other

words, you would have your construction zone, you would

10

put your barrels on the edge of the construction zone,

11

and then have a two foot--I'm sorry--you put your barrels

12

there and then two feet would be--in front of the barrel

13

would be the buffer zone, or do you put the barrels out

14

two feet from the construction zone?

15
16
17
18

A

The barrels would be two feet from the edge of

the travel lane.
Q

The barrels would be two feet from the edge of

the travel lane?

19

A

That's correct.

20

Q

Is that right?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

How would the travel lane be delineated?

23

A

With paint striping.

24

Q

So if I understood what you are saying, you

25

J would have--this will be the outside travel lane.

That
29

1

would be the striping.

2

construction zone line.

And then let's make this line the
Okay?

Now, my question is let's say you are

3
4

going--you are heading to the top of the page or

5

heading--do you see what I'm saying?

6

this way--

7

A

Sure.

8

Q

--like this.

9

You are driving

So as I understand it, what you

said is the barrels would be two feet into the travel

10

lane from--or no, you said the barrels would be two feet

11

away from the marked line of the travel lane.

12

would be a marked line like this and then the barrels

13

would be two feet from that marked line?

14

A

There would be a marked line, but it wouldn't

15

be dashed like you just wrote it.

16

that inside.

17

Q

It would be solid on

Solid, and then the barrels would be two feet

18

from that?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Toward the construction zone?

21

A

Toward the construction zone.

22

Q

So it would be like this.

23
24
25

How far would they

be from the construction zone, the barrels?
A

So there

Two feet?

Well, the construction zone could be on the

face of the barrels actually.
30

Q

1

So it would look like that.

2

travel lane here.

3

here.

You would have one

Let's put travel lane, one travel lane

Is that correct?

4

A

That's--

5

Q

You would have a solid line, correct?

6

A

Uh-huh.

7

Q

And then you would have barrels two feet from

8

that solid line?

9

A

That's right.

10

Q

And then the construction zone can start from

11

basically anywhere from where those barrels are in,

12

correct?

13

A

14

(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)

15

Q

Including the position of the barrels

What we have just talked about I have tried to

16

draw out and it's now marked Exhibit 2.

17

accurate representation of how you should put those

18

barrels on a two-foot buffer zone?

19

A

20

plan, yes.

21

Q

Would that be an

That's the way I would interpret it from the

And the plan--does the plan dictate where if

22

the barrel should be on the edge of the construction zone

23

or five feet from it?

24

that at all?

25

A

Or does it make any comment about

These plans here don't appear to me to show
31

1

is heavier.

And by that point in time, the holes should

2

have already been filled in?

3

A

That's true.

4

Q

And you know, don't you, for a fact that that

didn1t occur?

5
6

A

That did not occur.

7

Q

Does the contract allow you to fine them for

8

not adhering to the contract?

9

A

Not that I recall.

10

Q

What can you do when you have a major

11

contractor who is not adhering to the terms of the

12

contract that affects the safety to the motoring public?

13

What can UDOT do?

14

A

15

I don't really know.

I have never been put in

that position before.

16

Q

17

Did you report to your superiors that, "Hey,

they are not doing what they are supposed to do"?

18

A

No.

19

Q

You don't remember that?

20

A

At least I don't remember that I did.

However,

21

I did have several conversations with them about this.

22

And so I guess the answer would be yes, because I did

23

have conversations with my supervisor about this, my

24

direct supervisor, and his supervisor.

25

J

Q

Were there any instructions passed down to you
51

1

to pass on to Granite?
A

2
3

Just do it the way the specifications

indicated
In other words, go back and tell them to do it

4

Q

5

right?

6

A

Uh-huh.

7

Q

Yes?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Did you convey your concerns to the project

10

manager for Granite, either Mr. Lindsay, Chuck Lindsay

11

or--

12

A

I believe Chuck would have been--I believe

13

Chuck would have been in this particular area which is

14

the southbound lane--

15

Q

Right.

16
17
18
19

(Witness reviewed photograph.)
A

It might have been Jim by then.

I'm not right

sure which one would have been in charge at that point.
Q

Would it be fair to say, though, Mr. Nichols,

20

that whichever one it was, you did talk to them about

21

your concerns?

22

A

Yes, we talked to them.

23

Q

Is it fair to assume that they assured you they

24

would go ahead and straighten it out?

25

tell you, "Tough luck, this is the way it's going to be"?

Or did they just

52

1
2

Q

Have you been involved in projects that have

done concrete slab replacement before like this?

3

A

Not like this one, no.

4

Q

Where there has been any concrete slab

5

replacement at all?

6

A

Only on a project that wasn't in traffic.

7

Q

So you didn't worry about having open holes

9

A

Not on that job.

10

Q

Are you a member of AASHTO?

11

A

UDOT is.

12

Q

Do you read their journals and review their

8

13

or--

publications?

14

A

I very seldom see them.

15

Q

What sources do you rely on for your

16

information in helping you to appropriately review

17

traffic control plans?

18

In other words, what is the source of your knowledge that

19

allows you to review traffic control plans for propriety?

Do you understand my question?

20

A

Reference to the MUTCD manual.

21

Q

Is that all, just that?

22

A

Basically that's the key manual.

23

Q

Tell me roughly where you would point me to in

24
25

the MUTCD manual about dropoffs.
A

I would have to look it up myself.
47
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 970700411 PI

VS.

Judge Thomas L. Kay

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS &
REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-V,
Defendants.

DEPOSITION OF:
PHILLIP PASKETT

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of July 2000 the
deposition of PHILLIP PASKETT produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the plaintiff herein, was
taken before TAMARA P. SIEBERT, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:30 of said day at
the offices of GRIDLEY, WARD & SHAW, 849 W. Hillfield
Road,1 Suite 202, Layton, Utah.
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1

I control,

2

I

3

I What do they teach you in there?

4

Q.

A.

Tell me a little about that eight-hour class.

The distance for signs that we put up, you

5

know, for the space in between the signs and length of

6

our tapers for our barrels.

7

safety and that.

Just the things for

8

Q.

What kind of text do they refer you to?

9

A.

There's a manual, Manual Uniform Traffic

10

Control Devices, MUTCD.

11

Q.

Anything besides that?

12

A.

Not that I f m familiar with right now.

13

Q.

Do you believe you have a working knowledge

14

of the MUTCD?

15

A.

Yes, a rudimentary one, yes.

16

Q.

Have you had any training on what kinds of

17

I safety standards to follow when you have a pavement

18

| dropoff next to travel lanes?

19

I

20

I provisions.

21

I

22

A.

Q.

Just what's in our plans and our special

And that would be basically what's in the

MUTCD?

23

I

A.

As far as I know.

24

I

Q.

Do you have any understanding of different

25

I standards to use depending on the depth of the

11
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1

dropoff?

2

A.

Just what I have read in the prints.

3

Q.

Tell me what you understand about different

4

depths of dropoffs.

5

A.

Well, according to the prints, if there's

6

over a six-inch dropoff, it f s supposed to be barrier

7

wall and if it's less, we have other standards,

8

Q.

What's a barrier wall?

9

A.

Concrete barrier.

10

Q.

Did the standards talk about any kind of a

11

buffer zone?

12

A.

13

I couldn't tell you honestly right now off

the top of my head.

14

Q.

How about striping delineation?

15

A.

According to the prints on the project, we

16

was supposed to stripe the outside shoulder for the

17

delineation of the outside lane while we move traffic

18

over to the shoulder of the road.

19

I

Q.

20

I specific project we are here about?

21

I

A.

Yes.

22

1

Q.

I'm talking generally MUTCD, is there any --

23

I

A.

Just all I'm familiar with right now are the

24

| plans that we used on that particular job.

25

|

Q.

Are you talking about the plans on the

And you had an opportunity to review those?

12
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1
2

barrels.
Q.

And that ! s what controlled it.
(BY MR. WARD)

Let me back it up.

You

3

testified earlier that the standard next to a dropoff

4

of more than six inches was to use jersey barriers.

5

A.

Yes, according to sheet four.

6

Q.

Exactly.

So if jersey barriers weren't used

7

and barrels were used because it was cheaper and yet

8

the state knew and Granite knew that jersey barriers

9

really were the industry and national standard for

10

those kind of dropoffs, whose responsibility is it to

11

supply the barriers?

12

to make sure Granite does it or is Granite allowed to

13

make an economic decision that they won't do it

14

because it's cheaper?

15
16

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Objection, that assumes

facts not in evidence.

17

THE WITNESS:

18

or ours on our level.

19

Is it the state's responsibility

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

That wasn't Granite's decision

I understand.

I guess what

20

I'm saying is, have you ever been in a situation

21

before -- let's see if I can flesh this out so I

22

understand what you're telling me, where you know that

23

there's a standard and the contractor says, well, I

24

want to do that and the state says, well, go ahead,

25

but it's your cost, not ours.

Would you then expect

43
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the contractor to go ahead and do it or is the
contractor excused from doing it because the
contractor thinks it's too expensive?
A.

No.

As far as I understand things, the

contractor, regardless of the cost, is required to do
what specs call for.
Q.

That makes sense to me too.

So I guess my

question is, if you thought jersey barriers were
required and that was initially contemplated and
somehow it gets changed in the mix there and barrels
start being used, did you have the authority to order
them to use injury barriers?
A.

No.

Q.

Because the bid involved the use of barrels?

A.

They bid it as barrels.

And like I said

before, the prints came out with barrels and that's
what we did and we was within specifications by using
barrels.

The choice not to use barrier wall came from

either Salt Lake down to the main office from our
region headquarters, that was way beyond.

We couldn't

have forced them to use barrier walls even if we
wanted them after the prints came out and they bid it
as barrels.
Q.

That's what I think you have explained to me.

The ultimate decision was made by the state?
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safety manager in the region*
Q.

Did Mr. Smith come and say, hey, Phil, I have

investigated this thing and it appears as though they
were putting those barrels right on the seam rather
than giving a little buffer zone here.

I want you to

get on those guys and make sure they don't do that
anymore.
A.

I can't recollect whether he did or not.

It's been three years ago.
Q.

I can represent to you that the Granite

Construction people said that nobody ever told them to
change the traffic delineation markers they had there.
So you wouldn't have told them to do that?
A.

No.

Q.

So you don't disagree with that

representation on their part that nobody from UDOT
ever told them to change anything.
A.

No.

Q.

There were apparently some other accidents

out there similar, people entering in the holes.

I

have been told about not only my accident, but at
least two other incidents where people went into the
holes.
A.

Were you familiar with those?
Vaguely familiar with one that happened down

on the south end down by the Kaysville interchange
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3

DYKE LeFEVRE,

4

called as a witness, by and on behalf of

5

the plaintiff, having been first duly

6

sworn, testified as follows:
EXAMINATION

7
8

BY MR. WARD:

9

Q.

Would you state your full name, please?

10

A.

Dyke LeFevre.

11

Q.

Are you presently employed by UDOT?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Are you retired?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

When did you retire?

16

A.

July of 2000.

17

Q.

What was your position with UDOT when you retired?

18

A.

Region one director.

19

Q.

How long had you been in that position?

20

A.

Since '95.

21

Q.

Did you work for UDOT before that time?

22

A.

Yes,

23

Q.

For how long?

24

A.

Total of 39 years.

25

Q.

What was your position when you first started?

1

I

Q.

It appears that the work area extends in several

2

I lanes, correct?

3

A.

Two lanes, plus a buffer.

4

Q.

You haven't reviewed the special provisions

5

applicable to this contract, have you?

6

A.

Not for five years.

7

Q.

Would this be one of those areas if there was a

8

question, that might be something that the contractor would

9

take to the field engineer?

10
11

MR. WARD: Asks him to speculate.

How would he

know what the contractor would do?

12

Q.

(BY MR. CHRISTENSEN)

13

A.

The interpretations of the things is probably

14
15

We have been talking about —

between the project engineer and the contractor.
Q.

If the contractor then agreed with the

16

interpretation of the field engineer, there wouldn't be any

17

need to start that process of requesting change orders, et

18

cetera, et cetera?

19

A.

If they were to follow it.

20

Q.

Are you aware of any documentation generated by the

21

State in response to Granite's request for the use of

22

concrete barriers, a formal written response to their

23

request, whether it was considered a change order or not?

24

you know whether the State ever wrote a letter following your

25

meeting with Granite?

Do

38

1

A.

I don't know.

Mr. Nichols was instructed to, but I

2

don't know if he ever wrote one.

3

him to write it, because the request came through him and he

4

would be the one to answer it.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

5
6

9

That's all the questions I have.

Thank you.
EXAMINATION

7
8

It would have been up to

BY MR. JACOBSON:
Q.

The only thing I wanted to clarify was back at the

10

start when you were asked how long you had been a region one

11

director.

12

recollection you also operated in that capacity at some prior

13

time period; is that correct?

14

A.

You said since 1995.

It seems like it was my

'89 — part of '89 and part of '90, I was the

15

regional director, and then I went to the State

16

preconstruction engineer from '90 to '95.

17

to that time, I was the director of region four or district

18

four from '85 to '89, the fall of '89.

19

MR. JACOBSON:

20
21
22

Five years prior

That's all I have.

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. WARD:
Q.

Mr. Nielson testified that it is not infrequent

23

that contractors will come in with change orders and use

24

those change orders to request money to inflate their profits

25

on the job.

Would you agree with that?
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
1
2

Q
J

Okay.
MR. JACOBSON:

Are you referring to any of

3

those elements, including the actual completion of

4

the work?

5

Q

(BY MR. WARD)

With the caveat being -- you

6

obviously hired Granite to complete the work.

7

understand that.

I

8

A

But to do the construction?

9

Q

Right.

10

A

But I can't recall if we hired anybody to

11

do any design, that I can remember.

12

Q

Or outside supervision, other than --

13

nobody else?

14

A

I don't recall any.

15

Q

You didn't hire anybody at any time to do

16
17
18
19
20

any safety studies?
A

Oh, we do, but I can't remember if we did

anything on this project.
Q

Well, if you would have, you, I assume,

would have put that in your affidavit, wouldn't you?

21

A

Not that I can remember that we did.

22

Q

So that's why you didn't put it in your

23

affidavit?

24

A

Right.

25

Q

Okay.

So in the design and supervision,

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1

MR. JACOBSON:

2

MR. WARD:

3

MR. JACOBSON:

MR. WARD:

He's talking about paragraph

nine.

8
9

What review are you claiming

he's done?

6
7

I do not have to preview my

questions to you.

4
5

What review --

MR. JACOBSON:

What review are you claiming

he's done?

10

MR. WARD:

Well, review or development.

11

talks about "worked together with officials of the

12

Federal Highway Administration."

13

about what they worked together on.

14

find that out.

15

Q

So my question is:

He

I want to find out
I'm entitled to

As you see this

16

document in front of you, the last page of that

17

Exhibit No. 5 of what's part of the special

18

provisions, who is the person referred to there where

19

it says "prior approval by the engineer" in the first

20

paragraph?

21
22
23

A

Is that the project engineer?
The project engineer is the final on all

proj ects.
Q

Well, so is that -- it doesn't say what

24

type of engineer, construction engineer or project

25

engineer, so should we assume project engineer?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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A

He has to approve it, but if there's things

that he is not sure of, he goes to a higher engineer,
but he's the one that finally has to say yea or nay
because he's the one that's managing the project.
MR. JACOBSON:

And let me just object to

that question and answer.

You're asking him to

interpret what's in this document.

This is a

document that was in your possession prior to his
deposition.

It has nothing to do with what's

mentioned in the affidavit.
MR. WARD:

I'll show you what it has to do

with.
MR. JACOBSON:

If you didn't go there last

time, that's your own fault, but that is going well
beyond the scope of this deposition.
MR. WARD:

Then you can ask the judge to

strike it if you think that's the case.
MR. JACOBSON:

I'm making my objection for

the record.
MR. WARD:
Q

I understand.

Look down at Phase 4.

Now, isn't that the

Phase 4 that's referred to in the Exhibit No. 7?
MR. JACOBSON:

Same objection.

Q

(BY MR. WARD)

At least part of it?

A

I assume it is.

I -- you know, without

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1

charact erization?

2

A

Yeah.

1

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

I guess I should have said yes, not yeah.

5

Q

That's okay.

Now --

That's fine.

In paragraph

6

18, you say, In response to Granite's proposals, I

7

considered the same safety, cost and time factors

8

that had been considered previously, and ultimately I

9

concluded that the safety and time considerations

10

could not justify the additional financial costs that

11

UDOT would be forced to incur if it accepted

12

Granite's proposal.

13

rejected.

As a result, the proposal was

Correct?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Now, do I understand the criteria that

16

you've used here, this "I considered the same safety,

17

cost and time factors," to be that the contract

18

called for the phasing to be done in a particular way

19

and that the traffic control plan was a safe way to

20

do that, as both shown in Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 here,

21

and that your consideration was, since it was agreed

22

upon and was safe to begin with, if they're worried

23

about it not being safe, then it's been their problem

24

and they need to pay to correct it, not the State.

25

Is that your thinking, as shown in paragraph 18 where

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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too, because he's the one that's also, you know,
agreeing to what they are.
Q

Pretty fair to say he relies on all his

regional directors?
A

He does.

Shortly after that project, I

think he quit signing plans and the regional
directors started to sign them.
Q

Yeah, I bet.

A

It wasn't because of that.

It's just that

he said, well, you guys are the ones that's really
responsible and you're making a decision.
telling me it's okay.

You're

Why don't you just go ahead

and sign it.
Q

Which bring up a question.

You know, you

refer to this traffic control plan and you referred
to the initial one, or you referred to it as a
proposed traffic control plan, but I think you
testified what was proposed wasn't really what ended
up the same thing -A

Yes.

Q

-- in the plans and specifications and

everything, but as we've looked through this, we see
no signature anywhere.

Is that common that you guys

would make up a traffic control plan and nobody owns
up to who did it?

How does that happen?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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referring just to this sheet.
every sheet.

We've looked through

Nobody can find who developed that

traffic control plan.
A

Generally a designer is supposed to sign

this sheet, but I see there's no

signature on it.

Q

So do we know for sure it was done by UDOT?

A

Well, I couldn't say it was a hundred

percent, but I'm fairly sure that's -- the designer
assigned to that project was a UDOT designer.
Q

Okay.

So there's no way this was done by

Granite Construction?
A

No.

Q

Because you have to get approval of the

FHWA?

You have to develop the traffic control plan?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Well, can Mr. Nichols decide to use

plastic barrels instead of concrete Jersey barriers,
or does it have to go to you?

You said this one went

to you, but does it have to?
MR. JACOBSON:

Objection.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I'm going to object.

This is well beyond what I understood the scope of
the deposition was.

Those questions were -- even

though I don't have my transcript of Mr. LeFevre's
deposition, I have a pretty clear recollection that

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

these were issues that were addressed there.

2

this is inappropriate.

3

MR. JACOBSON:

4

THE WITNESS:

I think

Join in the objection.
A change in the traffic

5

control plan would have to go to a designer -- not a

6

designer.

7
8
9

Q

A safety person.
(BY MR. WARD)

I'm not asking about a

change.
A

And then to me.

I may not write the letter

10

back and say I agree that Nichols has to make the

11

final letter, but somebody above him would probably

12

say, okay, we can go do that.

13

Q

I'm not asking about a change.

I'm saying,

14

in the development of the plan -- forget about any

15

change order.

16

you have to come up with the idea to use barrels or

17

could Nichols have said, well, I think, as we're

18

doing this, we ought to use barrels?

19

your other construction engineers.

20

A

21
22

Q

In this development of this plan, did

Or maybe one of

They could have suggested it.
MR. JACOBSON:

Same objection.

(BY MR. WARD)

So it wasn't necessarily

23

your idea to use -- the affidavit seems to imply it

24

was your idea to use -- but at least to me -- that it

25

was your idea to use plastic barrels.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

saying is it was UDOT's idea?

2

A

UDOT's idea.

3

Q

It could have been anybody?

4
5

engineer?
A

It could have.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6

I'm going to object.

7

Q

(BY MR. WARD)

8

A

It could have been Nichols.

9

A construction

Nichols, correct?
It could have

been many -- one of many.
MR. CHRISTENSEN;

10

I'm going to object that

11

the affidavit, paragraph 13, indicates that the final

12

decision to include plastic barriers was made by the

13

witness.

14

that were clearly discussed in the first deposition.

You know, this is getting back into areas

15

MR. WARD:

16

need clarification.

17

That brings up a good point.

MR. JACOBSON:

I don't think the affidavit

18

states whose idea it was, I mean, who came up with

19

this initial concept.

20

decisions.

21
22
23
24
25

MR. WARD:

This affidavit addresses

That's why I asked the

question.
MR. JACOBSON:

So you're asking questions

that aren't issues
MR. WARD:

I

They're bought up by the

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

decision to include plastic barrels rather than

2

concrete barriers in the proposed traffic control for

3

the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after

4

consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham."
So my question is:

5

Does that refer to this

6

issue of the request from Granite, hey, we want it

7

now.

8

use -- that you went to Topham and asked him about

9

that, or is this the initial decision before you ever

10

We want to

let the contract?
A

11
12

We've got this project going.

This had been the initial decision before

the contract was let.
Q

13

Okay.

So you remember specifically going

14

and talking to Mr. Topham about whether to use

15

plastic barrels?

16

A

What -- as the district director -- you

17

know, I'm not sure I talked to him specifically about

18

the barrels.

19

ready to go and I feel comfortable with what's go ing

20

on.

21

Q

What I talked to him is the project is

R-ight.

And I understand that.

In 01che: r

22

words, what you're say ing is , when we ' re going to

23

sign off on a proj ect, I go in and say I reviewed

24

everything and loo ked - - everything look ed good, and

25

if he has concerns , he asks it, but you didn't go in

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

and say, Is it okay for me to use plastic barrels on

2

this project to Clint Topham, did you?

3

A

Probably not, but, you know, he asked me,

4

Is there any concern you have with the project or

5

anything I should know about?

6

Q

Right.

7

A

I didn't have any.

8

Q

And that was based upon a plan that had

9

And you didn't have any?

been developed and the sequencing that had been

10

developed?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

When you had discussions with the FHWA

13

about developing this traffic control plan that you

14

referred to in your affidavit here, how specific were

15

they in this sense?

16

placements?

17

other than roughly show where the barrel placements

18

are to be, did you ever talk specifically about how

19

far apart they'd be or how big they'd be or what

20

they'd look like?

21

A

Did you ever talk about barrel

I mean, does the traffic control plan --

I don't think that would have ever come up

22

because the amount of orange and stuff on a barrel is

23

in a di fferent document.

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

And it's standard.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

talking initially, do you mean before the project was

2

let out to bid?
MR. WARD:

3
4
5

Q

Yes.

Before the project was let out to bid, you

talked over the use of the barrels with who?

6

A

With --

7

Q

I mean, I know - - you told me that your

8

underlings, Nielsen, guys like that, work with FHWA.

9

My question is:

Do you remember talking over the use

10

of barrels versus barriers with anybody besides your

11

own people, your own -- Nichols and your engineers

12

and stuff like that?
MR. JACOBSON:

13
14

Asked and

answered?
THE WITNESS:

15
16

Objection.

Q

No.

(BY MR. WARD)

Okay.

That's fine.

I

17

wanted to make sure.

So, now, when Granite comes

18

into the picture and then makes their request, did

19

you talk it over with -- their request, did you talk

20

it over with the FHWA?

21

A

Not that I recall.

22

Q

Do you remember talking that over with

23

Topham?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And his response was?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

A

What is the cost.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

Do we have money to make it?

4

Q

Okay.

And so you're left, once again, with

5

having to -- I guess that's why you say you

6

considered.

7

up to you, correct?

You're told, if you can afford it, it's

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Correct?

10

A

If I could have found a way to afford it

11

and keep the cost and time factor of the project, I

12

probably could have made that decision, but where it

13

involved extra cost, it probably would have had to go

14

back clear to the commission to even be considered.

15
16
17
18
19

Q

Well, now, every change order involves some

cost adjustment, doesn't it?
A

It does, but not to the volume or amount

that it would in this one.
Q

So is there kind of a trigger that takes

20

you to the commission?

21

considered this.

22

this because you felt the money was too high or --

23

I'm not sure what you're saying.

24

MR. JACOBSON:

25

THE WITNESS:

Why -- like you say, I

You didn't go to the commission on

Objection.
I knew the costs were too

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

high.

2
3

MR. JACOBSON:

We're going way beyond the

affidavit.

4

MR. WARD:

No, I'm not.

5

was just him that considered it.

6

MR. JACOBSON:

7

Why he didn't go to the

commission?

8

MR. WARD:

9

MR. JACOBSON:

10

It's about why it

Yeah, right.
There's nothing in the

affidavit about that.

11

MR. WARD:

It says "I considered."

12

he didn't consult with anybody, and that's my

13

question.

Why?

14

MR. JACOBSON:

15

THE WITNESS:

16
17

He says

I made my objection.
Well, I, as a UDOT engineer,

made that decision.
Q

(BY MR. WARD)

I understand.

But you

18

mentioned money, that you felt that you couldn't make

19

that decision because it was so much you'd have to go

20

to the commission.

21

it's more than 100,000, you don't feel comfortable

22

trying to make that decision unilaterally?

23

A

24

have to.

25

money?

Is there a number?

I mean, if

When it gets close to a million dollars you
Where are you going to come up with the

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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MR. WARD:

1

If it is, we can strike it.

2

Q

Go ahead and tell me if you recall that.

3

A

I know we went back and asked if there was

4

a reduction.

5

a reduction in the cost you're proposing, and also a

6

reduction in the time that you could do the project.

7
8

Q

There's two things we asked, if there's

(BY MR. WARD)

And that proposal was

carried by Mr. Nichols to --

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

-- the Granite -- okay.

Did you get any

11

written report or anything from Mr. Nichols about

12

that cost-benefit analysis and what had transpired?

13

A

Not that I recall.

14

Q

Is it fair -- in paragraph 15 you say --

15

A

Which one?

16

Q

Paragraph 15.

"My duties as the Region One

17

director required me to balance the safety factors,

18

cost factors and other factors on every project,

19

including the Layton-Clearfield project, in order to

20

ensure that the projects were completed as safely as

21

possible and as fast as possible and to ensure that

22

all of th.is was accomplished with the limited funds

23

aval lable

ti

24

Now, is it fair to understand that

25

statement to mean that basically that s what your job

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

was?

You say "My duties as the Region One director."

2

in other words, isn't the very thing you did here

3

what you do every day on a daily basis?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

There wasn't anything unusual or

6

outstanding about your involvement in this project

7

versus any other project, was there?

8

A

No.

9

Q

It was the kinds of things you do as part

10
11

of your daily duties every day?
A

Yes.

If the designers come in and say this

12

project is going to cost $3 million more than was

13

anticipated, why, and what do we have to do to get it

14

back in the money that we have available.

15

Q

And so you start your work?

You start

16

talking to people, you start looking for ways to save

17

money, you start making this analysis about do we

18

want to spend this much for this or can we afford to

19

get by w i t h that?

That's your job,

right?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Not only was that your job, it was every

22

region director's job, wasn't it?

23

A

That's true.

24

Q

So as I understand part of your analysis

25

that you made here regarding time -- you mentioned

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

that a couple of times here.

2

barriers, a negative for their use was that they're

3

more time consuming to use; is that right?

4
5
6

A

The use of the concrete

Concrete barriers generally requires more

time to take them down and put them up.
Q

And particularly in a case here where, at

7

night during off-peak hours, you wanted to run one

8

lane, and then during the day during peak hours, you

9

wanted to run two lanes.

You found it to be

10

impractical and unfeasible that you'd be moving

11

concrete Jersey barriers back and forth; is that

12

right?

13

A

That would be very difficult to do.

14

Q

And is that part of your analysis that you

15

did here?

16

A

Yes, it would be.

17

Q

Okay.

I wonder about this.

You said in

18

paragraph 19, "Although UDOT rejected Granite

19

Construction's requests for additional funding for

20

concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's

21

contract with Granite Construction which prevented

22

Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at

23

Granite Construction's own expense."

24
25

They would have had to request a change
order, wouldn't they?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

A

They would have.

2

Q

Are you saying by that that you guys would

3
4

have approved that?
A

If they'd have shown us how they could have

5

done it in the time frame that we wanted and within

6

the cost factor we already had, we'd probably have

7

approved it.

8
9

Q

Well, okay.

In other words, if they would

have paid for it?

10

A

Uh-huh.

11

Q

And then shown that it could be done safely

12

and expeditiously?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And it's your testimony that they never

15
16

came back and made that proposal to you?
A

17
18
19

They did not.
MR. WARD:

LeFevre.

I think that's all I have, Mr.

Thank you.
MR. JACOBSON:

If you could send that

20

deposition to my office and then I'll get it to Mr.

21

LeFevre to read and sign.

22

THE WITNESS:

23

MR. WARD:

What is this?

This is your consent to -- if

24

these guys won't settle this case with me, that

25

you'll come to trial.
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108.4.2 Construction Sequence: Construction operations shall proceed in order, phase by
phase, as detailed in the Traffic Control Plans. Any alteration to the Traffic Control Plan
phases or sequence of work must have prior approval by the Engineer. The construction
sequence is listed below:
108.4.2.1 PHASE 1. The outside lane and shoulder is closed, long term traffic
control for Roadway Excavation of existing asphalt shoulder, regrading and
replacement of the shoulder with Asphalt Concrete.
Bridge rehabilitation work that can be completed during this phase can begin.
108.4.2.2 PHASE 2. Short term traffic control is used to close the center lane, outside
lane and shoulder. The work operations are restricted during peak hour traffic flows
since only one traffic lane will be maintained. Roadway Excavation of shoulder and
replacement with Asphalt Concrete can continue. Full-Depth and Partial-Depth Repair
work in the outside lane can proceed during this phase.
108.4.2.5 PHASE 3. Long term traffic control is used to close the center lane, inside
lane and shoulder and shift traffic onto the outside lane and shoulder. Temporary
Traffic Paint is used on the outside shoulder to create the second traffic lane.
Shoulder and inside lane work of Partial-Depdi Repair, Full-Depth Slab Replacement,
Surface Grinding, Crack and Joint Sealing can be completed during this phase.
108.4.2.6 PHASE 4. Short lerm traffic control is used to close ail three lanes and
maintain one lane of traffic on the outside shoulder. Center lane work of Partial-Depth
Repair, Full-Depth Slab Replacement, Surface Grinding, Crack and Joint Sealing can
be completed during this phase. After all work is completed in this phase and after
proper concrete cure time is attained, the permanent Pavement Markings can be placed
and traffic allowed to travel on the rehabilitated pavement.
108.4.2.6 PHASE 5. Individual Bridge rehabilitation work can proceed according to
the traffic control plans.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
*

*

*

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

DEPOSITION OF:
JIMMIE KEYES

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS &
REED COMPANY, and JOHN DOES
i-v,
Defendants.

Civil No. 970760411 PI

COPY
Judge Thomas L.Kay

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 13th day of June,
2000, the deposition of JIMMIE KEYES, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the Plaintiff herein, in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before JAMIE ROBINSON, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
commencing at the hour of 10:06 a.m. of said day at the
offices of GRIDLEY WARD & SHAW, 849 West Hillfield Road,
Suite 202, Layton, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to
notice.
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Q.

That would be -- I don!t understand.

I said

would that hole constitute construction activity whether
there was workers there at that moment or not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So it would need proper delineation, wouldn't

A.

(No oral response.)

Q.

If the plan says when you have that hole

it?

there you've got to have more than one lane of traffic.
I'm asking who gave you authority to have two lanes just
because you didn't have workers there?
A.

That was -- the hole was not in the third

lane next to the one lane.
Q.

No, my question was who gave you the

authority to open another lane of traffic on the basis that
since you didn't have workers there there was no
construction activity?
A.

UDOT.

Q.

Who from UDOT told you that?

A.

It would be the inspector.

Q.

So that's Mr. Paskett?

A.

Possibly.

Q.

Possibly?

You talked to him; it wasn't me.

Who was it?
A.

There was two inspectors on the project.

JAMIE ROBINSON, CSR, RPR
DEPOMAX REPORTING (801) 328-1188
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Q.

So it would either be Paskett or who was the

other one?
A.

Kevin Griffen.

Q.

So you know that evening that, in fact, there

were two lanes of traffic open that this accident happened;
right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And you know that the lane of traffic my

client was traveling in literally buttressed up against
that hole -- in fact, there were four of them, one over 55
feet long, the others 15, 20, over a period of 400 feet on
the freeway, that that lane of traffic buttressed right up
against that hole.

Were you aware of that?

A.

Okay.

Q.

Were you aware that there was no delineation

mark on the pavement?
A.

There was barrels.

Q.

Right.

I said mark on the pavement, no

delineation striping to show where the hole started and
where the travel lane ended?
A.

Okay.

Q.

Now there were barrels, apparently, so many

feet; correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Do you know where those barrels were placed?

JAMIE ROBINSON, CSR, RPR
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Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs
in Construction M6 Maintenance Work Zones
Chitf, Construction and Maintenance Oivislon
Office of Highway Operations

Washington, P. C. 2QS90

oait

QEC I

AJITO?

. HHO-31

B86

Regional Federal Highway Administrators
Regions 1-10

Oirect Federal Program Administrator
One of the problems noted during our 1986 construction reviews and work
zone safety reviews involves pavement dropoffs adjacent to construction and
maintenance activities. These dropoffs include, those created by pavement or
bridge deck removal work, shoulder excavations, and the placement of new
layers of pav.ement. When not properly addressed, dropoffs may lead to an
errant vehicle losing control resulting in property damage, .injury, and
possibly death. It was found that many States do'not have any policy or
guidelines addressing this hazardous situation/ With the growing nunber
of 3R/4R projects, there is potential for. dropoff incidents to increase
significantly.
To address this concern, information has been compiled and used to develop
steps to mitigate potentially hazardous dropoffs. These suggested procedures
are based on findings from recent research, current policies and guidelines
fran a nunoer of States, and consideration of construction operations. The
information presented here is not Intended in any way to represent policy or
to serve as a directive of the F W A , nor does 1t represent or promulgate any
new standard. Instead, this Information 1s to provide guidelines to States
in the development of their own dropoff policy.
Any dropoff 1s considered hazardous, but those greater than 2 Inches, left
overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential.
For such situations, oat or a combination of the following mitigating measures
1s recommended;
1. Specify that the contractor schedule resurfacing or construction
operations such that no dropoff Is left unprotected overnight, or,
as a minimum, limit the length of the dropoff and the period of
exposure.
2.

If feasible, place steel plates to cover an excavation or trench.
A wedge of material around the cover may be required ]n order to
assure a smooth transition between the pavement and the plate.
Warning signs should be used to alert motorists of the presence
of steel plates particularly when the plates are on the travel
lanes.

era •-!
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I
3. Place a wedge of material along the face of the dropoff. The wedge
should consist of stable material placed at a 3:1 or flatter slope.
Warning signs may be needed in advance and throughout the treatment.
Pavement markings or markers are useful In delineating the edge of
the travel Ian*.
4. Place channelizing devices along the traffic side of the hazard and
maintain a 3-foot wide buffer between the edge of the travel lane and
the dropoff. Thero1n1muttspacing of the devices \n feet should be, at
most, twice the speed 1n miles per hour. Dropoff warning signs should
be placed in advance and throughout the dropoff treatment.
5. Install portable concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers
with a 2-foot buffer between the barrier face and the traveled way.
An acceptable crashworthy terminal or flared barriers are required at
the upstream end of the section. For nighttime use, the barriers must
be supplemented by standard delineation devices, 1.e.f paint,
retroreflectlve tape, markers, or warning lights.
For dropoffs greater than 6 inches, recommendation 5 is strongly suggested
if recommendations I or 2 are not feasible. Speed reduction measures need
to be considered particularly for recommendations 4 and 5. Although these
mitigating measures are directed to nighttime conditions, dropoffs must also
be properly addressed during daylight operations*
We recognize that there may be so*e reluctance by the States to develop a
dropoff policy or guidelines. The .primary concern that has been stated in
the past is that the development of such a policy would increase the
potential for tort liability actions. It has however also htw stated that
the existance of properly developed policies and conformance to those
policies can 1n fact provide the. State with a good defenst aoainst tort
liability. More Important however, 1s that such policies will provide
greater protection from accidents and Injuries for th* motorist.
We strongly encourage yog to work with the States on the development of such
policies. If any further information or technical assistance 1s%needed,
please contact us at your convenience*
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 970700411 PI

VS.

Judge Thomas L. Kay

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, dba GIBBONS
REED COMPANY, and JOHN
DOES I-V,
Defendants.
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DEPOSITION

OF:

KEVIN GRIFFIN
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of July 2000 the
deposition of KEVIN GRIFFIN produced as a witness
herein at the instance^of the plaintiff herein, was
taken before,TAMARA P. SIEBERT, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, commencing at the hour of 11:00 of said day at
the offices of GRIDLEY, WARD & SHAW, 849, W. Hillfield
Road, Suite 202, Layton, Utah.
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I

2

| going into a hole.

3

|

4

| testified earlier, you think it was a money issue as

5

| to why Granite didn't do that.

6

I

7

I

8

A.

Q.

A.

Exactly.

It's my understanding, you

That's correct.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Is why Granite didn't do it

or why the state didn't recommend it?

9
10

It would yes, definitely stop someone from

THE WITNESS:

Why the state didn't recommend

it.

11

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

12

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

There was a difference.

That's going to be my next

13

question.

Apparently, the state, as I have been told,

14

Granite went to the state and said we think we should

15

use jersey barriers there.

Were you aware of that?

16

A.

Yes, sir.

17

Q.

And this testimony is that high-ups in the

18

state said, "Well, we are not paying for it.

Go ahead

19

and use it if you want, but you have got to pay for

20

it."

Were you aware of that?

21

A.

Yes, sir.

22

Q.

So nobody disagreed that that was a good

23

thing to do, they just disagreed on who should pay for

24

it; right?

25

A.

It was a finance issue.

Basically, what

48
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1

recommendation from the Federal Highway

2

Administration.

3
4

A.

It's recommended that they do that, it's not

saying it has to be.

5

Q.

Isn't that a safety recommendation?

6

A.

If it actually states that, yes.

7

Q.

They weren't doing it just so everybody had

8

to spend more money, they were doing it to protect the

9

motoring public, weren't they?

10
11

recommendation.
A.

You are always saying it's just to protect

12

the motoring public.

13

there to protect the workers.

14
15

That's the

Q.

A lot of times it's actually

Both then, I think that's true, the workers

and the motoring public.

16

A.

Uh-huh.

17

Q.

So tell me what other reason besides the

18

finances that you know of that the state didn't say to

19

Granite, yeah, you're right, let's go ahead and use

20

those jersey barriers.

21

A.

None that I know of.

22

Q.

It was money?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And don't you agree that the jersey barriers

25

would have been safer?

50
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH,
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY,
JOHN DOES l-V,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
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Civil No. 970700411
Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendant Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT'1), through counsel, submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, and for those

reasons stated in UDOTs opening summary judgment memorandum, UDOT respectfully
asks the Court to grant UDOTs motion by dismissing all claims against UDOT as a matter
of law.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following paragraphs are numbered to correspond to fact paragraphs 1-20 on
pages 1-4 of plaintiffs summary judgment opposition memorandum:
1.

Although the precise facts surrounding the accident are not directly relevant

to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, it should be noted that
Trooper Lundeirs deposition testimony and accident report estimate plaintiffs speed at the
time of the accident as 70 mph rather than 65 mph. (Lundell Depo. at p. 38, plaintiffs
Exhibit 1; Accident Report, UDOTs Exhibit 19).
3.

UDOT acknowledges that the speed limit on 1-15 was raised from 55 mph to

65 mph between the time the Layton-Clearfield project was let out for bid, and the time
Granite actually commenced work on the project. That increase in speed limit was
mandated by the Utah legislature following the lifting of federal restrictions that prevented
individual states from having speed limits in excess of 55 mph. UDOT also acknowledges
that Granite made requests to have the 65 mph speed limit reduced after construction on
the Layton-Clearfield project had commenced. While the posted speed limit remained 65
mph at the time of plaintiffs accident, an advisory speed limit of 50 mph had been posted
on orange signs throughout the construction zone prior to plaintiffs accident. This 50 mph
2

advisory speed limit was posted and in effect at the time of plaintiffs accident. (Lundell
Depo. at pp. 38-39, plaintiffs Exhibit 1; Accident Report, UDOTs Exhibit 19).
4.

For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does not dispute

plaintiffs claim that the traffic control plan called for a solid white line to separate traffic
from the construction zone. If this matter proceeds to trial, however, UDOT contends that
the evidence will show that no solid white line was called for under UDOTs proposed
traffic control plan.
5.

For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does not dispute

plaintiffs claim that certain aspects of the traffic control plan were not followed on the night
of plaintiff's accident.

As UDOT makes clear in its summary judgment arguments,

however, it was not UDOTs responsibility to implement or monitor the traffic control plan,
and any failure to do so cannot be attributed to UDOT. Furthermore, if this matter does
proceed to trial, UDOT contends that the evidence will contradict all or part of plaintiffs
allegations that the traffic control plan was not followed.
6.

While UDOT acknowledges that it had personnel on the project site on a

daily basis, it disputes the allegation that UDOTs personnel were "supervising" the
construction work. There is nothing in the evidentiary cites provided by plaintiff which
indicates that UDOTs personnel were "supervising" Granite.
Plaintiffs evidentiary cites also do not support plaintiffs allegation that "UDOT took
no corrective action." The cited excerpts of Kent Nichols' testimony plainly state that Mr.

3

Nichols reported his concerns to his UDOT supervisors, and then went back to Granite's
representatives with instructions to do the work as required by the specifications. (Nichols'
Depo. at pp. 51-52, plaintiffs Exhibit 4). It should also be noted that the cited excerpts
from Mr. Paskett's deposition refer to UDOTs actions following plaintiffs accident, and Mr.
Paskett simply testified that he can't remember if UDOT took any corrective action at that
time. Since that testimony pertains to UDOT's conduct after the subject accident, it is not
relevant to the issues raised in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
7.

UDOT disputes plaintiffs allegation that the "Manual Uniform Traffic Control

Devices ("MUTCD") requires concrete barriers to divide construction from the motoring
public if there over a six-inch drop off in the pavement next to travel lanes." This allegation
is not supported by the evidentiary cites contained in plaintiffs summary judgment
opposition memorandum, and more importantly, plaintiff has failed to cite to any specific
provision of the MUTCD that contains such a requirement. Therefore, this allegation
should be entirely disregarded by the Court.
UDOT acknowledges that UDOT Region I Director Dyke LeFevre made the decision
to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield project, and
that the use of barrels was a less expensive alternative than concrete barriers. UDOT
disputes any insinuation, however, that cost was the sole factor behind Mr. LeFevre's
decision. There is undisputed evidence in both Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony and
affidavit that several factors, including safety, project completion time, and cost, all
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factored heavily into the decision to use plastic barrels. (LeFevre Affidavit U 14, UDOT
Exhibit 1; LeFevre Depo. at pp. 103-104, plaintiffs Exhibit 7)
8.

UDOT disputes any suggestion that Mr. LeFevre was not qualified because

he "had only recently been hired as the Region One [Director]" in 1995. Plaintiff fails to
mention the fact that prior to Mr. LeFevre's appointment as Region One Director in 1995,
Mr. LeFevre had also served as the Region One Director from 1989-1990, and had also
served as the Region Four Director from 1985-1989. When Mr. LeFevre retired from
UDOT in July of 2000, he had worked at UDOT for a total of 39 years. (LeFevre Depo.
at pp. 3, 39, plaintiffs Exhibit 7)
Plaintiffs suggestion that Mr. LeFevre "did not consult any of his UDOT superiors
or the FHA regarding his initial decision to use plastic barriers" is a gross misstatement of
the undisputed evidence. Mr. LeFevre stated very plainly in his affidavit and in his
deposition that Clint Topham and the FHA were consulted. (LeFevre Affidavit ^J16, UDOT
Exhibit 1; LeFevre Deposition at pp. 60-62, 67, 76, 91-93, plaintiffs Exhibit 7 and UDOT
Exhibit 20). 1
9.
1

Plaintiff seizes on a snippet of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony to attempt

The Court should not be confused by Mr. LeFevre's testimony on pages 92-93 of his
deposition wherein he stated that UDOT's discussions with the FHA (or FHWA) did not
go so far as to address specific barrel placement. Mr. LeFevre made it very clear that
an issue such as proper barrel placement is something that is standard for all projects,
and therefore, does not need to be addressed by the FHA. There is nothing in this
portion of Mr. LeFevre's testimony, however, that contradicts his other deposition and
affidavit statements that the FHA was directly involved with the decision to use plastic
barrels rather than concrete barriers.
5

to create the impression that UDOT did not study the safety issues surrounding the use
of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. Nothing, however, could be further from
the truth. The excerpt of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony cited by plaintiff simply states
that Mr. LeFevre cannot remember if UDOT hired any "outside" or "independent
contractors" to be involved with the design of the proposed traffic control plan. The
question being posed by plaintiffs counsel was whether anyone other than the FHA or
UDOTs own design engineers was involved in the design of that traffic control plan.
(LeFevre Depo. at pp. 58-61, UDOT Exhibit 20). It has been well established that UDOTs
own personnel and the FHA were heavily involved in evaluating the safety issues
surrounding the use of plastic barrels.
It should be noted that plaintiff has once again erroneously suggested, without any
evidentiary support, that the "MUTCD mandated concrete barriers."
10.

UDOT acknowledges that the names of the UDOT engineers who designed

the proposed traffic control plan are not noted on the actual plans. That fact, however, is
not material to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

Plaintiff never disputes the fact that Mr. LeFevre is the UDOT official who

made the final decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. Instead,
plaintiff attempts to cloud the issue by suggesting that Mr. LeFevre may not have initially
come up with that idea on his own. UDOT has never suggested that Mr. LeFevre was the
one who initially recommended the use of plastic barrels. The key factor for purposes of
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UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is the fact that Mr. LeFevre was the one who made
the final decision. That fact is undisputed.
13.

Plaintiff erroneously states that Granite's proposal was "denied by UDOTs

Project Engineer, Kent Nichols." While the 4/2/96 letter cited by plaintiff was signed by Mr.
Nichols, that letter states very clearly that Mr. Nichols had discussed the proposal with
Region One Director Dyke LeFevre, and that Mr. LeFevre rejected the proposal.
Plaintiff also attempts to create an issue by suggesting that Mr. Nichols lacked
experience with this type of construction project.

UDOT contends that Mr. Nichols'

experience is in no way material to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, and is nothing
more than a red herring thrown in by the plaintiff.
14.

Plaintiff completely ignores the undisputed facts by suggesting that "there is

no evidence" that "other supervisors," besides Mr. LeFevre, were involved in the decision
surrounding Granite's change order request. Mr. LeFevre stated in his deposition that he
specifically remembers discussing Granite's change order request with UDOT Deputy
Director Clint Topham, and that Mr. Topham gave his input on the decision. (LeFevre
Depo. at pp. 98-99, plaintiffs Exhibit 7). Mr Topham acknowledged this fact in his own
deposition, testifying that "the request came and I conferred with [Mr. LeFevre] about it and
we decided that we would not do it." (Topham Depo. at p. 31, attached hereto as UDOT
Exhibit 21)
15.

Plaintiff attempts to suggest that "there was never a formal response to
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[Granite's] proposed change order." Once again, this is nothing more than a red herring.
While there may not have been a written response to Granite's request, it is undisputed
that UDOT rejected the request. (LeFevre Affidavit fl 18, UDOT Exhibit 1; Topham Depo.
at p. 31, UDOT Exhibit 21)
18.

Plaintiff claims that UDOTs field engineer or inspector gave Granite authority

to open two lanes of traffic during off-peak hours if there were no workers in that part of
the construction zone. For purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT does
not dispute that fact. It is important to note, however, that Jimmie Keyes deposition
testimony, which is the only evidence cited by plaintiff in support of this fact, does not state
that UDOT expressly authorized two lanes of traffic on the night of plaintiffs incident, or
that UDOT authorized Granite to set up the barrels in the manner plaintiff has alleged
occurred on the night of plaintiffs accident. In fact there is no evidence that UDOT ever
authorized Granite to open two lanes of traffic in any manner other than that specified for
peak hour traffic in the traffic control plan.
19.

UDOT contends that the U.S. Department of Transportation ("USDOT")

memorandum, dated 12/1/86, is not material to the issues raised in UDOTs Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Mr. LeFevre and Mr. Topham both testified that the 12/1/86

memorandum is nothing more than a recommendation issued by the USDOT for purposes
of assisting the individual states in formulating their own policies. (LeFevre Depo. at pp.
24-27, UDOT Exhibit 20; Topham Depo. at pp. 10-11, UDOT Exhibit 21). That point is
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made clear by the memorandum itself which states:
The information presented here is not intended in any way
to represent policy or to serve as a directive of the FHWA,
nor does it represent or promulgate any new standard.
Instead, this information is to provide guidelines to States
in the development of their own dropoff policy.
(12/1/86 USDOT Memo., plaintiffs Exhibit 11) (emphasis added).
20.

See UDOTs response to plaintiffs Fact No. 5 above.

The following paragraphs are numbered to correspond to the fact paragraphs
contained in UDOTs opening summary judgment memorandum and plaintiffs response
to those facts at pages 5-8 of plaintiffs summary judgment opposition memorandum:
3.

Plaintiff attempts to dispute the fact that upper UDOT officials made the

decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton-Clearfield
project. Curiously, however, plaintiff also acknowledges that Mr. LeFevre was the one who
made this decision. There can be no question that Mr. LeFevre, as the Region One
Director, was one of the uppermost UDOT officials. Furthermore, it has been well
documented in the preceding paragraphs and in UDOTs opening summary judgment
memorandum that UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham was also involved in deciding
whether to use plastic barrels on this project.
5.

Plaintiffs attempt to dispute UDOT Fact No. 5 is based on several gross

mischaracterizations of the evidence. First, Mr. LeFevre plainly testified that he not only
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discussed the proposed traffic control plan with Clint Topham, but that Mr. Topham
actually signed off on the plans, thereby giving his written approval. (LeFevre Depo. at pp.
85-86, 91-92, UDOT Exhibit 20). Second, as was discussed earlier, Mr. Topham was
directly involved in the consideration and rejection of Granite's proposed change order.
(LeFevre Depo. at pp. 98-99, plaintiffs Exhibit 7; Topham Depo. at p. 31, UDOT Exhibit
21). Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to dispute that testimony. Finally, it is
entirely incorrect to suggest that the decision to reject Granite's proposal was "based
solely on the costs involved." Mr. LeFevre has repeatedly stated that several key factors,
other than financial cost, were also weighed heavily in the decision to use plastic barrels.
(LeFevre Affidavit fflj 14,18, UDOT Exhibit 1; LeFevre Depo. at pp. 95-96,103-104, UDOT
Exhibit 20)
6.

Plaintiff erroneously attempts to suggest that the FHA was not involved in the

decision to use plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield project. The only evidence cited
by plaintiff, however, is a snippet of Mr. LeFevre's deposition testimony where he states
that the FHA was not involved in UDOTs decision to reject Granite's proposed change
order after the project had already commenced. The undisputed evidence clearly
shows, however, that the FHA was directly involved in the decision making process that
occurred during the original development of the proposed traffic control plan, including the
decision to use plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers. (LeFevre Affidavit fflj 10-12,
UDOT Exhibit 1; LeFevre Affidavit at pp. 60-62, 67, 76, UDOT Exhibit 20)
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20.

See UDOTs responses to plaintiffs Fact No. 14 and UDOT Fact No. 5, both

of which are discussed above.
21.

Despite plaintiffs attempt to dispute UDOT Fact No. 21, plaintiff has failed

to provide any evidentiary support for his response. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, UDOTs Fact No. 21, which was properly
supported by evidence in the record, must be deemed admitted for purposes of UDOTs
Motion for Summary Judgment.
22.

Plaintiffs response to UDOT Fact No. 22 likewise lack's any evidentiary

support, and therefore, UDOTs Fact No. 22 must also be deemed admitted for purposes
of UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment.
23.

Although, UDOT has pointed out the fact that Granite could have decided to

use concrete barriers at its own cost, UDOT has never alleged that Granite was expected
or required, either under the contract or otherwise, to furnish concrete barriers.
24.

See UDOTs response to plaintiffs Fact No. 3 above.

26.

UDOT acknowledges that the facts surrounding plaintiffs accident are

disputed. The Court should note, however, that the description of the accident contained
in UDOT Fact No. 26 was simply intended to provide the Court with a general
understanding of the facts surrounding the accident. The precise facts surrounding the
accident, and any dispute surrounding those facts are not material to the issues raised in
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment.
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ARGUMENT
In plaintiffs response to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff has
attempted to avoid summary judgment by suggesting that there are disputed facts which
preclude summary judgment. In an attempt to support this argument, plaintiff has grossly
distorted the deposition testimony offered by several witnesses, and has completely
ignored other key pieces of undisputed evidence. UDOT urges this Court to look closely
at the evidence cited by the parties. In doing so, the Court will see that those facts which
are material to UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment are, in fact, undisputed, and that
those facts weigh heavily in support of UDOTs Motion.
In addition to those undisputed facts, the legal arguments advanced by the parties
also strongly suggest that the claims against UDOT should be dismissed as a matter of
law.
I.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HIS CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT
ARE NOT BARRED UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION.

The parties are apparently in agreement as to the legal standard applicable to the
discretionary function exception of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The only issue
which the Court must resolve is whether the facts of this case fall within the holding of
Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), or Truiillo v. UDOT. 986 P.2d 752
(Utah App. 1999). Not surprisingly, plaintiff has argued that the facts of this case mirror
those found by the Utah Court of Appeals in Trujillo. UDOT contends, however, that the
12

present case is easily distinguishable from Truiillo, and that the holding of Keegan must
apply.
The primary distinction between the present case and Truiillo is the amount of
evidence presented to this Court establishing that the discretionary function exception is
applicable. As was noted by the Utah Court of Appeals in Truiillo, the record presented
to the court "contained] no evidence that the traffic control plan was ever specifically
singled out for discussion, review, or approval at any point in the approval process." 986
P.2d at 756. In the present case, however, there is overwhelming undisputed evidence
showing that not only was the traffic control plan singled out, but also that the key issue
of whether to use plastic barrels or concrete barriers was singled out and scrutinized by
UDOT engineers, FHA officials, and finally upper UDOT management, including UDOT
Region One Director Dyke LeFevre who made the final decision. Furthermore, after the
project commenced, that issue was singled out for a second look, and once again, upper
UDOT management analyzed the various safety, cost, and time factors involved with using
barrels and barriers before deciding to stand by their initial decision.
Plaintiff has not disputed the fact that the barrel versus barrier issue was scrutinized
and ultimately decided by Mr. LeFevre. Instead, plaintiff has attempted to argue that Mr.
LeFevre was not an upper UDOT official making discretionary function types of decisions,
but rather someone acting on the operational level. Such an argument completely ignores
the undisputed facts of this case. Mr. LeFevre was UDOTs senior most official for all of
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Region One. His decision regarding the use of barrels took into account not just the
operational factors that would be of concern to project engineers and contractors, but also
the financial cost factors, safety factors, and public impact factors that are at the heart of
the discretionary function exception. UDOT and plaintiff both agree that these are the
types of issues Mr. LeFevre, as the Region One Director, was forced to deal with on a
daily basis.
In support of UDOTs argument that Mr. LeFevre was acting at the policy making
level rather than the operational level, UDOT obtained a copy of the appellate brief filed
by UDOT in Keegan for purposes of evaluating what level of decision making had occurred
in that case where the Utah Supreme Court found that the discretionary function exception
was applicable. (Relevant Portions of UDOTs Brief in Keegan are attached hereto as
Exhibit 22). In Keegan, the only evidence presented to the Court in support of UDOTs
claim that the discretionary function exception would apply was evidence that a UDOT
safety studies engineer had conducted a safety study, and that the project design engineer
had prepared a cost-benefit report based on that safety study. (Keegan Brief at pp. 7-9).
There was no evidence, however, that anyone superior to the safety studies engineer or
project design engineer was involved in the analysis or decision process, and there is
certainly no evidence that the analysis or decision made it all the way to the Region
Director who supervised those engineers.
Since the facts in Keegan were found by the Utah Supreme Court to be sufficient
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to warrant a summary judgment in favor of UDOT, there can be no question that UDOT's
analysis and decisions surrounding the use of plastic barrels on the Layton-Clearfield
project rose to the policy making level that falls squarely within the discretionary function
exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.
II.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR HOLDING
UDOT LIABLE FOR A FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED
TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN OR MONITOR GRANITE'S WORK.

Although though plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to suggest that UDOT played
an active role in the implementation of the traffic control plan, plaintiff has failed to present
any evidence to dispute the contract language or the deposition testimony of UDOTs and
Granite's employees which clearly establishes that Granite alone shouldered the
responsibility of implementing and monitoring the traffic control plan on the LaytonClearfield project. Since there is absolutely no evidence suggesting that UDOT had any
involvement in the implementation or monitoring of the traffic control plan, UDOT cannot
be held liable for any alleged failure to follow the traffic control plan on the night of
plaintiffs accident.
III.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY BASIS FOR HOLDING
UDOT LIABLE FOR GRANITE'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE.

Finally, plaintiff does not dispute that Granite was hired by UDOT as an
independent contractor on the Layton-Clearfield Project. Despite this undisputed fact,
plaintiff has attempted to argue that UDOT can be held vicariously liable for Granite's
alleged negligence because UDOT allegedly controlled Granite's employees and
15
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operations. The only evidence offered in support of this argument is the fact that UDOT
had inspectors and engineers on the project site on a daily basis. That fact alone,
however, falls woefully short of establishing that UDOT was controlling Granite.
Both plaintiff and UDOT have relied on Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah
1999) to support their respective positions. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated
as follows:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the
employer must have retained at least some degree of control
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough
that he has merely a general right to order the work
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which
need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe
alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the
contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to
operative detail.
] d at 327 (emphasis added). In the present case, UDOTs daily involvement on the
Layton-Clearfield Project amounted to little more than monitoring and inspecting the
construction work being done by Granite. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence disputing
the fact that Granite was free to use the means and methods it desired to fulfill its
obligations under the contract.
Since UDOT did not exercise control over Granite's means and methods of work,
UDOT cannot be held liable for Granite's alleged negligence.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for those reasons stated in UDOTs opening
summary judgment memorandum, UDOT respectfully asks this Court to grant its Motion
for Summary Judgment by dismissing the claims against UDOT with prejudice and as a
matter of law.
DATED this 1 Y

day of November, 2002.
STRONG & HANNI

rayner
tobson
Defendant UDOT
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
plan sheet.
A

Do you remember looking at that before?

Yes, we looked at .it last time.

Phase 4

and 3 .
Q

And my exact question is going to b e :

Was

that document -- I know it's not the whole traffic

|

control plan, but is that part of the document that

\

you ref erred to in paragraph seven when you said
"inc luded a proposed traffic control plan"?
thoise plans, you mean?

A

It was part of

Q

Yes.

A

Which is what, 6?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes, they were.

Q

So 7 would be just a one document out of

many , but was one of the documents that was part of
it?
A

Yes.

One page, essentially.

MR. WARD:

Okay.

Now let's mark this.

!
!

(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit N o . 8 was
marked
Q
plan

for identification. )
In the development of that traffic control
well, let me ask you this:

You say in the

[ next paragraph, paragraph eight, "Throughout the

j

various phases of the Layton -Clearfield project,
several levels of UDOT personnel were involved in the

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328--1188
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
decisions, design, supervision" -- I'll just leave it
at that.

That's paragraph eight, okay?
Now, my question is:

Was there anybody

involved in the design and supervision and completion
of the work, other than UDOT personnel?
A
input.

Oh, Federal Highway Administrations have
The district designers have input.

Q

What are district designers?

A

Those are the people that really put the

thing together.
Q

They don't work for UDOT?

A

They do.

Q

Well, then they would constitute UDOT

personnel.
A

Yes, they'd be UDOT personnel.

Q

My question --

A

But there's different levels of UDOT

personnel that get involved.
Q

I understand, but my question is:

Did

anybody besides UDOT personnel get involved in that?
Did you hire any outside third independent
contractors to do anything or to evaluate anything or
design anything or develop anything?
A

On this particular project, I can't totally

recall, but I don't think so.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
Q

Okay.
MR. JACOBSON:

Are you :referring to any of

those elements, including the actual completion of
the work?
(BY MR. WARD)

Q

With the caveat being -- you

obviously hired Granite to complete the work.

I

understand that.
A

But to do the construction?

Q

Right.

A

But I can't recall if we hired anybody to

do any de sign, that I can remember.
Q

Or outside supervision, other than --

nobody el se?
A

I don't recall any.

Q

You didn't hire anybody at any time to do

any safety studies?
A

Oh, we do, but I can't remember if we did

anything <on this project.
Q

Well, if you would have , you, I assume,

would have put that in your affidavit, wouldn't you?
A

Not that I can remember that we did.

Q

So that's why you didn't put it in your

affidavit p
A

Right.

Q

Okay.

So in the design and supervision,

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
what you do is, once you've got a design and you know
what you want to do, that's when you go meet with the
FHA, correct?
A

Or FHWA, whatever they're called.

There's several meetings with the FHWA.

There's kind of a preliminary meeting when you go
concept; this is what we want to do.

And we discuss

that and then we go back and develop it into design
plans, and then it goes back to the -- you know, for
another review with all the people involved and say,
"Is this what we had in mind," and they all agree.
Q

And anywhere in the process you've just

described would you have already reached the stage
shown in Exhibit 6?

Would you have ever had this

kind of specificity prior to the project -A

Oh, yes.

This thing was -- there's that

level of meeting before the plans go out.
Q
them?

Okay.

Because you're looking for aid from

They have to be intimately involved?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Now --

A

Yeah.

Since they provide the money, they

have a little bit of say.
Q

So is it fair to say, then, in terms of

paragraph eight, not only were several levels of UDOT
personnel involved, but several levels of FHWA people

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
were involved?

Or do you do all that work and then

go to them?
A

We do the work and then go to them.

Q

Well, that's kind of what my question was.

You develop the plan?
A

Yes.

Q

And you go to them.

and say, "Here's our idea.

You don't go to them

Why don't you draft

something"?
A

No.

They don't do any designing.

They

recommend and -Q

Review?

A

And review, yeah.

Q

Okay.

understand.

So that's -- I want to make sure I

Only the UDOT people are involved in

what you show in paragraph eight?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Now, I have pulled out, without

going through the full book that you call the blue
book, and I guess what I want to -- well, first what
I want to ask you is:
mean UDOT.

Would you develop - - b y you, I

Would UDOT develop the table of contents

and then run this by the FHWA, or does the FHWA get
involved in the special provisions?

You understand

what I'm saying?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LeFEVRE,

EXAM BY WARD

having -- seeing the whole document, just seeing
these twc>, I'd say it probably was.
Q

Okay.

Now, you say, as I understand it,

that you develop these documents and you take them to
the Federal Highway Work Administration and there's a
give and take, and the ultimate product is the
combination of your efforts and the Federal Highway
Administration's efforts; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Would these documents that are in front of

l us as exhLibits right now, would they have been part
of what you referred to as working together with,
being developed with, in paragraph nine of your
affidavit where you say you worked with officials of
the Federal Highway Administration to develop a
i proposed traffic control plan?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Now, in Phase 4 it says short-term

traffic control is used to close all three lanes and
maintain one lane of traffic on the outside
shoulder.

Is that what is shown in Deposition

Exhibit No. 7?

Q

MR. JACOBSON:

Same objection.

(BY MR. WARD)

Doesn't it show all three

lanes closed, one lane on the outside shoulder open?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
testified about this, but if this plan were to be

1

changed, it had to be done through the proj<set
engineer in writing?
A

Yes.

Q

You say in paragraph ten that the primary

means of traffic channelization throughout 1:he
project was something which underwent

substantial

scrutiny and was ultimately decided by UDOT 's upper
management and FHA officials.

Now, are you talking

about - - is this a point in time where you're talking
about bef ore you've ever even let it out for bid, or
is this - - are you talking about -- is this the time
when the contractor came back?
A

No.

This would be before it was awarded.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Which paragraph are you

referring to?
MR. WARD:
Q

Ten.

(BY MR. WARD)

In your experience -- well,

do you understand that the reason the traffic, by
your safe ty engineers, was run out one lane from the
cutoff was for safety purposes, that UDOT was giving
up a lane of travel for safety purposes?
MR. JACOBSON:

Let me just object

Going

beyond the scope of the affidavit here.
MR. WARD:

Well, no, it isn't.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

He's
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LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
Q

(BY MR. WARD)

And that reason was because

your involvement in decision making regarding barrels
and Jersey barriers was specifically oriented towards i
their use in this specific project designated in
Exhibit 6, correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

And so it wouldn't be something applicable

in every situation?
A

No.

Q

And so it doesn't have to go above you for

a decision, does it?

i

A

For this thing here?

Q

Right.

A

No.

Q

I mean you didn't violate any rule by not"

asking somebody else, can I use Jersey barriers
versus p lastic barrels or -A

No.

Q

You didn't have to go to the governor or

anybody, did you?
A

No.

Q

You made that decision?

A

I did.

As you noticed on the front of

those pi ans, Clint Topham, as the state engineer,
signed those, so he has to know about those things,

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

85

LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
too, because he's the one that's also, you know,
agreeing to what they are.
Q

Pretty fair to say he relies on all his

regional directors?
A

He does.

Shortly after that project, I

think he quit signing plans and the regional
directors started to sign them.
Q
A

Yeah, I bet.
' It wasn't because of that.

It's just that

he said, well, you guys are the ones that's really
responsible and you're making a decision.
telling me it's okay.

You're

Why don't you just go ahead

and sign it.
Q

Which bring up a question.

You know, you

refer to this traffic control plan and you referred
to the initial one, or you referred to it as a
proposed traffic control plan, but I think you
testified what was proposed wasn't really what ended
up the same thing -A

Yes.

Q

-- in the plans and specifications and

everything, but as we've looked through this, we see
no signature anywhere.

Is that common that you guys

would make up a traffic control plan and nobody owns
up to who did it?

How does that happen?
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decision to include plastic barrels rather than
concrete barriers in the proposed traffic control for
the Layton-Clearfield project was made by me after
consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham."
So my question is:

Does that refer to this

issue of the request from Granite, hey, we want it
now.

We've got this project going.

We want to

use -- that you went to Topham and asked him about
that, or is this the initial decision before you ever
let the contract?
A

This had been the initial decision before

the contract was let.
Q

Okay.

So you remember specifically going

and talking to Mr. Topham about whether to use
plastic barrels?
A

What -- as the district director -- you

know, I'm not sure I talked to him specifically about
the barrels.

What I talked to him is the project is

ready to go and I feel comfortable with what's going
on.
Q

Right.

And I understand that.

In other

words, what you're saying is, when we're going to
sign off on a project, I go in and say I reviewed
everything and looked -- everything looked good, and
if he has concerns, he asks it, but you didn't go in

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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and say, Is it okay for me to use plastic barrels on
this project to Clint Topham, did you?
A

Probably not, but, you know, he asked me,

Is there any concern you have with the project or
anything I should know about?
Q

Right.

And you didn't have any?

A

I didn't have any.

Q

And that was based upon a plan that had

been developed and the sequencing that had been
developed?
A

Yes.

Q

When you had discussions with the FHWA

about developing this traffic control plan that you
referred to in your affidavit here, how specific were
they in this sense?
placements?

Did you ever talk about barrel

I mean, does the traffic control plan --

other than roughly show where the barrel placements
are to be, did you ever talk specifically about how
far apart they'd be or how big they'd be or what
they'd look like?
A

I don't think that would have ever come up

because the amount of orange and stuff on a barrel is
in a different document.
Q

Okay.

A

And it's standard.

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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Q

But there is going to be agreement in some

place, ei ther by understanding, by normal custom and
business or by written document, as to what barrels
you were talking about there and -A

Yes •

Q

"

they'd be ?

approximate size and how far apart
Might be

—

MR. JACOBSON:

This has nothing to do with

what's in the affidavit.
MR. WARD:

Well, it's got to do with his

saying he 's h ad discussion with developing the
i traffic control plan.
MR. JACOBSON:

There's nothing about barrel

placement , size of barrels.
MR. WARD:

It's the traffic control plan

I'm asking him about and the specificity -MR. JACOBSON:
MR. WARD:

Then why did you --

Can I finish?

You ask me a

question and then interrupt my answer.
MR. JACOBSON:

Why didn't you ask those

questions during his last deposition?
MR. WARD:

I didn't have the affidavit.

MR. JACOBSON:

And it's not in the

affidavit •
MR. WARD:

Yes, it is.
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that, Scott, and that's why we're doing this depo
now.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
MR. WARD:
Q

Well, I disagree.

That's the way it goes.

So here's what I'm saying to you:

You

didn't have specificity discussions with the FHWA
about the types of barrels, how far apart they'd be,
where they'd be placed, those kinds of things?
A

No.

That would not be part of the

discussions with the FHWA.
Q

That's developed internally through your

own standards?
A

That's standards that go beyond this

particular project.

The spacing and tapers and stuff

is another standard altogether.
Q

But it's an established standard?

A

It is, yes.

Q

That the FHWA understands?

A

It's kind of an established standard

throughout the country.
Q

Okay.

A

It's more than just UDOT.

Q

When you did what you say here -- once

again in paragraph 18 -- you said, I considered the
same safety, cost and time factors that had been

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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considered previously.

You're referring to -- this

is now after the request by Granite?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, did you go through the same analysis

as you did initially when you say I considered the
same safety, cost and time factors?

Was anything

different, other than Granite was now specifically
requesting through a letter that they be given money
for Jersey barriers?
A

Well, the other different thing is, is if

we use barrels, how do we modify the traffic control
plan to provide -Q

If you use barriers, you mean?

A

Or barriers.

Excuse me.

If you use

barriers for the traffic to get through the project,
especially in a Phase 4 mode, and so we have to
analyze that, and if we change to a concrete barrier,
a different traffic control plan altogether would
have had to have been developed and there would have
been a cost and a time involved in construction and
the whole works.
Q

Now, did you -- you just -- you don't say

here that you've discussed with the FHWA.

This is

something you did on your own, right?
A

Yes.
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You say "My duties as the Region One director."

in othe r words, isn't the very thing you did here

!

what yo u do every day on a daily basis?
A

Yes.

Q

There wasn't anything unusual or

j

outstanding about your involvement in this project
versus any other project, was there?
A

No.

Q

It was the kinds of things you do as part

j

of your daily duties every day?
A

Yes.

If the designers come in and say this

project is going to cost $3 million more than was
anticip ated, why, and what do we have to do to get it j
back in the money that we have available.
Q

And so you start your work?

You start

talking to people, you start looking for ways to save
money, you start making this analysis about do we
want to spend this much for this or can we afford to
get by with that?

That's your job, right?

A

Yes.

Q

Not only was that your job, it was every

region director's job, wasn't it?
A

That's true.

Q

So as I understand part of your analysis

that you made here regarding time -- you mentioned

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

103
/

of?

LeFEVRE, EXAM BY WARD
that a couple of times here.

The use of the concrete

barriers, a negative for their use was that they're
more time consuming to use; is that right?
A

Concrete barriers generally requires more

time to take them down and put them up.
Q

And particularly in a case here where, at

night during off-peak hours, you wanted to run one
lane, and then during the day during peak hours, you
wanted to run two lanes.

You found it to be

impractical and unfeasible that you f d be moving
concrete Jersey barriers back and forth; is that
right?
A

That would be very difficult to do.

Q

And is that part of your analysis that you

did here?
A

Yes, it would be.

Q

Okay.

I wonder about this.

You said in

paragraph 19, "Although UDOT rejected Granite
Construction's requests for additional funding for
concrete barriers, there was nothing in UDOT's
contract with Granite Construction which prevented
Granite Construction from using concrete barriers at
Granite Construction's own expense."
They would have had to request a change
order, wouldn't they?
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1

will have her mark.

2

(The reporter marked Deposition Exhibit 2.)

3

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

This is Plaintiff's Exhibit 2,

4

Mr. LeFevre.

5

letter to the Regional Federal Highway Administration clear

6

back in 198 6 having to do with the guidelines for mitigating

7

pavement dropoffs and construction zone and maintenance work

8

zone.

It is a memorandum —

a copy of a memorandum, a

You understand what a pavement dropoff is?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

You understand that as shown on Phase 4 there were

11

going to be cutouts in the center lane of this project?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Those cutouts would be as deep as 10 to 12 inches,

14

as wide as a full lane of traffic, some 30 feet long, some 60

15

feet long.

16

needed to be replaced.

Just varied, depending on how much concrete

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

You understand that would be considered a pavement

19

droppoff?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

If you would look at this letter that was sent out

22

to everybody in 1986.

23

Have you had a chance to read that exhibit?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Is there anything in there you would disagree with

24

/0^1

as a safety principle?
A.

Probably not.

Q.

That is a guideline for when you have pavement

dropoffs in excess of certain inches, right, two inches, six
inches, whatever?
A.

Yes.

Q.

In this case, the pavement droppoff was in excess

of six inches that our client went into, and it says that the
strongly-recommended situation is that you install portable
concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers with
a two-foot buffer zone between the barrier face and the
travel portion of the road.

You would agree with that as a

principle?
A.

Yes.

Q.

In this case, why you didn't think that was going

to be applicable is the Traffic Control Plan shows you
wouldn't be traveling next to an open cutout?
A.

That's correct.
(The reporter marked Deposition Exhibit 3.)

Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

Let me show you what has been marked

as Exhibit 3, which is a picture of the center cutout and
barrel placement in accordance with the Traffic Control Plan
where they reduced it to one lane of traffic so there is an
actual lane between the cutouts and the travel lane.

You can

see that?

oc

1

A,

Yes.

2

Q.

That is appropriate, correct, according to the

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Let me represent to you what actually occurred on

3

plan?

6

the night of this accident was that the Granite traffic

7

control person took the barrels that closed it down to one

8

lane and simply moved them over and lined them up with the

9

cutoff.

Actually putting barrels in the cutout rather than

10

any kind of a buffer zone, but actually putting them in the

11

cutout and then ran traffic right next to the cutout.

12

would be a violation of the Traffic Control Plan, wouldn't

13

it?

That

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

That would be unsafe, wouldn't it?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

That would be something you would never approve,

18

correct?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

That would be something you would not allow your

21

field engineer to approve, either, correct?

22

A.

If he knew about it, yes.

23

Q.

Yes, you wouldn't allow it?

24

A.

I wouldn't allow it.

25

Q.

Does the State have guidelines that differ from

26

fO 6?f

1
2
3
4

Exhibit 2 as regards to pavement dropoffs?
A.

No.

They are guidelines, and we try to follow them

as best we can.
Q.

They are federal guidelines and, if I understand

5

the contracts, you get money from the federal government.

6

And as part of the strings attached to that, they require you

7

to follow their guidelines; is that correct?

8
9

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

12
13

I think that calls for

a legal conclusion.

10
11

I object.

THE WITNESS:

Guidelines are recommendations.

It

doesn't mean we have to follow them.
Q.

(BY MR. WARD)

I assume you try to be consistent

with safety as much as possible?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

There may be some instances where you vary?

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

You can't vary too much or they won't approve the

18

project?

19

A.

Right.

20

Q.

They already approved it based on Exhibit 1?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

If they were to change it, it would have to be in

23

They already approved this project.

writing?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Approved by you and t h e Federal Highway
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TOPHAM, EXAM BY WARD
changed unilaterally by the contractor; it must be
through written agreement with the State, correct?
A

I'd say that would depend on the contract.

If the contract says that, that would be the case.
Q

Yeah.

Okay.

I want to show you a

memorandum from the U.S. Department of
Transportation.

It was sent out in 1986.

What was

your position in 1986 with UDOT?
A

'86.

1986, I was the engineer for planning

and programming.
Q

Okay.

So you may well have seen this.

If

you'd take a moment and look at Exhibit 1.
A

(Time lapse.)

Okay.

Q

Fair to say that that document refers to

standards that should be followed with pavement
dropoffs depending on the depth of the pavement
dropoff?
A
to —

It refers to that, but I think you need
when I was at UDOT, I would have read this

second paragraph here where -- I think it's the
second paragraph -- where it says that -- and this is
consistent with what I said earlier, that the feds
don't develop these standards.

The states develop

the standards and the feds give input to that.
In this second paragraph here, it says this

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188

10
tf)

(*h

TOPHAM,

EXAM BY WARD

is to serve -- this is -- this information presented
here is not intended in any way to represent policy
to serve as a directive of the FHWA, nor does it
represent or promulgate any new standard.

Instead,

j

it is information provided to the states, and then
they take that information and decide whether to
adopt a standard based on it or not.
Q

Okay.

Now, this was in 1986.

Do you know

if at any time since 1986 the State has adopted the
same or similar standards for pavement dropoffs?
A

Don't know that.

Q

What if I were to tell you that the

contract that controlled this situation that we're
here about today, according to -- your project
engineer testified that that same standard applied,
that anything below six -- I'm sorry -- any change in
the pavement dropoff in excess of six inches required
either the use of Jersey barriers to separate it from
traffic flow or it be covered, as recommended in that
manual, so that a car couldn't go into that hole.
Would that surprise you?
A

I wouldn't -- I just wouldn't know.

Q

Okay.

A

Just wouldn't know.

Q

Would you believe that would be a good
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Now, this accident happ<ened at 4:00 a.m. in

the morni ng that I'm here about, <and it's been
testified that that was the off-p<sak hours, and so,
according to the traffic control ]plan, there should
have been one lane open, correct, as you look at that
plan?
A

Well, you know, I don't know for sure.

Sometimes this could be that -- I think it could
be -- don 't know -- but it could ]possibly be that
there were times that they wanted to just go to one
! lane and there were times when they thought they
I could keep two lanes open.

I don 't know the answer

to that.
Q

But by looking --

A

By looking at this plan , I would say that

it shows it being one lane during the off-peak hours.
Q

And it shows a separation -- it shows --

those little dots, I assume, are the barrels.

That's

what you would assume, too?
A

(Witness nods.)

Q

And it shows a separation.

Those barrels

seem to b e kind of in the middle of the second lane,
which wou Id be, according to -- I think it was Mr.
LeFevre - - some six to eight feet away from the
cutouts.

And you know what I mean by cutouts?
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it out as an offer.
Q

And in an affidavit filed by Mr. LeFevre,

he said, "I concluded that the safety and time
considerations could not justify the additional
financial costs that UDOT would be forced to incur if
it accept ed Granite's proposal," indicating that
Granite's proposal was that UDOT pay for it,
correct?
A

Do you remember that?
Yeah.

Well, there was a request come --

that I considered, and I don f t know whether -- I
assumed it was -- that Granite was -- well, I know
that Granite was involved with it.

I don't know all

of those workings.
Q

Sure .

A

But the request came and I conferred with

Dyke about it and we decided that we would not do it.
Q

Okay.

Mr. LeFevre went on to say that

several factors were considered in his decision to
stay with plastic barrels, and the first factor he
lists is the safety of project workers and the
motoring public, so you would agree that that, if not
the first , it's certainly one of the most important
factors?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Okay.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

44

The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j)

42

(Supp, 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of

governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34

(1993) does not infringe upon any

substantial right protected by the open courts provision of Utah
Const., Art. I, § 11 (1991).
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
-x-

West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002
(Utah 1993).
2. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of

governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34

(1993) , does not

infringe upon any

substantial right protected by the wrongful death action provision

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
w»i,f Vallev Citv Corp. ^

gait Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002

of Utah Const., Art. XVI, § 5 (1991).
(Utah 1993).
STANDARD OP REVIEW?

This Court accords no deference to a

5.

The question of whether the damage cap found in Utah Code

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) may constitutionally be applied to actual
West Valley Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002
compensatory damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and
(Utah 1993).
suffering and punitive damages, was not raised by the plaintiff in
3. Because no substantial right protected by the Constitution

the trial court.

This Court should not address this issue for the

of Utah is implicated, the heightened scrutiny standard does not
first time on appeal. This is especially important where, as here,
apply to the instant matter.

The rational basis test does apply.
the

plaintiff

had

the

burden

of

presenting

proof

of

the

Under the rational basis test, the burden was upon the plaintiff to
unconstitutionality of the statute in question.
prove the unconstitutionality of the damage cap found in Utah Code
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Ann.

§

63-30-34

(1993)

in

light

of

the

presumption

This Court accords no deference to a

of
trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.

constitutionality afforded legislative acts.
w»«h Vallev fHt-v Corp. V , fl»lr Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002
STANDARD OP REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a
(Utah 1993).

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
6.
West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002
(Utah 1993).
4.

governmental immunity, up to the dollar amount of the damage cap in
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34

If this Court should conclude, unlike the trial court,

found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993), and that the burden of
proof was therefore shifted to the State of Utah, the only proper
disposition is to vacate the judgment appealed from and remand the
to

the

trial

court

for

heightened scrutiny standard.

proceedings

under

the

STANDARD OP REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
w—f

Vallev rj «-Y m m .

v. Salt Lake Cc-untV, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002

(Utah 1993).
7.

If the damage cap found in Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-34

(1993) is found to be unconstitutional, it is not severable from
2

'o>^

further

(1993), does not violate the uniform

operation of laws clause of Utah Const., Art. I, § 24 (1991).

that a constitutional right was impinged upon by the damage cap

matter

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of

the balance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and this Court
must strike down

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

the act in its entirety, including those
The determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are

provisions waiving the absolute immunity of the State of Utah.
set forth in the Addendum to this brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
Cynthia Keegan brought the instant wrongful death action
West Vallev Citv Corp

v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002
alleging that the death of her husband, David J. Keegan, in a

(Utah 1993) .
single car accident in Parley's Canyon was caused by the negligence
8.

The

State

of

Utah

and

the

Utah

Department

of
of the State of Utah and the Utah Department of Transportation. R.

Transportation were entitled to immunity from the present action
2-6, 628-37.
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)

The State of Utah and the Utah Department of

(1993) because the
Transportation (UDOT) filed a motion for summary judgment on the

complained of actions these defendants were done in the performance
basis that the alleged actions of the defendants were entitled to
of a discretionary function.
sovereign immunity as discretionary functions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Where, as here, a challenge to a denial

of summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law,
this Court

accords

no deference

to a

trial

conclusions but reviews them for correctness.

court's

legal

West Valley Citv

Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993).
9. Judge Wilkinson erred in denying the State of Utah and the
Utah Department of Transportation's motion to have the jury
determine the percentage and proportion of fault attributable to

R. 240-81.

The

motion was denied by the trial court. R. 404, 467-68.
The State and UDOT also filed a motion to join the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) for the limited purpose of having the
proportion of

fault attributable

to the FHWA

(a non-party)

determined by the jury. R. 341. While this motion was initially
granted (R. 404, 467-68), it was then denied by the trial court
upon reconsideration.

R. 576-78, 627.

The jury, having found Mr. Keegan not to have been negligent,

the Federal Highway Administration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78and the State of Utah and UDOT to have been negligent, awarded Mrs.
27-39 (1992).
Keegan special damages of $435,000.00 and general damages of
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court accords no deference to a
$65,000,00.

R. 902-904. The trial court reduced the judgment to

trial court's legal conclusions but reviews them for correctness.
West Vallev Citv Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 852 P.2d 1000, 1002

1387-88.
Cynthia Keegan has appealed the reduction of the judgment (R.

(Utah 1993).
4

*

>&

$250,000.00 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) . R. 1000,

5

1406-07) and the State of Utah and UDOT have cross-appealed the
denial of their motion for summary judgment and the denial of their
motion to compare the fault of the FHWA.

R. 144 5-46.

next to the barrier.

R. 258, 280-81.

In 1984, approximately 6

years before the accident, UDOT began to plan and design a road
resurfacing project for 1-80 in Parley's Canyon.

STATEMENT OP RELEVANT PACTS

project

R. 257.

design engineer for the 1984 resurfacing

UDOT's

job was Alex

This action arose from a single vehicle accident on January 9,
Badalian.
1990.

At

approximately

7:30

a.m.

that

morning,

R. 257.

Mr. Badalian holds a bachelor's degree in

plaintiff's
engineering

from

the

University

of

Utah

and

is

a

licensed

decedent drove his 1972 Chevrolet Blazer east on Interstate 80
professional engineer in the State of Utah.
through Parley's Canyon.

R. 256.

A continuous concrete median barrier
In planning the resurfacing project,

divided the east and west lanes of travel in the canyon.

Badalian took

sample

The
measurements of the height of the concrete median barrier in the

Blazer left its lane of traffic, travelled up the concrete barrier
canyon.

The height measurements ranged from 27 to 29 inches.

R.

and then slid on top of it for some distance until it collided with
259,
a concrete pillar that supported an overhead bridge.

262.

These

measurements

prompted

him

to

request

an

The driver
engineering safety study to determine whether the median barrier

died in the accident.

R. 86-87.

Plaintiff sued the State of Utah
should

be

raised

before

the

road

was

resurfaced.

The

study

and the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) for the death on
specifically concerned the issue of whether the median barrier,
a negligence theory.

She contended that the highway design and
which was anchored below the road surface, should be dug out and

engineering standards required that a concrete median barrier be 32
replaced with a new, taller barrier.

R. 260, 262.

inches high with a 3 inch vertical rise at the base of the barrier.
The safety study was performed by Art Guerts, UDOT's safety
She argued that the concrete barrier in the canyon is substandard
studies engineer.

R. 260-61.

Mr. Guerts gathered and reviewed

because it was 27 inches high and did not have a 3 inch vertical
accident
rise at the point of the Blazer's impact.

rate

information

for

1-80

and

comparable

roads

and

She claimed that UDOT
performed a statistical analysis of the rates.

R. 270-72.

Guerts

was negligent in failing to maintain the barrier in accordance with
concluded that UDOT could resurface 1-80 without having to raise
her version of highway and engineering standards.

R. 88-90.
the median barrier by replacing it.

R. 263, 270-72.

He concluded

In 1969, UDOT installed the subject concrete median barrier in
that if the resurfacing layer was tapered "to negligible thickness
Parley's Canyon.

R. 258, 276.

overlay project in the canyon.

In 1975, there was a surface

at the barrier," there would be M[n]o adverse safety effects as a

Such a project involves laying road
result of this resurfacing."

R. 271.

Guerts proposed resurfacing

surface material on the travelled lanes and on the inside shoulder
without removing and replacing the existing median barrier.

6

7

R.

271.

1984 and instead replacing the barrier when the future concrete
After receiving

prepared

the results of the safety study,

a cost-benefit

analysis

of

the proposal

to

Badalian

overlay project was begun.

resurface
(5) The

without removing and replacing the existing median barrier.

1984 overlay project

would

be

feathered

near

the

R.
median barrier to avoid reducing the existing barrier height.

264.

In preparing the analysis, Badalian determined that the cost
R. 270-73.

of removing and replacing the existing barrier would be $750,000.
The Federal Highway Administration approved UDOT's p r o p o s a l .
The

total

amount

allocated

in

the budget

for

the

resurfacing
R. 273.

project was $1.3 million.

The resurfacing project was completed in 1984, and

overlay material

was

tapered

to negligible

thickness

near

This cost-benefit analysis was prepared in order to obtain
median barrier in the vicinity of the accident site.
Federal Highway Administration approval for UDOT's proposal.

Since

95V of the resurfacing project was funded with federal money, it
was required that the federal government approve the proposal.
264-69.

R.

The cost benefit analysis examined the safety advantages

of removing and replacing the median barrier and balanced those
with the financial cost and other disadvantages of doing so.

The

factors included in the analysis were:
(1) The Guerts

report

that

concluded,

"No adverse

safety

effects are anticipated as a result of this resurfacing."
(2) Removing the barrier would cause major disruption
inconvenience

to

the motoring

public, which would

have

to

and
be

repeated in five or six years when an anticipated concrete overlay
project was to begin.
(3) Increased construction
jeopardize

completion

of

the

time for barrier removal

could

project

short

because

of

the

construction season in Parley's Canyon.
(4) $124,500 would be saved by not removing the barrier in
8
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the

R. 264.

9
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on her erroneous claim that the burden of proof had been shifted to
the State of Utah.

If this Court finds that the burden was indeed
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shifted to the State, it should remand this action to the trial

:

court

v.

for

further

proceedings

under

the

heightened

scrutiny

standard.
Priority 15

STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

This Court has already held that sovereign immunity does not

:

Defendants and
Appellees/Cross-Appellants

violate

:

the

uniform

Constitution.

operation

of

laws

provision

of

the

Utah

A partial waiver of that absolute immunity does not

violate the provision either.
RESPONSE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEES (PART I) AND OPENING BRIEF
OF
STATE
OF UTAH
AND
THE
UTAH
DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION AS CROSS-APPELLANTS (PART II)

If the damage cap is found to be unconstitutional, it is not
severable from the balance of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
and this Court must strike down the act in its entirety, including

PART I.

RESPONSE BRIEF AS APPELLEES
the waivers of the State of Utah's absolute immunity.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

Neither the open courts provision nor the wrongful

death

INTRODUCTION

provision of the Utah State Constitution is violated by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's partial waiver of immunity.

Keegan's state constitutional challenges to the damage cap in

No common

the Governmental Immunity Act must be considered in light of the

law right of action existed against the State of Utah for the

history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the principle that

manner in which it maintained the public roads.

the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.

For this reason

these provisions are not implicated by the damage cap set out in
section 34 of the act.
Because

no

such

Sovereign immunity was a well-settled feature of American common
law when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution.

substantial

right

heightened scrutiny standard does not apply.

is

implicated,

Madsen

the

v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983); QaUegps v, Miflvale

Instead the rational

Citv. 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (1972); Wilkinson v.

basis test applies. Plaintiff failed to go forward with her burden

State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913).

of proving the unconstitutionality of this statute, instead relying

its critics, e.g.. Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, 100 Utah 573, 111
P.2d

800,

804

(1941)

(concurring

10
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opinion

Although not without

of

Wolfe,

J . ) , the

doctrine has nonetheless been applied continually by the courts of
this state to immunize governmental entities from tort liability
when carrying out a governmental function, absent any waiver of
immunity.

E.g.,

Ramirez v. Qgden Citv. 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d

463, 464 (1955), and cases cited therein; see also Condemarin, 775
P.2d

at

349

(separate

opinion

of Durham,

J.); !£. at

circumstance, but it recognized that open-ended liability would
endanger governmental operating budgets and substantially interfere
with the governmental entities' ability to fulfill the functions
required of government:
Numerous citizens have been injured in their
person and property by negligent acts of
government employees and by the construction
of public improvements.
In many of these
cases no recourse against the governmental
entity has been possible.
It was found that
the present system works substantial injustice
to citizens. There is a fear, however, among
government officials, that to open the door to
unrestrained claims would be too burdensome
upon governmental funds.

370-71

(separate opinion of Stewart, J.); id. at 383 (dissenting opinion
of Hall, C.J.).
In 1963, the Utah Legislature directed the Utah Legislative
Council to study the effects of the waiver of governmental immunity
enjoyed at common law upon the state, its political subdivisions,
and municipal corporations.
1963).

House Joint Resolution 21 (March 14,

A twenty-one member Governmental

Immunity Committee of

legislators, laypersons, and representatives of governmental units
was formed by the Council at the legislature's direction and met
monthly for two years.

36th Utah Legislature, Record of House

Proceedings, February 11, 1965.

The committee gathered data about

liability insurance costs and availability, and prepared numerous
working drafts of legislation.

Report and Recommendations of the

In its final report, the Council recommended legislation that
reaffirmed the doctrine of governmental immunity, but waived that
immunity in certain exceptional circumstances where deemed required

injury resulting
performing

J£. at 48.

The Council concluded that

from the negligence of governmental

governmental

functions

was

Council,

such

an

employees

exceptional

Proposed legislation along the lines suggested by the

Senate

Bill

4,

the

Governmental

Immunity

Act,

was

ultimately recommended for passage by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary

in January 1965.

1965 Senate Journal

at 101.

The

Committee reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immunity needed
to be modified
citizens, but

in our modern society to do equity to
pointed

out

that

the recommended

bill

injured

empowered

governmental entities to protect themselves by purchasing liability
insurance.

Utah Legislative Council 1963-65 at 45-46.

"as a matter of justice. M

!£. at 46.

Id.

At the bill's reading, copies of the Legislative Council's
report were distributed.

Bill sponsor Senator Charles Welch, Jr.,

recited numerous examples of personal

injuries suffered at

the

hands of governmental employees negligently performing their duties
where no compensation from the employer entity was possible because
of the common law governmental immunity doctrine.

He repeatedly

stressed to his colleagues that the injuries incurred worked the
12

13
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same hardship whether the negligent tortfeasor was a government
employee

or

a private

citizen.

However,

he

also

repeatedly

restricted mill levies or tax bases could not raise enough money to
pay for insurance premiums or for large judgments.

36th Utah

Arizona in which many millions of dollars in claims were filed

Legislature,

11,

against

Senator Welch attempted to allay these fears by pointing out the

recounted

to

them

the

governmental

experiences

entities

of

California,

in the period

after

Nevada,

their

and

state

appellate courts had abolished governmental immunity as a common
law doctrine, but before state lawmakers had a chance to adopt
controlling legislation.

Endorsing his bill's "middle of the road

course" between absolute immunity and unlimited liability, Welch
encouraged

his

colleagues

to address

before the Utah courts did, and to

the

issue

legislatively,

"open the doors" to suits

been waived.

House

Proceedings,

February

1965.

Id.

Representative

Bullock

believed

that

some

control would be provided by the presence on the jury of taxpayers,
who would ultimately have to foot the bill.

Id.

Representative

Buckner expressed his reluctant support of the bill, warning his
colleagues,
I would hate to see the door open too wide.
But on the opposite side of the coin, I think
we have very little choice facing us based
upon the history of surrounding states and
what has happened when a court test has gone
to the supreme court and they have thrown out
completely the governmental immunity. I think
the people of this State are entitled to some
defense and unless we get something like this
on the books that's been studied for many
years, I think we have some real problems
facing us.

36th Utah

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965; 36th
Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings, February 11, 1965.
Injured persons would thus be protected by the waivers of immunity,
while governmental entities and the public would be protected by
the statutory limitation on the amount of liability.

of

bill's dollar limit cap on any judgment obtained where immunity had

involving injury "[bjut not to open that door wide open where it
would be detrimental to the State or its subdivisions."

Record

36th Utah
Id.

Several legislators remarked that many of their constituents,

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965.
particularly
The record of legislative debate of Senate Bill 4 reveals that
many legislators were skeptical about Welch's claim that this was
only a partial opening of the litigation door.

Some were concerned

about the "real costs" of the bill, particularly the increased
costs to entities for liability insurance coverage or for defending
the

rash of suits

immunity.

likely to ensue because

Id., disc IV.

of

the waivers of

Others were concerned that entities with
14

those

from

sparsely populated

o

^

and

small

municipalities, strongly opposed the bill and had urged them to
vote against it.

One legislator opposed the bill as "an automatic

increase in property tax" by each taxing entity, while another
suggested that they enact only that portion of the bill adopting
absolute governmental immunity and not enact any waiver provisions.

Id.
Senate Bill 4 was, in fact, defeated in the House vote that
took place after these discussions, with 31 votes in favor of
15

^

counties

passage and 36 against.

Id-; 1965 House Journal at 341.

On

exercise

and discharge

of

a governmental

in

the Act.

function,"

except

as

reconsideration, Representative Harding, House sponsor of Senate

otherwise

Bill 4, told his colleagues the bill was defeated only because of

defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions on roads, highways and

a misunderstanding that it would bankrupt government entities with

sidewalks, as well as for nonlatent defects in public structures

million dollar judgments.

and public

He referred them again to section 34 of

provided

for

improvements.

Immunity

1965 Utah Laws,

was

waived

ch. 13 9, §§

for

8,

9.

the bill, which required a court to reduce any judgment to the

Immunity from suit was also waived for injuries proximately caused

dollar amount of the liability limit set by section 29, telling

by the negligence of government employees acting within the scope

them there was no opportunity for a judgment in excess of that

of their employment, with numerous exceptions to waiver.

damage cap amount.

Id.

10.

Noting that the bill was drafted by a committee with eight

Senator

Welch

had

repeatedly

told

his

jEd. at §

colleagues

these

exceptions in section 10 were specifically intended to protect the

lawyers on it and recounting how a New Jersey School District had

entities by retaining immunity in some circumstances.

been

Legislature, Record of Senate Proceedings, January 18, 1965, disc

bankrupted

by

one

large

personal

injury

judgment,

Representative Prior rose in opposition to the bill, saying that
supporters' representations about how minimal the increased costs
would be "do not jibe with real experience."

After pointing out

that tort claims against the state of California had jumped from
$4.71 million to $9.75 million in the year following

judicial

abolition of common law governmental immunity, Prior added, "Now,

11.

36th Utah

Political subdivisions of the State were authorized in Section

27 to impose taxes to pay judgments, or to settle or defend claims.
Section 28 authorized entities to purchase liability insurance.
Section 34 required a court to reduce to the amounts listed in
Section 29 ($100,000 per injured person and $300,000 per accident)
or to the amount of any insurance coverage in excess of

those

these are the things that our communities are fearful of that will
figures, any judgment obtained in an action for which immunity had
bankrupt the subdivisions of our state[.]"

?d.
been waived by the Act.

Despite these concerns, the House nonetheless passed the bill
by a 41-25 vote.

1965 House Journal at 343.

Immunity Act, went into effect July 1, 1966.
139.

The Governmental

1965 Utah Laws, ch.

In Section 3, the legislature adopted immunity from suit of

all governmental entities "for any injury that may result from the
activities of said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the
16
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Section 29 was repealed by 1983 Utah Laws ch. 130, § 5, but
its liability limitations were incorporated into reenacted section
34, which was rewritten essentially into the form it took at the
time of Keegan's judgment, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34
the reenactment
raised

to

process, the personal

$250,000

per

person

17

and

(1989).

injury damage

$500,000

per

caps

accident

In
were
by

Substitute House Bill 289.

1983 Utah Laws, ch. 130, § 3.

House

Bill 289's increase in the liability limit from that in effect
since

1965 was described

current

recovery

as

levels."

intended

to

1983 General

"reflect
Session,

more

fairly

Governmental

Immunity Act Amendments, Explanation Material, para. 2 [on file in
the

bill

file

at

Office

of

Legislative

Research

and

General

Rep. 3, 6-7

(Utah 1993) four Justices of this Court

(Hall, C.J.,

with whom Howe, J., concurred, and Stewart, J., with whom Durham,
J., concurred) (Zimmerman, J. concurred only in the result) agreed
that the damage cap, when applied to the governmental function of
maintaining

the public roads, did not violate

the open courts

guarantee of article I, § 11 and did not invoke the heightened

Counsel].

scrutiny standard under the uniform operation of laws provision of
According

to

the

bill's

sponsor,

Representative

Gayle

McKeachnie, this and other 1983 amendments to the Governmental
Immunity Act were negotiated as a package deal by the League of
Cities and Towns, the Association of Counties, representatives from

article I, § 24.

Court's holding that the damage cap did not violate article I, §
24.
I. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NO COMMON LAW RIGHT
TO RECOVER FROM THE STATE AND UDOT, THE
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP, DOES NOT
IMPLICATE A RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE OPEN COURTS
PROVISION

the Attorney General's Office and higher education, and plaintiffs'
attorneys.

44th Utah Legislature, Record of House Proceedings,

February 24, 1983, disc I.
Six years later, in Condemarin v. Univ. H Q S D . . 775 P.2d 348,
366 (Utah 1989), Justices Durham, Zimmerman, and Stewart reached
the

limited

holding

that

the

$100,000

damage

cap

imposed

Utah's open courts provision, Utah Const, article I, § 11,
states:

by

All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.

sections 63-30-29 and -34 before 1983 was "unconstitutional" as
applied to limit recovery from the University Hospital in a medical
malpractice action.

Although a majority could not agree on which

constitutional provision was violated by the damage cap in that
case,

as

concurring

discussed

below,

the

starting

point

for

the

three

justices' heightened

scrutiny

under both

the

equal

protection and due process provisions was the open courts guarantee
in article I, § 11.

Justices Stewart and Durham dissented from the

In Berrv ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Co.. 717 P.2d 670,
680

(Utah

1985),

this

Court

established

a

two-part

test

to

determine whether a statute can limit or eliminate a common law
right of action or remedy consistent with due process and the open

Last year, in McCorvey v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv.

18

courts provision.

But the initial question must always be whether

the cause of action or remedy being sought by the plaintiff existed

at common

law.

Although the open courts provision protects a
j^dsen

person

from being

"arbitrarily

deprived

of effective

v.

Borthick

and

Brown

a

reading

v.

Wichita

the

open

State—VnjversjtY

remedies
understood,

broad

of

courts

provision

as

designed to protect basic individual rights," i£. at 675, it does
protecting rights or remedies that did not even exist when the
not create new remedies or new rights of action that did not exist
constitution was adopted would prohibit retention of governmental
at common law.

"Consequently, Article I, § 11 worked no change in
immunity even for governmental functions, grown, 547 P.2d at 1024.

the principle of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not
Under Madsen. a person injured in the course of a governmental
unconstitutional under that section." Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d
entity's performance

of a governmental

function

simply

has

no

627, 629 (Utah 1983); Brown v. Wiahtman. 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366,
"right" that

is constitutionally

protected

by the open

courts

366-67 (1915).
provision from legislative infringement.
An injured person had no common law right of action against,
Keegan

claims

that

somehow

the

enactment

of

the

Utah

or remedy from, a governmental entity performing a governmental
Governmental Immunity Act itself abrogated sovereign immunity and
function.

McCorvev v. Utah State Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv.

Rep. 3, 6

(Utah 1993) .

created new common

law causes of action that had never before

Since the adoption of the open courts
existed.

This claim

is contrary

to this Court's decision

in

is contrary to this Court's decisions

in

provision worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity,
Madsen.

Indeed,

it

this Court has held that legislatively adopted sovereign immunity
McCorvev and Condemarin v. Univ. H O S P . , 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) .
itself does not violate the open courts provision.

Madsen v.
A majority of this Court in Condemarin never ruled that the

Borthick. 658 P.2d at 629

(adopting the reasoning in Brown v.
damage cap statute was unconstitutional as applied to governmental

Wichita State Univ.. 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015, 1022-24

(1976));
functions for which the entity would have been immune at common

eccprd

Feal

v,

PPKehve,

611

P.2d

1125,

1128-29

(Okl. 1980);
law.

As Justice Durham stated in the lead opinion, "there is no

Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Washburn County. 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840
fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from governmental
(1957)

(no

remedy

protected

by

open

courts

provision

since
entities performing governmental functions."

Cpnflemarjn* 755 P.2d

government immune at common law for negligence occurring in the
at 352 (opinion of Durham, J . ) .
performance of a governmental

function, such as maintenance of
Condemarin involved application of the damage cap to limit

highways); &&& also Wright v. Colleton County School Disfcr-. 301
liability

of

the University

Hospital

for medical

malpractice.

S.C. 282, 391 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1990) (open courts provision is not
Precisely because the operation of this hospital was not considered
a guarantee of full compensation to all injured) . As the courts in
a

governmental

function,

a

majority

20
21

'*<*>

concluded

the

Cpntiemerin

plaintiff had a common law right to recover from the governmental
entity for negligently inflicted injuries, a right that was
infringed by the

damage cap.

Condemarin, 755 P.2d at 357-58

(opinion of Durham, J.); ici. at 372 (opinion of Stewart, J.) ("The
test also identifies where the constitutional right of a person to
have a remedy for personal injury begins under Article I, section
11 of the Utah Constitution as against a governmental agency, and
where the governmental right to immunity from such lawsuit stops").
This Court's decision in McCorvev expressly declared that:

This

Court

should

therefore

affirm

constitutionality of the damage cap.
The same result should be reached on plaintiff's claims under
Utah Const., Art. 1, § 10.

Section 10 does not create rights or

remedies any more than the open courts provision in section 11
does. The right to jury trial in section 10 applies only to cases
cognizable at common law when our constitution was adopted. Zion's
First Nat'l Bank v. Rockv Mt. Irrigation. 795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990).

common law against a governmental entity discharging a governmental
function.

Furthermore, the damage cap in section 63-30-34 merely

sets the outer limits of a governmental tort victim's remedy in a
legislatively created cause of action. It does not deny access to

reached this same conclusion.

the courts, and it does not prevent the jury from finding the facts

I agree that Article I, section 11 does not
guarantee a right to sue the state when it
acts in a governmental function, . . .
As stated, the right to sue the state when it
performs
a
governmental
function,
as
constitutionally defined, does not implicate a
right protected by the open courts provision
of Article I, section 11.
(Stewart, J.,

and assessing a plaintiff's damages, which is the crux of the right
to jury trial. Wright. 391 S.E.2d at 569-70; Bovd v. Bulala, 877
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
plaintiffs

dissenting).

The

amount of the statutory damage cap implicates a right protected by
For this

reason the trial court was correct when it rejected the plaintiff's
open courts challenge to the damage cap of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-

in Keegan's circumstances

a right

to jury trial

II. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NO COMMON LAW RIGHT
TO RECOVER FROM THE STATE AND UDOT, THE
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP, DOES NOT
IMPLICATE A RIGHT PROTECTED BY THE WRONGFUL
DEATH PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

neither absolute immunity nor the partial waiver of immunity to the

the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.

Thus, section 63-30-34 does not deny

protected by article I, section 10.

maintenance of public roads is a governmental function. As such,

Utah's wrongful death provision, Utah Const, article XVI, S 5,
states:
The right of action to recover damages for
23
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the

trial where there would have been no right of action at all at

Indeed, even the dissent in McCorvey

225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7

(1993).

Here, section 63-30-34 cannot violate the section 10 right to jury

Because no right existed at common law to
recover from the state for injuries arising
out of the state's maintenance of public
roadways, the legislature is free to limit the
state's liability in that area without
implicating the open courts clause and its
concomitant heightened scrutiny.
225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.

34

injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall
not be subject to any statutory limitation,
except
in cases where compensation
for
injuries resulting in death is provided for by
law.

action as it existed at the time of the enactment of the Utah
Constitution demonstrates

that

such a cause of action did

not

include a right to sue the State of Utah.
Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of the common law

As is the case with our constitution's open courts provision,
this section was never intended to create new causes of action, but

when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution.

At the time

instead to prevent the abrogation by the legislative branch of

Utah

those causes of action that existed at the time of its enactment.

subsequent years, the state had absolute immunity at common law and

In Garfield Smelting Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 53 Utah 133, 178

could not be sued without its consent.

P. 57 (1918), this Court explained:

P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1964); Bingham v. Bd. of E d u c , 223 P.2d 432,

In view, therefore, that the Constitution
clearly
prohibits
the
Legislature
from
abrogating the "right of action," it becomes
necessary to inquire what that right was and
who enjoyed it at the time the Constitution
was adopted by the people of this state. As
we have seen, the Constitution says "the right
of action" shall not be abrogated; hence the
right referred to must be deemed to be the

right ag it then existed and not merely an
abstract right.
178 P. at 59 (emphasis added).

In Jones v. Carvel 1. 641 P.2d 105,

Const.,

Art. XVI,

§ 5

(1991) was

drafted,

and

for

many

See Campbell v. Pack. 389

435 (Utah 1950); State v. Dist. Court. Fourth Jud. Dist.. 78 P.2d
502, 504 (Utah 1937); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n. 70
P.2d 857, 861

(Utah 1937); Decorso v. Thomas. 50 P.2d 951, 952

(Utah 1935); Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913).
Since

there

was

no

common

law

right

to

recover

any

compensation for death from the state, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34
(1993) does not infringe on a right that is protected by Art. XVI,

107 (Utah 1982), this Court pointed out that the reason for this

§ 5.

constitutional provision was the "uncertainty of the law, at least

against the state.

in other states."

State is an action for damages as authorized and limited by the

I&u

£££. algp Berrv ex rel. Berry v. Beech

Aircraft Co.. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985) (the plain meaning of

That provision does not apply to wrongful death

actions

Plaintiff's only "right" to recover from the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

the provision is to prevent the abolition of the right of action

In urging this court to reach the opposite result, plaintiff

for a wrongful death); ftalan v. Lewis. 693 P. 2d 661, 667 (Utah

relies on Yearance v. Salt Lake Citv. 24 P. 254 (Utah 1890), for

1984) (provision is directed at preventing the Legislature from

the proposition that a governmental entity could be sued for the

abolishing a right of action for wrongful death, whether in a

creation of an unsafe condition in a street.

wholesale or piecemeal fashion).

to consider is that Yearance. while not so stating in the decision

Even a brief glance at the right to file a wrongful death

What plaintiff fails

because it was not at issue, relied upon a statutory waiver of the

25

absolute immunity of the city for maintenance of the public roads.
This point was made clear in Niblock v. Salt Lake Citv, Ill P.2d

that it misconstrues the purpose and effect of the constitutional

800 (Utah 1941).

provision. Keegan could just as well argue that sovereign immunity

This court is committed to the doctrine that
the duty to repair or construct streets within
its corporate limits is a governmental one and
that in the absence of a statute no liability
devolves on a municipality for the defective
condition of its streets. As stated in Hurley
v. Town of Binaham, supra [63 Utah 589, 228 P.
215) : "The right to institute an action in
this class of cases [injury caused by
obstruction] is purely statutory. It did not
exist at common law, and therefore the
conditions precedent fixed by the statute
which confers the right must be complied with,
or the action fails."
Ill P.2d at 802 (citations omitted) . Indeed, this Court cited both
flj-blpck and Hurley in its recent decision of McCorvev v. Utah State
Dep't of Transp., 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 n.2.6 (Utah 1993) for the
proposition that: "At common law, both the municipalities and the
state were immune from lawsuits based on the negligent maintenance
of public roads."

does not apply to the open courts provision of the constitution
because that provision too lacks any express exception for that
doctrine.
Article XVI, Section 5 seeks to preserve a statutory cause of
action that the writers of our state constitution were concerned
might be abolished at some future point by the legislature. It did
not create any new rights; instead, it protected those that already
existed.
Utah.

Yet no right existed at common law to sue the State of

The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity is just as

applicable to wrongful death actions as it is to all other actions
against governmental entities when the entity is performing a
governmental function.

The trial court correctly rejected the

plaintiff's wrongful death provision challenge to the damage cap of
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) .

This Court has routinely applied the doctrine of sovereign
immunity to wrongful death actions, as well as to all other types
of actions. £e^, e,gt, Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 842 P. 2d 832
(Utah 1992); Loveland v. Orem Citv Corp. . 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987);
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Serv. . 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983);

This Court should therefore

affirm the constitutionality of the damage cap.
III. BECAUSE HO SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY
THE CONSTITUTION OP UTAH IS IMPLICATED, THE
RATIONAL BASIS TEST, AND NOT THE HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY STANDARD, APPLIES IN THIS ACTION
Legislative enactments are generally afforded a strong

Madsen v. State. 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978); Eptina v. State. 546 P.2d

presumption of constitutionality, Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

242 (Utah 1976); Emerv v. State. 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971).

Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 187 (Utah 1991); Citv of Monticello

Keegan sets great store by the fact that Utah Const., Art.

vt Cftrj-stensen, 7 8 8 p.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990); gt;at;e ex rel t pjvT

XVI, § 5 (1991) does not contain an express exception for suits

Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347

against government entities.

(Utah 1990) . The heavy burden of overcoming that presumption and

This argument is without merit in

proving a statute's invalidity is on the party challenging it.
27

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d
1991

816, 819

>- Mt. States Tel, & Tel. Co.. 811 P.2d at 187; Blue Cross g.

Blue Shield of Utah v. Stat*. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989);
&lga Ejo Vjjgta QH,
constitutionality

Rd„

786

dissipates

P. 2d at

and

the

1349-50.

burden

see

Presumptive

thereby

shifts,

constitutional and the burden remained on Keegan to prove
invalidity.

Both the decision of this Court in McCorvey. 225 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 6 and the dissent agreed on this point.

?<l. at

6-7.

requiring the opposing party to prove the constitutional validity

flcCorvev is of special note because it not only dealt, as does the

of the challenged statute, only where it impinges on a fundamental

instant action, with a damages suit against UDOT concerning the

or specially protected interest.

maintenance

£ejg. Citv of West Jordan v. nt-aft

of public

roads, but

also because McCorvey

raised

State Retirement pd t , 767 P.2d 530, 537 (Utah 1988) (article I, §

almost identical claims that section 63-30-34 is unconstitutional

24 analysis); Rjo Vista Qjl K.d., 786 P.2d at 1350 (dictum re due

as have been presented by Keegan in the present action.

process analysis); see

also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman,

Court's decision in McCorvey expressly rejects these same arguments

(once infringement of interest protected by open

because McCorvey, like Keegan, failed to meet his burden of proving

J., concurring)

This

courts provision is shown, burden of proving statute does not

that the statute was unconstitutional

violate due process in article I, § 7 is on proponent

false claim that the burden was upon UDOT to prove the statute to

validity);

i£.

at

363

(opinion

of

Durham,

J.)

(due

of its
process

analysis; state failed to make necessary showing of need for, and
reasonableness of, damage cap).
Unlike the Cpnflemarin, plaintiff, however, persons injured by
a governmental entity performing a governmental function have no
right to full recovery for personal injuries that is specially
protected by the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
At most, an individual

in this latter group has a statutorily

(but instead relied on a

be constitutional).
As the trial court correctly noted, McCorvey's
contentions must be considered in light of the
presumption
of constitutionality
afforded
legislative acts.
If a statute does not
impinge on a fundamental or specifically
protected interest, the legislation's opponent
has the burden of proving unconstitutionality.
In this case, McCorvey has failed to meet his
burden of proving that the cap, which does not
infringe
on
a
fundamental
right,
is
unconstitutional as applied to him.
Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).

The dissenting opinion of Justices

created interest in recovering from the governmental entity only up

Stewart and Durham reached the same conclusion as to which party

to the amount of the damage cap.

had the burden of proof.

Because this interest is neither

a fundamental right nor a substantial one specifically protected by
the

constitution,

the

damage
28

cap

statute

was

presumed

While I agree that Article I, section 11 does
not guarantee a right to sue the state when it
acts in a governmental function, Article I,
section 24 still applies, and the least
restrictive standard of judicial scrytiny
governs the determination of whether the cap

29
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its

* J**>

on damages is constitutional. . . .
Thus, although a heightened scrutiny standard
of judicial analysis does not govern the
Article I, section 24 analysis, the rational
basis standard of scrutiny does.

contrary

Keegan made no effort to carry her burden in the trial court.
Instead, she merely asserted that the burden has shifted to the
State of Utah and that the State had failed to meet its burden.
Keegan relied solely on her erroneous reading of Condemarin as
shifting the burden of proof onto the State to satisfy the two-part
(not applicable in this case) by demonstrating

the

damage cap's reasonableness under due process or equal protection
analysis.
Section 63-30-34 provides a reasonable method for protecting
taxpayers and governmental entities' operating budgets and assets
from unpredictable catastrophic losses caused in the performance of
governmental functions and a figure on which future losses can be
actuarially estimated and planned for.
•limit

on

a

governmental

i.e.,

that

section

63-30-34

is

unconstitutional under the applicable mode of analysis, this Court

Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).

Berry test

conclusion,

entity's

It establishes a rational
liability

that

has

been

appropriately reached through competing interests' give and take in

should affirm the trial court's conclusion that Keegan failed to
overcome the presumptive constitutionality of section 63-30-34.
On appeal, Keegan should not be allowed to shift the burden
of proving the damage cap statute's constitutionality to UDOT. See
Citv of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 537.

Nonetheless, if this Court

goes on to examine the merits of the constitutional claims that
Keegan merely asserts without applicable analysis, it will find
that section 63-30-34 does not violate the due process or equal
protection rights of persons injured during the discharge of a
governmental function.
IV. IP THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE BURDEN OF
PROOF AS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
63-30-34 SHIFTED TO THE STATE OF UTAH, THE
ONLY PROPER DISPOSITION IS TO VACATE THE
APPEALED FROM JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS ACTION
TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
UNDER THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY STANDARD
Pursuant to this Court's decision in McCorvev v. Utah State

a

Dep't of Transp.. 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993), the trial court

legislative balancing of the desire to compensate with a realistic

appears to have been correct in determining that the plaintiff had

view of the taxing capacities of governmental units and the scope

the burden of coming

the

democratic

political

process.

It

is

the

result

of

forward with proof

to

show the

alleged

of potential governmental liability, in light of past actuarial

unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) . For this

experience and projected losses.

reason the State of Utah did not have a duty to defend the statute

In light of Keegan's failure to go forward in the trial court
with any evidence or relevant argument and analysis to support a

by putting forth evidence of the actual legislative purpose behind
the statute and a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the
means chosen in the statute rationally serve its intended ends as

30

it would have if the heightened scrutiny standard applied to this

31

action.

Lee v. Gaufin,

227 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8

(Utah 1993);

V. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER AN
ISSUE THAT HAS BEEN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIKE

Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 356, 368, 373.
If this Court determines, for the first time on appeal, that

ON APPEAL
At no time in the trial court did Cynthia Keegan raise the

the burden of proof did indeed shift to the State of Utah for
question of whether the damage cap found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30whatever reason, the State has had no opportunity to go forward and
meet its burden because

the trial court did not

conduct

this

34 (1993) could constitutionally be applied to actual compensatory
damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and suffering and

"heightened" level of constitutional scrutiny. The normal workings

punitive damages.

of the judicial process, as well as basic fairness and due process,

sponte, for the first time on appeal.

This issue has been raised by this Court, sua

would therefore require this Court to vacate the judgment appealed

Because the plaintiff failed to raise this claim in the trial

from and remand the case at that point to the trial court for

court, this Court should not address the issue for the first time

further proceedings in light of the belated conclusion that the

on appeal.

(Utah 1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the

burden of proof has for some reason shifted.
It would be disingenuous for this Court to shift the burden of
demonstrating the statute's reasonableness to the party who did not
have that burden in the trial court, and then rule against that
party for not satisfying the newly imposed burden.

Such a practice

would also disregard the proper role of the trial courts in finding
facts based on evidence presented and in declaring the protections
afforded by the state constitution.
At a minimum,

if this Court determines that the burden of

proof is shifted, it should remand this matter to the trial court
so that the State of Utah and UDOT can present evidence, the trial
court can engage in appropriate factfinding, and the trial court
can make an initial ruling on the reasonableness issue under the
heightened scrutiny standard.

In Espjnal y, g a Ufrafregj^y pfl, of gfluc,, 797 P.2d 412

first time on appeal.

In refusing to consider that claim, this

Court explained:
Appellants'
first
claim
is
that
the
realignment violated article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution by denying them the
liberty to control their children's education.
This claim was raised for the first time on
appeal. With limited exceptions, the practice
of
this
Court
has
been
to
decline
consideration of issues raised for the first
time on appeal. We therefore do not address
this claim.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted) . The limited exceptions to the
general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain
error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P. 2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992) . &££ also State
v. Brown^. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992); State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d
781 (Utah 1992).
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It was the duty of the plaintiff to raise any and all defenses
she had to the State of Utah's Motion to Reduce the Judgment in the

purpose of the challenged law are treated differently by it, to the

trial court. Because this issue was not raised in the trial court,

detriment of the complaining class.

the defendants have had no opportunity to make a record to support

fftate, 779 P.2d at 637.

the

compliance with article I section 24, this court determines (1)

validity

challenge.

of

this

legislative

enactment

against

such

a

It is disingenuous of the plaintiff to claim on appeal

that the State has failed to present evidence to rebut this claim
of unconstitutionality, when no such claim was raised in the trial
court.

whether

the

objectives

In examining a challenged statute for

classification

of

the

Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.

is

legislative

reasonable;
action

are

the question raised by the Court, the State does submit that a full
and complete hearing on this issue must include the making of a
proper record in the trial court so that the issue may be properly
framed and prepared for the consideration of this Court.
not been done in the instant case.

This has

For this reason the Court

whether

the

legitimate; and

(3)

whether there is a reasonable relationship between the legislative
classification and the legislative purposes.

While the State of Utah does not denigrate the importance of

(2)

Blue Cross and Blue

Shield. 779 P.2d at 637; sje^ Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670-75
(Utah 1984) .
In applying this mode of equal protection analysis, general
social or economic legislative enactments are given varying degrees
of scrutiny depending on the nature of the complainant's affected
interest.

If the challenged statute impinges no fundamental right,

should follow its standard practice and decline to consider an
or one that is specially protected by another state constitutional
issue for the first time on appeal.
provision such as the open courts provision, the legislature must
VI. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT'S
PARTIAL WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, UP TO
THE DOLLAR AMOUNT OF THE DAMAGE CAP FOUND IN
SECTION 63-30-34 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORM
OPERATION
OF
LAWS
CLAUSE
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION

be given broad deference when this Court
reasonableness

of

the

legislative

scrutinizes both the

classifications

relationship to legitimate legislative purposes.
Blue Shield,

779 P.2d at 637.

and

their

Blue Cross and

As this Court has stated,

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides that
"fa)11 laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
This provision has been interpreted as reflecting the

"settled

concern of the law that the legislature be restrained from the
fundamentally unfair practice" of classifying persons in such a

When considering challenges to matters of
economic regulation
that
do not
affect
specially
protected
interests,
we
give
deference to the legislature's judgment as to
classifications needed to achieve the ends
sought. To strike down such legislation, we
must find that the means are not reasonably
related to the achievement of a legitimate
legislative purpose.

manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the
34

City of West Jordan. 767 P.2d at 537 (citations omitted); ace also

35
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j^jke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group. Inc.. 438 U.S. 59,
The first classification is created, not by the damage cap
83-84

(1978)

(statutory

cap

on

liability

for

nuclear

plant
statute, but by the principle of sovereign immunity

itself

as

embraced

by

partially

waived.

Sse Hale. 783 P.2d at 516; Brown, 547 P.2d at 1029,

accidents is a classic example of economic regulation to which
rational

basis

test

applies).

Because

those

injured

the Governmental

Immunity

Act

and

then

by

governmental tortfeasors performing governmental functions have no
Keegan has neither claimed nor proven that governmental immunity
constitutional or specially protected right to recover fully, or at
for governmental functions violates any constitutional provision.
•11, from governmental entities, this deferential level of scrutiny
Indeed, this Court has already held that the Governmental Immunity
is applicable to Keegan's challenge to section 63-30-34.

The
Act does not violate article I, section 24 by failing to completely

statute must accordingly be upheld under the uniform operation of
waive absolute immunity for injuries arising from the performance
the laws provision unless it is not reasonably related to the
of all governmental functions.

Madsen v. State. 583 P. 2d 92, 93

achievement of any conceivable, permissible legislative objective.
(Utah

1978);

£££

also

McCorvev,

225

Utah

Adv.

Rep.

at

6;

£££ Plug Crogff ?P3 pjue Shield, 779 P.2d at 637; Baker v. Matheson.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 363

(opinion of Durham, J.)

(rejecting

607 P.2d 233, 244 (1979) (sustain legislative classifications if
"extreme position" that naked existence of governmental immunity
facts

can

reasonably

be

conceived

to

justify

the

disparate
violates equal protection) .

treatment); £££ aJLss Rio Vista Oi) . 786 P.2d at 1350.
The

Colorado

Supreme

Court

also

rejected

a

state

equal

With regard to the first step of the test for article I
protection challenge to governmental immunity that was aimed at the
section 24 compliance, Keegan asserts on appeal that section 63-30statutory damage cap for injuries arising out of
34

creates

three

unreasonable

and

therefore

functions.
impermissible classifications:

governmental

constitutionally
Concluding, as this Court did in McCorvev. that there

(a) between victims of governmental
was no statutory infringement on a fundamental right, the court

tortfeasors and nongovernmental tortfeasors; (b) between victims of
held

that

the

statutory

classification

granting

only

limited

governmental negligence and victims of governmental takings; and
recovery to victims of governmental tortfeasors had a reasonable
(c) between plaintiffs granted the ability to sue the sovereign
basis

in

fact

and

was

reasonably

related

to

the

legitimate

whose damages are less than the $250,000 cap, and those similarly
governmental objective of providing fiscal certainty in carrying
situated whose damages exceed the cap.1
out the manifold responsibilities of government.

Lee v. Colorado

1

The Court, sua sponte, has asked the parties to consider a
fourth classification, whether the cap can be applied to actual
compensatory damages, as distinguished from damages for pain and

suffering and punitive damages.
The consideration of this
classification does not vary from that for the third classification
raised by the plaintiff.

36
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Dept. of Health. 718 P.2d 221, 226-27 (Colo. 1986).
In short, as long as absolute governmental immunity can be
The statutory classification limiting the
amounts recoverable against a public entity is
based on real differences in fact between
governmental and private tortfeasors. Public
entities are responsible for providing a vast
array of governmental services to the public
and, as a result, are exposed to far greater
liability and risks than a private individual.
Moreover, the public entity, unlike the
private individual, does not have the option
of declaring bankruptcy or going out of
business when subjected to tort liability, but
rather must
continue
to carry out
its
responsibility to the public. The legislative
decision
to
limit
the
public
entity's
liability . . . therefore, proceeds from
actual differences in the magnitude and
character of the functions assumed by public
entities and
in the effect
of
greater
potential liability exposure on the public
entity's ability to continue its governmental
functions.
14. at 227.

legislatively retained without violating

article

(frladsen

the

v.

State.

583

P. 2d

at

94)

I, section 24

first

challenged

classification created by the Governmental Immunity Act's adoption
and then partial waiver of that
peFoor,

824

P.2d

at

795

immunity

(Rovira,

J.

is not unreasonable.

concurring);

Seifert

Standard Paving Co.. 64 111.2d 109, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539

v.

(1976),

overruled on other grounds, fiossetti Contracting CQr V, Court; of
Claims.

109

111.2d

72,

485

N.E.2d

Reorganized School Distr. R-2. 636

332

S.W.2d

(1985);

Winston

v,

324, 328 (Mo. 1982);

Smith v, City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1986), appeal
dismissed. 479 U.S. 1074 (1987); see also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at

Lee was recently reaffirmed in State v. DeFoor. 824

388 n.70 (Hall, C.J., dissenting) (since legislature could retain

P.2d 783, 787 (Colo. 1992), cert, denied. 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992),

absolute

which held that the legislature could, consistent with the state

governmental

and

guarantee, legislature can also constitutionally limit recovery

federal

equal

protection

guarantees,

statutorily

waive

governmental immunity for the maintenance of public highways while
simultaneously limiting that recovery to a fixed dollar amount.

immunity

for

torts

inflicted

function without violating

during

discharge

state equal

of

protection

where immunity has been partially waived).
Keegan'e second classification also fails to show a violation

DeFoor concluded that the damage cap was rationally related to the

of the uniform operation of laws provision.

legitimate state interests of fiscal solvency and provision of

exception of governmental takings of private property for public

essential services while minimizing taxpayer burden that would

use from the $250,000 damage cap is merely reflective of this

result from unforeseeable and unlimited tort judgments.

Court's holding that inverse condemnation suits are not subject to

790;

see Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 372

Jg. at

(opinion of Stewart,

J.)

Section 63-30-34 (3) ' s

common law governmental immunity principles or to the Governmental

(governmental immunity provides "protection to the public treasury

Immunity

and tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that the essential

Constitution is self-executing.

functions of government will not be imperiled").

v. Bountiful Citv. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.l (Utah 1990); Colman v.

Act

and

that

article

I,

section

22

of

the

Utah

Farmer's New World Life Ins. Co.

38
39

Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630-35 (Utah 1990).

Thus, the

second classification complained of by Keegan is created by article
I,

section

22

of

the

Utah

Constitution

itself,

not

by

budget with some degree of certainty and to perform these functions
with available

revenues.

Thus, the classification

necessarily

the
created by a damage cap of any amount is not an unreasonable one.

challenged statute.
Although not well articulated, Keegan seems to be contending
The third classification Keegan asserts is unreasonable is
that between persons with damages less than the statutory liability
limit

and

those whose

damages

exceed

it.

This

argument

was

rejected in Seifert. 355 N.E.2d at 541, in which the Illinois
Supreme Court held that, since the legislature had created the
right of action of victims of government torts, it could set a
maximum amount recoverable in that action without violating equal
protection.

once

immunity

is

waived,

any

damage

cap

is

per

governmental function, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act creates no
deprivations.

In other words, "If I don't get to recover all my

damages

a

from

governmental

entity,

then

other

victims

governmental torts whose damages are less than $250,000

action would otherwise exist.

All governmental tort victims are

likewise equally subject to section 63-30-34's limit on recoverable
There is nothing inherently unreasonable in the State's

consenting to be sued for otherwise immune activity only up to a
fixed amount.

of

cannot

constitutionally be allowed to recover all their damages either."
Under

such

operation

of

a

view,
the

the

legislature

laws provision

can

satisfy

only by

choosing

the

uniform

between

the
This

position is not only unsupportable as a matter of constitutional
law, it also constitutes bad public policy.

Instead, it grants a benefit equally by giving all

such persons the ability to sue a governmental entity where no such

se

unreasonable.

extreme options of absolute immunity or absolute liability.

With regard to those persons injured in the exercise of a

damages.

that,

Forced to choose between retention of absolute liability and
adoption

of

unlimited

liability

for

injuries

arising

from

governmental functions, the legislature would inevitably choose the
former so governmental entities could budget with enough certainty
to continue providing essential services, such as maintenance of
public

roads,

police

protection,

firefighting,

and

prison

On the contrary, such a limit (which is, in effect,
operation.

This would result in no compensation for any person

a legislative retention of immunity for an individual's damages
injured in the government's discharge of a governmental function,
greater than

$250,000)

is eminently rational

in light

of

the
putting the State of Utah back to the pre-1965 era, which

the

Governmental Immunity Act was expressly intended to rectify.

In

magnitude and nature of the essential functions of government, the
concomitant

huge potential

for governmental liability, and the
choosing partial waiver of absolute immunity, only up to $250,000,

effects of unlimited

liability on the government's

ability to
the

40
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legislature

has

created

a
41

classification

that

is

not

a

discrimination "with no rational basis," Mountain States Legal FnH
y.

Public Serv. Comm'n. 636 P.2d 1047, 1055 (Utah 1981), in light

of

the

constitutional

permissibility

of

governmental

immunity

reasonable

degree

of

fiscal

certainty

in

risk

management

and

budgeting for governmental functions without undue tax burdens are
the legitimate purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act's partial

itself and the Governmental Immunity Act's purposes.
Keegan does not demonstrate how the statutory classifications,
even if reasonable, nonetheless fails the second and third parts of
the applicable equal protection test, either because the objectives

waiver of absolute immunity only up to the damage cap in section
63-30-34.

DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790; Lee., 718 P.2d at 226-27;

fitanhope. 280 N.W.2d at 719; Wilson. 753 P.2d at 1351-52.

By

of the legislative action are illegitimate or because there is no

limiting the liability of a public entity to a fixed amount, the

reasonable relationship between the legislative classification and

Governmental Immunity Act "protects the public entity against the

the legislative purposes.

risk

Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 637 P.2d at

that unlimited

public

637.
The

Governmental

Immunity

Act

is

designed,

and

was

deliberately intended, to balance two competing interests:

the

compensation of many victims of governmental tortfeasors who would
otherwise have no recourse if the governmental entity was engaged
in a governmental function, and the preservation of the public
treasury

from

unpredictable,

devastating

judgments

essential services can continue being provided.

so

that

The damage cap

serves these purposes and at the same time provides governmental
entities with the ability
expenditures,
legislature.

which

was

to plan
also

a

for and pay
major

concern

for government
of

the

1965

gee Kennedy & Lynch, "Some Problems of a Sovereign

Without Immunity, • 36 So. Ca. L. Rev. 161, 177-78 (1963).

Only in

coffers

and

and unforeseen

judgments will deplete

result

termination

in

the

or

the

substantial

curtailment of important governmental functions." peFoor, 824 P.2d
at

790.2

As the Missouri Supreme Court

legislature

has

a

rational

basis

to

has pointed

fear

that

full

out, the
monetary

responsibility for any and all tort claims entails the risk of
insolvency or intolerable tax burdens. Winston, 636 S.W.2d at 328.
Limiting

recovery

allows

for

"fiscal

and

actuarial

planning

consonant with orderly stewardship of governmental funds," id. ,
while permitting some recovery.
The same conclusion about the legitimacy of the legislative
purposes

behind

statutory

damage

caps

on

the

liability

of

governmental entities performing governmental functions has been
reached by numerous other courts that have likewise rejected state

this way could the legislature open the door, but not all the way,

and/or federal equal protection challenges to them.

as the Act's proponents intended.

403 So.2d at 387 ($50,000 cap); Jetton v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth.,

The need to preserve the public treasury and the need for a
42

E.g., Caulev.

2
These are, of course, the same legitimate purposes served
by the doctrine of governmental immunity itself. Condemarin. 775
at 371-72 (Stewart, J., concurring).

43

399 So. 2d 396, 399 (Fla. App.) , review denied, 411 So.2d 383 (Fla.

Keegan and other similarly situated plaintiffs of nothing, but

1981) ($50,000 cap); Packard v. Joint School Distr., 104 Idaho 604,
instead only grants to all such persons equally the ability to sue
661 P.2d 770

(App. 1983)

($100,000 cap); Estate of Caraill v^
and

recover

up

to

$250,000,

there

has

been

no

deprivation

Rochester. 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704, 706-08 ($50,000 cap), appeal
triggering any but the most deferential scrutiny.
dismissed. 445 U.S. 921 (1979); Lienhard v. State. 431 N.W.2d 861,
To the extent the legislature may not enact economic or social
867 (Minn. 1988) ($100,000 cap); Wilson v. Gipson, 753 P.2d 1349,
legislation

that

creates

remedies

limited

in

some

cases

by

1352-53 (Okla. 1988) ($25,000 cap); Hale v. Portland. 308 Or. 508,
irrational or arbitrary line-drawing, a statutory damage cap is a
783 P.2d 506, 516 (1989) ($100,000 cap) ; Lvles v. Philadelphia. 88
rational

means

of

achieving

the

legitimate

purposes

of

the

Pa. Cmwlth. 509, 490 A.2d 936, 941 ($250,000 cap), aff'd. 512 Pa.
Governmental Immunity Act, and this particular $250,000 cap is not
322, 516 A.2d 701 (1985); Wright v. Colleton County School Distr..
arbitrary.

gee free. 718 P.d at 228; Jetton. 399 So.2d at 399;

391 S.E.2d at 570 ($250,000 cap); Texas Deot. of Mental Health v.
Packard. 661 P.2d at 775. Keegan has failed to carry her burden of
Petty. 817 S.W.2 at 721) ($250,000 cap); Stanhope. 280 N.2d at 719
overcoming the statute's presumptive constitutionality by proving
($25,000); Sambs v. Brookfield. 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504, 514
($25,000 cap), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).3

the contrary.
While Pfost
As noted above, a damage cap is the only rational way to serve

v. State. 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d 495, 504-05 (1985) and White v.
the competing purposes of the Utah Legislature's partial waiver of
State. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983) reach a contrary conclusion, it
absolute governmental immunity for governmental functions. A fixed
should be noted that both of these cases have been

expressly
limit of liability at $250,000 is large enough to compensate most

overruled by the Montana Supreme Court in Meech v. Hillhaven W. ,
injured persons and serve the deterrent function of tort liability,

Jnc..

776 P.2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989).
while simultaneously protecting the public treasury from the risk
Keegan

contends

that

section

63-30-34's

denial

of

full
of insolvency or unfeasible tax burdens that would result

from

compensation to governmental tort victims with damages greater than
catastrophic judgments. As the recent earthquake in San Francisco,
$250,000 is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relationship to the
floods in Chicago, and riots in Los Angeles demonstrate, there is
Act's purposes.

Since the Governmental

Immunity Act

deprives
already a hampered ability to predict the numbers of claims that
will

3

See generally Anno., "Validity and Construction of Statute
or Ordinance Limiting the Kinds or Amount of Actual Damages
Recoverable in Tort Action Against Governmental Unit," 43 A.L.R.4th
19, 29-34 (1986) and (Supp. 1993).

arise

out

of

a

governmental

efforts

at

flood

management, bridge repair, and police protection, all governmental
functions.

44
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entity's

A damage cap provides a crucial element of needed certainty.
premiums

inordinately

to assure

that

sufficient

funds will be

It supplies a fixed amount on which to estimate future liability
available to pay the larger awards, or to await such a large award
based on the best estimate of numbers of claims, thereby enabling
governments to budget for the costs of self-insurance.

In this

way, it comprises a central part of the state's risk management
program.

As the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized, risk

management
level

"requires that recovery be restricted at some finite

so

that

risk

exposure

can

be

underwriting decisions can be made."

projected

and

informed

Packard. 661 P.2d at 775.

Yearly actuarial studies establish the maximum cost of liability
for the next year, based on past loss experience and any visible
trends

in

the

numbers

and

types

of

claims

filed,

using

the

assumption that no claim will cost more than the $250,000 limit.
Without a fixed dollar cap to cut off unlimited liability and
define the actuary's worst

case scenario,

project future losses realistically.
place,

budgeting

expenditures

for

could

self-insurance

not

be

done

there is no way to

In short, with no cap in
and

with

all

any

other

government

tolerable

level

of

certainty.
In this regard the State of Utah, as a self-insurer, is no
different

than

any

private

insurance

company.

It

would

be

impossible for a private company to function without policy limits.
Such limitations permit the private insurer to rationally project
what

its exposure will be and determine

charge.

the premiums

it will

Without a policy limit, the private insurer would be

confronted with two equally undesirable options; either to raise

46

and then declare bankruptcy.
bankruptcy.

The State of Utah cannot declare

Instead, the State of Utah would need to narrow the

waivers of immunity that have been made, and reinstate the absolute
immunity of the State.

Otherwise the State would be unable to

adequately budget the amount that will be necessary to pay awards
made against the State, anymore than a private insurer could do so
without the benefit of policy limits.
The

legislative

history

of

1983

Utah

clearly that the amount of Utah's current

Laws

ch.

13 0 shows

cap, far from being

arbitrary, was reached through the difficult political process by
compromises between competing interests.
$15,000

above

the

average

of

Utah's cap was, in fact,

current

statutory

limits

on

governmental entity liability in states whose legislatures have
similarly acted to partially waive immunity only up to a fixed
dollar amount at that time.4

Deciding whether to give up sovereign

4
Ala. Code § 11-93-2 (1975) ($100,000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2410-114 (1988) ($150,000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4012 (Supp.
1990) ($300,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.28(5) (West Supp. 1992)
($100,000); Idaho Code § 6-926 (1984) ($500,000 per occurrence);
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (Smith-Hurd 1990) ($100,000);
Ind. Code. Ann. §34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986) ($300,000); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 75-6105 (1989) ($500,000 per occurrence); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 44.070 (Michie 1986) ($100,000); Me. Rev. Stat, titl 14, §
8105 (West 1964) ($300,000 per occurrence); Md. Code Ann. § 5-399.2
(Supp. 1991) (limited to extent of insurance coverage); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988) ($100,000); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
466.04 (Supp. 1992) ($200,000); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15 (Supp.
1991) ($25,000 until July 1, 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.035
(Supp. 1991) ($50,000); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-19 (Michie 1989)
($300,000); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000);
Okla. Stat. Ann. titl 51, § 154 (West Supp. 1992) ($100,000); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 30.270 (1991) ($100,000); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §

47

immunity and, if so, whether and where to draw the line of maximum

statutory liability limit for injuries arising from operation of

recovery is not a judicial function.

nuclear power plants, the United States Supreme Court recognized

As numerous courts have

pointed out, it is the role of the legislature, not the courts,
to evaluate the risks, the extent of exposure
to liability, the need to compensate citizens
for injury, the availability of and cost of
insurance, and the financial condition of the
governmental units. It is the legislature's
function to structure statutory provisions,
which will protect the public interest in
reimbursing the victim and in maintaining
government services and which will be fair and
reasonable to the victim and at the same time
will be realistic regarding the financial
burden to be placed on the taxpayers.
gfrmfrs, 293 N.W.2d

the

judiciary

to

whatever ceiling figure is selected will, of
necessity, be arbitrary in the sense that any
choice of a figure based on imponderables like
those at issue here can always be so
characterized. This is not, however, the kind
of
arbitrariness
which
flaws
otherwise
constitutional action.
puke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoted in PeFoor, 824 P.2d at 790
n.12.
at 129;

Likewise, Utah's recovery limit is not arbitrary, in the state

In short, it is not the province of

constitutional due process sense, and it is reasonably related to

at 514; accord Leliefeld.

Stanhope, 280 N.W, 2d at 719.

second-guess

elected

659 P.2d

officials'

weighing

of

competing interests and their resolution of the difficult policy
questions underlying a partial waiver of absolute
immunity up to a fixed dollar amount.

governmental

See Sambs, 293 N.W.2d at

512; Contiemarin, 775 P.2d at 377, 385, (Hall, C.J., dissenting).
Finally, section 63-30-34 is not arbitrary merely because it
precludes full recovery by those who, like Keegan's decedent, are
the most seriously injured.

that:

Any damage cap will do so, precisely

because it is intended to do so.

A cap high enough not to exclude

achieving

the Act's

purposes.

As

the

legislative

history of the 1965 Governmental Immunity Act documents, partial
waiver of immunity is the result of the legislature's balancing of
the needs for essential, costly government services and reasonable
tax limits with the perceived need for some compensation of injured
tort claimants.
rejecting

Numerous other courts have also concluded,

state due process or equal protection

challenges

in
to

similar statutes, that there is a rational relationship between a
damage cap and the legitimate purposes behind partial waivers of

any member of this group from full recovery would, in fact, be no

absolute

cap at all.

functions.

In rejecting a federal due process challenge to a

legitimate

governmental

immunity

for

some

or

all

governmental

When dealing with a large budget, as does the State of Utah,
8557 (1982) ($500,000); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2 (1985) ($100,000);
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 101.023 (West 1986) ($250,000); Wis. Stat. Ann.
S 893.82(6) (West Supp. 1991) ($250,000); Wyo. Stat. S 1-39-118
(Supp. 1991) ($250,000) .
48
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it is often impossible to identify the particular "straw that broke
the camel's back."

And yet, in setting

the

damage

cap,

the

legislative branch had to balance the available money and determine
49

how

much

could

the

State

of

Utah

afford

to

set

aside

compensating those injured by the actions of the State.

for

rjt-y v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) .

This is

To do so, the appellate court asks whether the balance of the

the same budgeting process that the legislature uses to determine

enactment, other than the portion struck down, can stand alone and

how much money should be expended in providing government services

serve its legitimate legislative purpose.

and fulfilling governmental functions.

rorp, v. Wilkinson. 723 P.2d 406, 414 (Utah 1986); Berry. 717 P.2d

Money expended in one area

must, of necessity, leave that much less to be spent for other

at 687; State v. Green. 793 P.2d 912, 917 (Utah App. 1990).

worthwhile goals and objectives. In reviewing the funds available,
the legislature has made a valid decision as to how large a partial
waiver of its immunity that the State of Utah and its political
subdivisions can afford.

This legislative determination should be

respected.

Utah Technology Fin,

In this case, the Governmental

Immunity Act

legislatively

adopted governmental immunity, then waived that immunity in some
circumstances but capped the liability at a certain dollar limit.
The

statute was designed

to waive

creating a limited cause of action.

immunity

only partially by

It is apparent

from the

For these reasons, the State of Utah and UDOT request that

structure of the Act itself, and from its legislative history, that

this Court affirm the trial court's ruling that Keegan has failed

the damage cap in section 63-30-34 is an integral part of this

to prove that section 63-30-34 violates the uniform operation of

enactment and is, therefore, not severable.

Salt Lake Citv v.

laws provision of the Utah Constitution.

Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters. 563 P.2d at 791.

It is indisputable

VII. IP THE DAMAGE CAP IN SECTION 63-30-34 IS
FOUND TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT IS NOT
SEVERABLE FROM THE BALANCE OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THIS COURT MUST
STRIKE DOWN THE ACT IN ITS ENTIRETY

that the Utah Legislature would not have enacted the Governmental
Immunity Act and created a cause of action against governmental
entities performing governmental functions (in sections 63-30-8 and

If the Court accepts any of Keegan's constitutional arguments

-10) if, in doing so, it were subjecting governmental entities to

and holds that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) violates the Utah

unlimited liability.

Constitution by limiting recovery by a person injured as a result

Product Liability Act struck down as inseverable where section

of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental function,

setting forth statute of repose invalidated as unconstitutional).

the Court must next consider the issue of severability.

The waiver of immunity and damage cap provisions were enacted as a

Where
severability

part

of

question

legislative intent.

an
is

enactment
primarily

is

unconstitutional,

answered

by

the

determining

Berry, 717 P.2d at 687 (Utah 1985); Salt Lake

50

S££ Berry. 717 P.2d at 686

package and are inextricably interrelated.

(entire Utah

In such a circumstance,

"it is not within the scope of the court's function to select the
valid portions of the act and make conjecture the

51

legislature

intended they should stand independent of the portions which are

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

invalid." Salt Lake Citv v. Int'l Ags'n of Firefighters. 563 P.2d
at 792.
In any event, the legislative history of the Governmental
Immunity Act rules out any such conjecture. The Utah Legislature
plainly did not intend that a plaintiff in Keegan's position could
have the benefits of the Act's waiver provisions without also being
subject to the recovery limitations in section 63-30-34. Standing
alone, the waiver of immunity portions of the Act cannot stand
independently and serve the legislature's purposes.

CYNTHIA L. KEEGAN, Personally
and as the Personal Representative
of the Estate of David J. Keegan

Case No. 930302

Plaintiff and
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
Priority 15
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants and
Appellees/Cross-Appellants

Berry. 717

P.2d at 688. Accordingly, the balance of the Act must be struck
down if this Court holds that the Utah Legislature may not,

RESPONSE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OP TRANSPORTATION AS APPELLEES (PART I) AND OPENING BRIEF
OF STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AS CROSS-APPELLANTS (PART II)

consistent with the Utah Constitution, prohibit one injured in the
course of a governmental entity's performance of a governmental

PART II. OPENING BRIEF AS CROSS-APPELLANTS

function from recovering, in a statutorily created right of action,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
all the damages attributed by the jury to the responsible entity.
The Utah Department of Transportation was faced with the
Without any valid statutory waiver of governmental immunity
and statutory creation of a right of action, Keegan's ability to
sue or recover from UDOT in this case is controlled by the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the common law, there is
no right of action to recover anything from a governmental entity
for injuries

arising

governmental function.

out

of public highway

maintenance, a

McCorvev v. Utah state Dep't of Transp.,

225 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993).

Accordingly, the judgment

entered in this case against UDOT must be vacated, and Keegan
should take nothing.

question of whether or not to replace the median barrier in
question, and when to do such a replacement.

decision, UDOT made both a safety and an engineering study of the
question. The final decision not to replace the barrier was then
reviewed by the Federal Highway Administration, which agreed with
the recommendation made by UDOT. These actions were discretionary
in nature and the State of Utah and UDOT are entitled to absolute
immunity for their conduct. The trial court erred in denying the
defendants motion for summary judgment and this matter should be
reversed and remanded with instructions that the case be dismissed.

52
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In making this

Even if the State and UDOT were not immune, they were entitled
to have the proportion of fault of FHWA (a non-party) determined by

burden of funding improvements.

the jury.

puncan noted:

Because this was not done, the State of Utah was wrongly

assessed by the jury a greater proportion of

Highway
maintenance
and
improvement
are
predominately fiscal matters.
Every highway could
probably be made safer by further expenditures, but we
will not hold UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature)
negligent for having to strike a difficult balance
between the need for greater safety and the burden of
funding improvements.

fault than that

attributable to the State.
ARGUMENT
VIII.
THE STATE OF UTAH AND UDOT WERE
ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY BECAUSE THE COMPLAINED OF
ACTIONS
WERE
DONE
IN
PERFORMANCE
OF
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS

790 P.2d at 601.
The

The Utah Governmental
functions

of

Immunity Act protects

government.

it

waives

immunity

discretionary
for

acts

of

negligence, but makes an exception to the waiver if the injury
arises out of the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused.
S 63-30-10(1)

613

p

- 2 d 517, 520 (Utah 1980).

Frank

Transrwr^M^
Simply put,

certain government activities are not subject to management through
litigation. Duncan v. Union PaHfir p,
App.

1990),

ailla;., 842 P.2d

832

7 90

functions include decisions that balance
54

Discretionary

safety needs and the

is

a

This Court held that, in

L i t t l e . 667 P.2d at 5 1 .
The first prong of Little asks w h e t h e r the activity

P.2d 595, 601 (ut. Ct.

(Utah 1992).

activity

(3) Does
the
act, omission,
or
decision
require
the
exercise
of
basic
policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4)
Does the governmental agency involved
possess
the
requisite
constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged a c t , o m i s s i o n ,
or
decision.

certain political decisions which are expressly committed to other

•Commission, 38 Ore. App. 331, 590 P.2d 260 (1979).

certain

(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision
necessarily
involve
a
basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective?

The basic policy behind

Morris v. Oregon at.***

whether

affirmed under the following four preliminary questions:

discretionary function immunity is "to preclude judicial review of

branches of government."

determining

order to be found purely discretionary, an act by the state must be

suit] those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large

S* a t e '

for

Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).

(1993).

numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways . . . "

test

discretionary function is found in Little v. Utah State Div. O L

Discretionary function immunity is "intended to shield [from

VT

The Utah Court of Appeals in

a

basic

government

objective.

Utah's

appellate

involves

courts

have

consistently held that a decision concerning public safety on Utah
roads

involves

a

basic

government

55

objective.

Duncan

v.

Union

Pacific

R..

842

P.2d

832,

835

(Utah

1992)

("First,

a basic

judgment and expertise."

Little, 667 P. 2d at 51. Utah's appellate

governmental objective is involved - the promotion of public safety

courts have held that engineering studies of roads satisfy

at railroad crossings."); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.

third prong.

Co. . 749 P.2d 660, 668 (Utah App. 1988) ("installing, maintaining,
reconstructing

and

improving

safety devices

is

the

the

In Duncan. this Court explained:

Third,
UDOT
exercises
"basic
policy
evaluation,
judgment
and
expertise"
in
utilizing a surveillance team to weigh the
degree of hazard at the crossings it inspects
and to subsequently assign priorities to those
crossings where the greatest hazard exists.

consistent

promotion of public safety, a basic government objective.").
In the present case, the first prong of frittle is satisfied.
Public safety was an inherent part of the decision of whether to
raise the barrier.

UDOT and FHWA officials expressly examined the

safety needs of the motoring public in deciding whether to raise
the barrier.

Therefore, the subject activity involves the basic

842 P.2d at 832.

In the present case, the barrier removal decision

satisfies the third prong.

UDOT inspected the median barrier and

performed an engineering study of its safety.
cost

benefit

analysis

that

examined

It then prepared i

several

factors:

safety

concerns associated with not raising the barrier; disruption of

government objective of promoting public safety.

traffic patterns; delay in completing the overlay project; cost of
The

second

prong

of

Little

asks

whether

the

challenged

activity is essential to accomplishing the government objective.
In the terms of this case, the question is whether a decision
concerning median barrier height is essential to
public safety.
affirmative.

accomplishing

This question also should be answered
Badalian

recognized

a potential

safety

in the
concern

involving the height of the median barrier in Parley's Canyon.
safety study was performed,

and UDOT decided

to seek

A

federal

removing

old

and

installing

new

postponing removal of barrier.

median

barrier;

savings

from

UDOT concluded that the most cost

beneficial approach would be to keep the existing barrier and taper
the overlay to avoid further reducing barrier height.

UDOT then

sought and obtained approval for this proposal from the Federal
Highway

Administration.

The

decision making

process

required

engineering analysis and the weighing of financial concerns

in

approval to resurface without removing and replacing the barrier.

order "to strike a difficult balance between the need for greater

That approval was obtained.

safety and the burden of funding improvements."

involved here was essential

Thus, the decision making process
to accomplishing

the objective of

at 601.

The third prong of the Little test asks whether the barrier
required

"the

exercise

of

basic

policy

evaluation,

power to make a decision to raise replacement of the barrier.

'/<£>

^

UDOT

is given "the general responsibility for state-wide highway . . .
and

56

This satisfies the third prong of Little.

The fourth prong of Little asks whether UDOT had the statutory

public safety in Parley's Canyon.

decision

Duncan. 790 P.2d

transportation planning

research
57

and design,

construction,

maintenance, security and safety."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-49-4(1).

This statute satisfies the fourth prong.

Fourth Circuit held that the Park Service, in making the challenged
decisions, was entitled to discretionary function immunity:

This is not a question of first impression.

This Court has

The question of what materials to use in such
a project is also fundamentally described as a
question of how to allocate limited resources
among competing needs.
Considered in this
light, we are of the opinion that the Park
Service's decision in this regard plainly was
one bound up in economic and political policy
considerations. . . . and we find the design
and construction decisions in this case to be
just the kind of planning-level decisions of
which the Court spoke . . . .

already twice held that the very similar activity of evaluating
railroad crossings by UDOT was a discretionary function.

Duncan v._

Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992); Velasquez v. Union Par.
R.R., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970) . The question presented in
those two cases is virtually identical to that presented by the
instant action.

The discretionary decision making process that is

986 F.2d at 722.

used to determine the adequacy of particular safety devices at a

The decision of how and when to replace a
major element of a substantial public facility
is, like the decisions involving design and
construction, at bottom a question of how best
to allocate resources.
Such a decision is
inherently bound up in considerations of
economic and political policy, and accordingly
is precisely the type of governmental decision
that Congress intended to insulate from
judicial second guessing through tort actions
for damages.

railroad crossing, and to prioritize the upgrading of such devices,
is the same process that was used by UDOT in the instant action to
determine the adequacy of the existing median barrier and determine
when that barrier should be upgraded.
In Little, this Court once again emphasized the similarity
between Utah's exceptions to waiver of governmental immunity and

986 F.2d at 724.

those enumerated under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort

barrier at issue in the present matter is no different than the

Claims Act, and stated that Utah has followed the lead of the

question of when to replace a guardrail.

federal cases interpreting that act.

involve considerations of economic and political policy.

Little. 667 P.2d at 51.

Baum v. U.S.. 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993), presents a closely
analogous

factual

plaintiffs

were

situation
injured

to the instant

when

the

car

they

action.

The

were

driving

Baum
in

The decision of when to replace the median

Both of these decisions
Indeed,

the decision in the instant action was expressly made after the
undertaking of safety and engineering studies, and the balancing of
many different factors.

For this reason, the trial court erred

penetrated a guardrail designed, constructed, and maintained by the

when it denied the State of Utah and UDOT's motion for summary

National Park Service.

judgment.

They alleged that the Park Service was

The State of Utah and UDOT are entitled to discretionary

negligent both in the choice of materials used in the construction

function immunity and the instant action should have been dismissed

of the guardrail and in the failure to replace the guardrail.

prior to trial.
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The
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IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
STATE OF UTAH AND UDOT'S MOTION TO COMPARE THE
FAULT OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

and FHWA.
The Liability Reform Act provides two distinct methods by

In 1986, the Utah Legislature rejected the theory that all
which its objective, that defendants only be held responsible for
defendants were jointly and severally liable for the whole amount
of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
instead the Utah Liability Reform Act.

The Legislature enacted

Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-37,

et seq. (1992) . The cornerstone of that act is that "no defendant
is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess
of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant."
Code Ann. § 78-27-38

(1992).

Utah

To implement this goal, Utah Code

the proportion of the damages attributable to their actions, can be
reached.

First, any party to the litigation "may join as parties

any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the injury or
damage for which recovery is sought."5

(1992) . Second, the jury can be directed to find separate special
verdicts "determining the total amount of damages sustained and the
percentage

Ann. S 78-27-40 (1992) provides:

or proportion of

fault

attributable

seeking recovery and to each defendant."
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to
any person seeking recovery is that percentage
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled
to contribution from any other person.

was

not

taken

by

the

defendants

alone.

Approximately 95% of the money for the 1984 resurfacing project
came from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) . FHWA approval
was required before those funds could be spent.
the decision of UDOT and approved it.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39

Pursuant to section 39, the State of Utah and UDOT sought to

height, rather than to increase its height to approximately 32".
decision

person

have the proportion of fault attributable to FHWA determined by the

they decided to retain the median barrier at approximately 27" in

this

to each

(1992).

Plaintiff's claim against the State of Utah and UDOT is that

But

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41

The FHWA reviewed

If the decision of UDOT

jury. This the trial court initially approved, but then refused to
do upon reconsideration.

The trial judge explained his reasoning

as follows:
It would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs to
have their judgment diluted as far as the
amount due the federal government to where
they would be able to collect it. That if the
judgment is taken against the State, and the
plaintiff is successful in obtaining that,
then the State would have to do what they have
to do as far as suing the federal government
to recover it, a proportionate amount. So I
would deny the Motion to Join the Federal
Highway Administration.

concerning the median barrier causes the State of Utah and UDOT to
be liable to the plaintiff, then the FHWA would also be liable for
its share of the consequences of the joint decision reached by UDOT
60

5
The term "defendant" in the Liability Reform Act is defined
more broadly than to include just "parties-defendant." A defendant
is "any person not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable
because of fault to any person seeking recovery." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37(1) (1992) .

61

' S&

f

R. 1468, 1. 13-21.

The trial court's decision is contrary to both

the specific language of the Liability Reform Act and the intent of
that act.

Section 39 makes it mandatory upon the trial court to

direct the jury to return special verdicts as to all defendants
when so requested by any party.

The trial court admitted that its

w ?? hinaton Blvd. Ass'n. 856 P.2d 352

(Utah 1993); Dahl v. Kerbs

ronstr. Corp., 853 P.2d 887 (Utah 1993).
While this Court has not directly addressed the question of
whether a jury may apportion the fault of persons who are not

decision would cause the State of Utah to be assessed more than its

parties to the action,6 section 3 9 of the act clearly permits such

proportional share of the damages.

apportionment.

The rationale of the trial

Further, as this Court stated in Sullivan:

A solid majority of states in the Pacific
region
have
adopted
the
practice
of
apportioning the fault of nonparties in
negligence actions.

court for refusing to follow the clear dictates of the Liability
Reform Act was that to do so would "dilute" the recovery of the
plaintiff.

853 P.2d at 883 n.6.
This Court rejected this argument in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain
Co.

of Utah. 853 P.2d

877

(Utah 1993).

Sullivan involved

an

employee's action for damages where the party-defendants alleged
that the employer was also at fault.

This Court held that the

employer, though immune from suit, should still be placed on the
special verdict

form

so as

to accomplish

the purpose

of

Sullivan lists twelve out of the fourteen other states in the
Pacific

Citv

Corp..

858

P.2d

995
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(Utah

1993);

Brown

v.

the

apportionment

of

fault

of

Co. v. Steel W.. Inc.. 621 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1980).
"It is established without doubt that, when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
opportunity to consider the negligence of all
parties to the transaction, whether or not
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or
not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to
the other tortfeasors either by operation of
law or because of a prior release."
"The reason for such [a rule] is that true
apportionment cannot be achieved unless that
apportionment includes all tortfeasors guilty
of causal negligence
either
causing
or
contributing to the occurrence in question,
whether or not they are parties to the case."
(citations omitted) .

In Palmeno v. Cashen, 627

P.2d 163, 165-66 (Wyo. 1981) the Supreme Court held:
Under

Lake

permitting

The rationale for this solid majority position was

621 P.2d at 403

See also Ericksen v. Salt

as

well stated by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Pocatello Indus. Park

Liability Reform Act.

853 P.2d at 880 (citations omitted).

region

nonparties.

the

That purpose is to ensure that "no defendant
is liable to any person seeking recovery for
any amount in excess of the proportion of
fault attributable to that defendant."
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation
is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve." Thus, failing
to
include
immune
employers
in
the
apportionment violates the main purpose of the
Act by improperly subjecting the remaining
defendants to liability in excess of their
proportion of fault.

In its Appendix, this Court's decision in

comparative

negligence

Bover'

Sullivan. 853 P.2d at 878 n.3.

law

in

this

state, the trier of fact should find the
percentage of negligence attributable to each
of the actors who have proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries regardless of whether the
actors have been named as parties to the
lawsuit.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma made an identical determination:
The negligence of tort-feasors who are not
parties to the lawsuit, "ghost tort-feasors,"
should be considered by the jury in order to
properly apportion the negligence of the
parties.

jury to the State of Utah and UDOT.

This is exactly the result

that this Court sought to avoid in Sullivan.

853 P. 2d at 879.

For

this reason the judgment for the plaintiff must be reversed and
this

matter

remanded

for

a new

trial

at

which

the

jury

may

apportion the fault not only of the plaintiff and UDOT, but also of
the Federal Highway Administration.
CONCLUSION

Gaither v. Citv of Tulsa. 664 P.2d 1026, 1029 n.7

(Okl. 1983).

Accord Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147 (Kan. 1988).

As to the plaintiff's appeal, the State of Utah and the Utah
Department

of

Transportation

urge

this

Court

to

uphold

the

Because the trial court refused to permit the fault of FHWA to

constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 (1993) against all

be compared and apportioned by the jury, the State of Utah and UDOT

of the constitutional challenges made by plaintiff for the reasons

were denied their right under section 39 to limit their liability
to the proportion of fault attributable to them.

given above.

The decision of trial court on this issue should be

To rule, as did
affirmed.

the trial court, that a defendant must be joined as a party under
The

State and UDOT urge

this

Court

to reverse

the

trial

section 41 of the act makes section 39 meaningless surplusage.
court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The

Such an interpretation of the act is not only to be avoided, but is
defendants actions were taken in the performance of a discretionary
contrary to the decisions of the solid majority of courts that have
function for which they are entitled to immunity.

This matter

considered this issue.
should have been dismissed before trial. The decision of the trial
Indeed, such an interpretation is contrary to the clear intent
of the act.

This Court has found the intent of the act to be to

court on this issue should be reversed and this suit remanded to
the trial court with instructions to dismiss the action.

ensure that "no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery
The trial court erred in not granting the defendants motion to
for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
have the Federal Highway Administration (a non-party) placed on the
that defendant."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992).

This did not
special verdict form so that the jury could attribute to FHWA its

occur in the instant action.

Because the State's motion to join
proper proportion of fault.

Because this was not done, any such

the FHWA on the verdict form was denied, any proportion of fault
percentage of fault was wrongly attributed to the State of Utah.
that was attributable to the FHWA was, instead, attributed by the
This Court should therefore, at a minimum, reverse this decision of
64
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the trial court and remand this action with instructions to the
trial court to grant the defendants a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

*L

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah and
Utah Department of Transportation
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, LAYTON DEPARTMENT
CRAIG JOHNSON, et al.,

Case No. 970700411 PI

Plaintiff,

AU$13

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA dba GIBBONS & REED
COMPANY, and JOHN DOES I-V,

ttyonD*trtie

tCom

Defendants.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION NOVEMBER 19, 2002
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 E. Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

+*~~

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals
AUG 18 2003
Pautetta Stsgg
Clerk of the Court
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

ERIK M. WARD
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
GRIDLEY, WARD & SHAW

For the Defendant:
State of Utah, UDOT:

SCOTT JACOBSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW

Granite Construction:

SCOTT M. CHRISTENSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

1

FARMINGTON, UTAH - NOVEMBER 19, 2002

2

HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

I will just advise the parties that we

5

have, for some reason there was an adoption that's been

6

scheduled at 10:30 and we may take a break at 10:30 to do an

7

adoption that would just take a few minutes.

8
9

Okay, we're here in the case Craig Johnson vs. State
of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation, Granite

10

Construction Company of Utah, and we have - this is set for

11

pre-trial and arguments on pending motions.

12

UDOT's motion for summary judgment filed in opposition.

13

There's been a reply.

14

defendants regarding Newell Knight, and there's been an

15

opposition and a reply to that.

16

continuance - motion for continuance of trial.

17

that people got the chance to respond and we're going to hear

18

this motion and if that effects the trial, it effects the

19

trial.

20

forward.

21

from December 2nd through 13th with half days on Thursday,

22

Thursday mornings because the felony law and motion calendar on

23

the 5th and the 12th. So I have read - do you wish to do the

24

summary judgment before the Newell Knight one, or what do you

25

wish to do?

There has been

There's been a motion filed by the

There's also been a
My attitude is

If it doesn't, you know, the trial would still go
I have read the motions.

This case is set for trial

1

1

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, the State filed a

2

motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's filed a motion in

3

reference to Mr. Knight.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6

certainly up to the court.

7

THE COURT:

Right.
So I have no preference.

It's

Okay, maybe before we get started why

8

doesn't everybody make their appearance for the record so that

9

we just have that for the videotape?

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

MR. SHAW:

Chris Shaw and Eric Ward for the

plaintiff.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Scott Christensen on behalf of the

defendant Granite Construction.
MR. JACOBSEN:

Scott Jacobsen on behalf of defendant

Utah Department of Transportation.
THE COURT:

Okay, and Mr. Jacobsen, do you wish to

argue first then?
MR. JACOBSEN:

That's fine, your Honor.

And let me

19

just state first of all on the motion for continuance,

20

obviously circumstances changed somewhat from when we filed

21

that, so we had no intent of pursing that today.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. JACOBSEN:

Your Honor, UDOT in this case has

24

filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal of

25

all of plaintiff's claims against defendant UDOT.

And as you

1

indicated, you have reviewed the briefs that have been filed in

2

support of and in opposition to that motion, so I won't belabor

3

the facts, but just briefly a general description of what we're

4

dealing with here.

5

THE COURT:

I guess there's two issues.

I guess

6

there's one issue is, you know, are there disputed facts

7

because in your first memo you say it's not disputed about, you

8

know, based on the affidavit that was attached.

9

and they basically - well, I guess the one question I have to

10

They come back

ask you is if you file your motion, you have numbered

11 I paragraphs with citation to the record.

They file their motion

12

and their first four pages have nothing to do with your

13

numbered paragraphs as I read them.

14

MR. JACOBSEN:

15

THE COURT:

I believe that is correct.

And then whey they get to page five, they

16

start to dispute paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26

17

where they set out your fact.

18

dispute it and then you claim that they really in fact are not

19

disputed.

20
21
22

MR. JACOBSEN:

Then make a claim that they

And that's correct, your Honor.

you want we could go those fact by fact.
THE COURT:

If

I think -

Well, I guess the issue is, I mean, is it

23

your position that pages one through three, I guess one through

24

four of the plaintiff's memo in opposition basically is not

25

disputing anything because it doesn't comply with Rule 4-501?
3

1

Is that your position?

2

MR, JACOBSEN:

I believe that's certainly part of our

3

position.

In our reply memo - and I think many of those facts

4

that were cited there were actually just duplicates of what we

5

had already - I mean, duplicates of contract language or

6

duplicates of what happened in the accident.

7

correct.

8

those facts that we think are material to the motion.

9

we argued in our reply memo, several of those facts we think

So I think that's

I mean, the burden in this case is on us to set forth
And as

10

are entirely irrelevant or non-material to the issues raised in

11

the motion for summary judgment.

12

THE COURT:

Well, so do you think the argument

13

basically is based upon the ones that they're disputing on

14

pages five through eight of their brief?

15

MR. JACOBSEN:

I believe that's correct, your Honor.

16

That certainly what Rule 4-501 requires them to do is to

17

respond to those facts and you'll note there that certain of

18

those facts that they attempted to respond to and dispute, no

19

evidentiary citation at all.

20

reply memorandum that in those cases, those facts must be

21

deemed admitted as they've been alleged by UDOT in its opening

22

memorandum.

23

THE COURT:

And I think as we noted in the

Well, I think the issue, yeah, I mean,

24

there's no secret why we have Rule 4-501 as it relates to

25

summary judgment motions, and that is so the judge who has to
4

1

review a summary judgment doesn't have to have through, you

2

know, six inches of paper and then put it together themselves.

3

It's - you put yours stated in numbered paragraphs with

4

citation to record.

5

list.

6
7
8
9

They come back and go one by one down the

MR. JACOBSEN:

I agree that's the appropriate way to

do it.
THE COURT:

They don't do that as the rule says, you

know, the statements of the moving papers are deemed admitted.

10

And it's a ^shall begin', it doesn't say may begin, of if you'd

11

like it to, it says shall.

12

that I'm not unaware that the appellate courts of the state,

13

basically if they get six inches of paper also say that there's

14

a disputed fact just like some trial judges will heft a binder

15

like this and say there must be one there somewhere.

16

the issue becomes are there disputed facts, and if there's

17

disputed facts, summary judgment's not appropriate.

18

really are not disputed facts, even though one side says there

19

are, then it may be appropriate.

20

and if you're going on these 3, 5,6, 20 to 24 and 26, then that

21

seems to me what needs to be the issue.

22

MR. JACOBSEN:

Now the question becomes though, is

And so

If there

And I think that's the issue

I think that is the issue, your Honor,

23

and I mean, obviously plaintiff has made a tactical decision

24

here to try and, you know, inject numerous other facts, you

25

know, because disputed facts, you know, do defeat a motion for
5

1

summary judgment.

But it's our position that Rule 4-501 sets

2

forth the procedure they need to follow and it's that second

3

section of facts which is, you know, can be viewed as their

4

only response that they complied with 4-501.

5

position, your Honor, that any of the facts that they did not

6

specifically respond to in their second section of facts must

7

be deemed admitted, and for those few facts that they did hit,

8

I think we've responded there why we do not believe they're

9

disputed.

So that is our

There's no question it's our position - it's

10

defendant UDOT's position that there are no disputed issues of

11

fact that are material to this motion for summary judgment.

12

And I think as I go through the argument -

13

THE COURT:

I think that we ought to go through those

14

in detail because I think, you know, specifically what's on

15

their pages five through eight, and what's on your response to

16

that I think are things that concern me.

17
18
19

MR. JACOBSEN:

Let me just get both of those in front

of me, your Honor.
THE COURT:

It's on page nine of your - page nine of

20

your reply memo is basically responding, as I see it, to page

21

five through eight of their memo in opposition.

22

MR. JACOBSEN:

That's correct.

Looking at the first

23

one, let me just glance quickly and refresh myself as to what

24

the fact was.

25

THE COURT:

They cited on tJheirs, three says the
6

1

decision to use barrels rather than concrete barriers to

2

channel traffic throughout this project area was made by the

3

upper most officials in the UDOT organization.

4

don't have to spend too much time on that one in your memo or

5

in your presentation, because you say it's this, is it Mr.

6

LeFevre?

Is that how you pronounce it?

7

MR. JACOBSEN:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

And maybe we

Dike LeFevre, yes.

Okay, Mr. LeFevre, and they say well,

yeah, it was LeFevre, but they dispute it was "upper most
officials".

So I don't know -

MR. JACOBSEN:

And I guess we've tried to provide

12

your Honor with some information in our opening memorandum kind

13

of on the UDOT hierarchy and where that flows.

14

position - I think -

15

THE COURT:

16
17

It's our

That's really paragraph four, I believe,

that you laid all those people's names and what they did.
MR. JACOBSEN:

Exactly.

And we attached an

18

organizational chart as an exhibit and it's our position that

19

even if you didn't have other people involved, Mr. LeFevre

20

himself is far higher in the UDOT organization than anybody

21

that was involved in, you know, if we talk about the Keeaan

22

cases and the Truiillo cases and the UDOT personnel that became

23 I involved in those cases, never reached anywhere near the level
24
25

that Mr. LeFevre occupies in UDOT.
THE COURT:

So your position he's high enough?
7

1

MR. JACOBSEN:

It's our position that he's high

2

enough.

But in addition to that, it's our position that it

3

went beyond him.

4

clearly copied to Clint Topham who is Mr. LeFevre's supervisor.

5

He was the executive director for all of UDOT, chief engineer

6

for the entire state.

7

deputy director and he's the one that reported to the governor.

8

So, you're getting about as high you can go.

9

himself testified in his deposition that he remembers these

I mean, there's letters in the file that were

The only person above Mr. Topham was the

But Mr. Topham

10

issues coming to him, he remembers going to meetings,

11

discussing these issues with Mr. LeFevre.

12

granted Mr. LeFevre, who was the head of Region I, the northern

13

part of the state, some leeway there in what the final decision

14

was, but those issues were actually brought all the way to Mr.

15

Topham's desk, were considered by Mr. Topham as well, and then

16

were handed back to Mr. LeFevre to make the final decision.

17

But as the director for Region I, it's our position that that's

18

exactly what he is is one of the upper most officials at UDOT.

19

Obviously, he

As you get down into the next fact that they dispute,

20

I believe that's where - at one point in our reply memo they

21

attempt to attack his experience claiming that he is somebody

22

who was recently hired.

23

39 years at UDOT, he had served as the director of a separate

24

region for approximately five years, he had been the director

25

of Region I on a prior occasion, then went into another

Mr. LeFevre is somebody who has spent

8

1

position and then was reappointed as the director of Region I

2

from 1995 until the point that he retired after 39 years at

3

UDOT in 2000.

4

that, you know, did Mr. LeFevre really consult others, did he

5

really talk to Mr. Topham, it's certainly our position that Mr.

6

LeFevre is high enough, and the parties agree that he's the one

7

that made this decision.

So even if plaintiffs want to point to the fact

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. JACOBSEN:

The next one is number five.

Right, just glancing at that. Again,

10

this goes partly to what we just talked about.

Mr. LeFevre's

11

testified about the involvement of Mr. Topham.

Mr. Topham has

12

acknowledged that he was involved with the review of not only

13

the traffic control plan, but specific -

14

THE COURT:

But if this is accurate or not, then

15

their opposition on page five where the say LeFevre testified

16

as his deposition that he was "not sure he talked to Topham

17

specifically about the barrels.

18

He made the decision to eliminate concrete barriers from the

19

proposal."

20

MR. JACOBSEN:

In fact, he probably did not.

If you look at the deposition

21

testimony, and we've tried to provide you with the additional

22

pages there, what Mr. LeFevre was saying, the question he was

23

responding to was, if you recall from reading the briefs, this

24

issue of barrels versus barriers comes up on a few different

25

occasions.

The question there was pertaining only to the issue
9

1

of before this project was ever awarded to Granite, before it

2

was ever let out to bid, when the initial decision was made

3

that UDOT was going to use barrels instead of barriers in the

4

traffic control plan, the question was did you at that time

5

talk to Mr. Topham about that issue.

6

that Mr. LeFevre was involved in the analysis of that issue.

7

But the question was did you talk to Mr. Topham at that time.

8

And in his deposition following the affidavit he said, "I

9

remember we took the traffic control plan to him, he reviewed

There was no question

10

it." Mr. Topham actually signs off on the traffic control

11

plan, his name appears on it.

12

at that time I specifically talked to Mr. Topham about the

13

barrel versus barrier issue."

14

But he says "I can't remember if

Later on when Granite comes back and starts making

15

requests sending in the proposed change orders to have the plan

16

modified to include barriers, there's no question at that time,

17

Mr. Topham's testified and Mr. LeFevre's testified that Mr.

18

Topham was involved with that process.

19

it's a little misleading is because the statement that they

20

take and quote in their opposition memo that refers only to

21

that instance prior to the contract ever being awarded to

22

Granite, and Mr. LeFevre's testimony was simply I don't

23

r€>member if I specifically discussed that single issue with him

24

at that time.

25

So I think that's why

And I think they acknowledge -

THE COURT:

So is it your position that in order for
10

1

you to be successful in the summary judgment that he had to

2

consult with Topham?

3

MR. JACOBSEN:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. JACOBSEN:

No.

Or is that just icing on the cake?
I think that's something that

6

plaintiffs thrown out.

They're trying to suggest that Mr.

7

LeFevre wasn't high enough up the ladder.

8

know, one of the things we attached to our reply memorandum was

9

the brief that was filed in the Keaan case, and there's no

But as I stated, you

10

evidence that was presented to the Utah Supreme Court in that

11

case showing that the decisions that were made in that case

12

went any higher than the design engineers that fell well below

13

the region director in that case.

14

that the types of analysis and the involvement of Mr. LeFevre

15

is certainly high enough, but I think it is icing that Mr.

16

Topham was actually involved in the process as well.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. JACOBSEN:

I mean, it's our position

Okay.
And we think it's also inaccurate the

19

reference here that the decisions made by Mr. LeFevre were

20

based solely on the cost involved.

21

whatsoever.

22

stated cost was a factor, safety of the workers was a factor,

23

safety of the public was a factor, and another key factor that

24

gets mentioned over and over throughout his deposition is this

25

factor that they felt like they were under immense pressure

There's no evidence of that

In Mr. LeFevre's affidavit and his depositions he

11

1

from the public to get this project done and to impact the

2

public as little as possible.

3

has acknowledged that the use of concrete barriers would have

4

delayed this project, it would have made it more difficult

5

because it's one thing to come along if you're trying to open

6

up two lanes part of the day and one lane part of the day, you

7

can move barrels back and forth.

8

concrete barriers out there it would have significantly delayed

9

the time this project would have taken.

And everybody that's testified

But if they would have stuck

So that's another

10

major factor.

11

to suggest that Mr. LeFevre's decision was based solely on the

12

costs involved.

13

So it's inaccurate there and there's no evidence

THE COURT:

Is it your position on disputed fact

14

number six - excuse me, go ahead with number six, or is that

15

the one you were on?

16
17

MR. JACOBSEN:

Well, no, I believe we were on the one

just before that, so let me look at six.

18

THE COURT:

Well, let me ask you this question.

19

it necessary for Mr. LeFevre to consult with the federal

20

highway administration, if he did or if he didn't does that

21

mean that the motion should not be granted or should be

22

granted?

23

MR. JACOBSEN:

24

the Quinn Topham issue.

25

believe it shows, you know, it's further evidence of the

Is

I think that issue is very similar to
If he did, I believe it's icing.

I

12

1

analysis that took place.

2

necessary, certainly it's not something that was deemed

3

necessary by the other courts that have looked at this

4

particular issue.

5

we cited in our reply memorandum, if you look at the pages in

6

the deposition, there's no question, I mean, Mr. LeFevre is

7

very clear in his affidavit and he was consistent in his

8

deposition that the federal highway administration played a

9

role here.

10 I

But, no, I don't think it's

So, no, I don't think it's necessary, but as

I think the pages that they refer to here - I'll have

11

to look back at it - but there was some question in Mr.

12

LeFevre's mind as far as what his personal involvement was with

13

the Federal Highway Administration, but he was very clear that

14

those working below him had consulted the Federal Highway

15

Administration.

16

was he said on these types of projects and other - up until

17

that point in time they had typically used concrete barriers.

18

And it had the problems that we just discussed a minute ago as

19

far as the timing of the project, the cost involved, so they

20

wanted to know, you know, would it be okay to use barrels on

21

this type of a project.

22

affidavit and his deposition that they went to the Federal

23

Highway Administration and said what have you done in other

24

states?

25

of projects?

One of the things he said in his deposition

So Mr. LeFevre has stated in his

Have you used barrels in other states on these types
And they came back with a feeling that it had
13

1

been done, it had been done safely and that it would be an

2

appropriate means of doing this.

3

that the Federal Highway Administration wasn't involved in the

4

analysis of that particular issue just isn't supported by any

5

evidence.

So attempting to state here

6

Do you have any further questions on that fact?

7

THE COURT: No.

8

MR. JACOBSEN: Okay.

9
10

The two issues there, I think

we've talked about, but I'll just hit them briefly again.
THE COURT:

Well, is your view when they say there is

11

no evidence that the July change order was reviewed by upper

12

management?

13

management.

I mean, it's your view that Mr. LeFevre is upper

14

MR. JACOBSEN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. JACOBSEN:

It's our view.

It was reviewed by him?
Correct, and in this case they're

17

simply wrong in the evidence they cite.

18

reply memo the deposition testimony of Mr. Topham.

19

said he specifically remembers that issue coming to him,

20

considering that issue, consulting with Mr. LeFevre, and it's

21

hard to say you can go much higher than Mr. Topham.

22

it's our view that Mr. LeFevre is high enough.

23

We included with our
Mr. Topham

But again,

And then again, there's the financial consideration

24

claiming that it was the financial consideration which

25

motivated the rejection.

Mr. LeFevre and Mr. Topham both
14

1

testified that those other factors were also considered and

2

that it wasn't simply a dollar decision, although there's no

3

question that was a factor.

4
5

THE COURT:

Okay, I believe on 21 you basically said

they haven't cited any record evidence.

6

MR. JACOBSEN:

Exactly, and I think it's pretty clear

7

that under Rule 4-501 that if you don't support it with

8

evidence from the record, then I would just note that our fact

9

was supported by deposition testimony.

I believe it was the

10

testimony of Mr. Hunter in addition to the terms of the

11

contract which lay out the responsibilities that are imposed on

12

the contractor.

That same thing for number 22. Yes.

13

THE COURT:

Okay, go ahead.

14

MR. JACOBSEN:

Twenty-three?

I think that's just a misunderstanding

15

of the fact.

16

you know, Granite was never prevented from using concrete

17

barriers if it wanted to do so at its own cost, but we've never

18

attempted to suggest that Granite is somehow liable because

19

they didn't do that.

20

interpreting it has no materiality that the issues on this

21

motion for summary judgment.

22

to allege.

23

be interpreted in that way.

24
25

We pointed out in our memorandum that Granite,

That's just - that fact, the way they're

That's not what we've attempted

And if that's how it came across, then it shouldn't

Same thing on the next one.

On number 24, I think

that's a misinterpretation of what we were trying to say.

On
15

1

the speed limit, there's no question it wasn't Granite who -

2

well, let's see what they say.

3

that the 55 mile per hour speed limit was Granite's creation.

4

If I can just give you a little background on the speed limit

5

issue.

6

throughout the state - that's back at the time when we were,

7

the states were under federal restrictions, you couldn't have

8

speed limits over 55 miles per hour.

9

started-

i

They say that the implication

When this project was let out to bid, speed limits

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. JACOBSEN:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. JACOBSEN:

By the time the project

Who drove 50 when it was 55.
Yeah.

I mean, 70 when it was 55 and then I don't know that it had much impact

14

on the change of actual speeds when the law changed.

But in

15

any event, federal restrictions were lifted and the Utah

16

legislature said we're not bound by that anymore.

17

the first things that happened is the speed limit for all of

18

1-15, throughout the state, was raised to 65 miles per hour.

19

And then they began looking at it on individual basis at other

20

roads throughout the state.

21

speed limit had gone up to 65 miles per hour.

22

correspondence that we've submitted to the court with our

23

original memorandum where we acknowledge that Granite made

24

requests, Granite said, "Hey, we bid this contract out at 55

25

miles per hour.

And one of

So when the project started the
There's

The speed limit is now 65 miles per hour.

Can
16

1

you lower the speed limit?" Well, what happened in response

2

and what's undisputed is that at the time of the accident, the

3

posted speed limit - you still have the white 65 mile per hour

4

signs up, but you also had orange advisory speed signs of 50

5

miles per hour for construction zone that were posted

6

throughout the construction zone.

7

investigating officer's testimony that have been submitted to

8

the court both indicate that those 50 mile per hour advisory

9

speed signs were posted and in effect at the time of the

The police report and the

10

accident in this case.

But as far as any implication that it

11

was Granite that lowered the speed or that raised the speed, I

12

think that's just a misunderstanding of the point that was

13

trying to be made.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. JACOBSEN: Twenty-six.

16
17
18

Okay, and 26 is just -

over how the accident occurred, and I don't think THE COURT:

You don't think that's not material to

your motion?

19

MR. JACOBSEN:

20

THE COURT:

21

else you wish to do.

22

Certainly there's disputes

Exactly.

Okay.

MR. JACOBSEN:

If you'd like to address whatever

Your Honor, what I would like to point

23

out and the arguments in addition to the fact that we don't

24

believe there's any disputed facts that would preclude summary

25

judgment in this case, we think that there's reasons - in the
17

1

complaint that was filed in this case, the claims were brought

2

against UDOT and Granite and there was a list of them.

3

tried to categorize those in as far as the claims against UDOT

4

and the categories that we've put in our brief - and I don't

5

think plaintiff has really objected to it in their response -

6

is first of all there's the claims that UDOT designed a bad

7

traffic control plan, that they never should have used barrels,

8

it should have been concrete barriers.

9

We

Second type of claim that's been brought against UDOT

10

is that the traffic control plan as it was designed wasn't

11

followed, that at the night plaintiff was driving through

12

there, barrels weren't set up right or things hadn't been

13

followed dealing with the implementation of the traffic control

14

plan.

15

And the third way in which plaintiffs attempted to

16

bring claims against UDOT is by saying regardless of everything

17

else, UDOT should be held liable for any of Granite's alleged

18

negligence, a vicarious liability theory.

19

And we've addressed each of those three areas in our

20

briefs, and I'll just go through our arguments to those briefly

21

just in order to respond to any questions you might have.

22

far as the first issue in whether or not UDOT can be held

23

liable for its design of the traffic control plan or the

24

decision to use plastic barrels instead of concrete barriers as

25

the primary dividing device on this project.

As

It's UDOT's
18

1

position that UDOT's protected under the Governmental Immunity

2

Act, which is falls in § 63-30-3 of the Utah Code,

3

Court's aware, there's a general grant of immunity in that

4

section, and then after it there's several other provisions

5

that modify that.

6

that have been cited by both parties are the Keeqan vs. State

7

of Utah case and the Truiillo vs. UDOT case.

8

helpful to this case that both of those cases deal with UDOT as

9

a defendant, deal with the issues that are really quite similar

10

to what we are dealing with here, deal with cases where summary

11

judgment was either denied or granted, so it provides the Court

12

with some guidance as to whether or not summary judgment is

13

appropriate in this type of a case.

As the

And the cases that are really key here are,

We believe it's

14

And in Keeqan, the Utah Supreme Court really lays out

15

the analysis that the court goes through, and then Truiillo was

16

a subsequent Utah Court of Appeals case where they applied the

17

Utah Supreme Court's analysis.

18

courts are required to go through under Keeqan is basically a

19

three part test.

20

and say was the activity or the decisions that are issued, were

21

they a governmental function.

22

on this issue.

First of all, the court needs to look at it

Plaintiff and UDOT seem to agree

There's no question that -

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. JACOBSEN:

25

But the analysis that the

One of the few things (inaudible).
Point two as well.

is does the statute contain a waiver.

The second issue

Not surprisingly
19

1

plaintiff agrees with UDOT that yes, the statute likely

2

contains a waiver - that being the waiver for injuries arising

3

out of dangerous conditions on highways.

4

that's found in § 63-30-8.

5

there.

6

That's a waiver

So the parties are in agreement

The third step is are there any exceptions to that

7

waiver.

And that of course is where the parties differ.

8

That's what the Truiillo and the Keeaan cases look at and

9

that's what this Court is faced with deciding.

And UDOT's

10

argument is that § 63-30-10, which contains a whole list of

11

exceptions to the waivers, that the first exception in that

12

list which is in subparagraph 1 and it's often referred to as

13

the discretionary function exception, is what protects UDOT's

14

decisions and actions in this case.

15

function, the way the courts have looked at it and the way it's

16

laid out and particularly in the Keeaan case, is the court said

17

there needs to be some protection for decisions that are made

18

at upper levels within governmental organizations where they're

19

weighing cost factors, where they're weighing public policy

20

factors, where they're looking at all of these different

21

factors and having to make what they call policy-based

22

decisions, or what the court refers to as the basic policy

23

making level.

24

types of decisions, it's those types of acts that fall within

25

the discretionary function exception.

And in that discretionary

That's what the courts have said.

It's those

20

1

The other level being the operational level.

The

2

examples that are cited in the cases are, you know, there's the

3

example I believe in both the Keeaan and the Truiillo where

4

they talk about a traffic light.

5

that a certain intersection warrants having a traffic light,

6

the decision of whether or not to put a traffic light in at

7

that intersection is a policy-based decision that is protected

8

under the discretionary function exception.

9

from the state and comes along and is installing that traffic

If somebody makes a decision

Now if somebody

10

light and the traffic light falls over and injures somebody,

11

that somebody who, at the operational level is executing the

12

policy that's already been developed, that is something which

13

is not covered under the discretionary functioning exception.

14

The facts of the Keeaan and the Truiillo cases are

15

really important here, and hopefully the Court's had an

16

opportunity to read those cases because I think that's really

17

what makes the difference here.

18

and the Keeaan - both cases like this case involve barrier

19

issues.

20

going up Parley's Canyon and there's the center dividing

21

barrier, and the question became how many times can you repave

22

the road before that barrier becomes short enough that it's no

23

longer a safe barrier.

24

the facts and the brief in the Keeaan case that we attached to

25

our reply memorandum, you had a safety studies engineer who was

You look at the Keeaan case

In Keeaan you had a highway that was being resurfaced

UDOT's personnel and what's stated in

21

1

involved, you had the project design engineer.

Both people

2

working withing a particular region of UDOT who looked at the

3

safety issues, who looked at the cost issues, did sort of a

4

cost benefit analysis, a safety analysis, and decided, "Hey, we

5

think" - and it's interesting to note in that case in I believe

6

it's one of the first couple paragraphs of that case where

7

they're laying out the facts, they note that the decision that

8

was ult imately made by UDOT that it didn't need to raise the

9

barrier was in violation of an ASHTO standard - a standard that

10

UDOT was supposedly required to follow.

They decided despite

11

that standard, we think it's safe enough and cost effective

12

enough that we're going to repave this road without raising

13

that barrier.

14

judgment - and obviously there was an accident.

15

over the barrier and was injured.

16

filed, UDOT brought a motion for summary judgment saying, "Hey,

17

our decision to repave this road without raising the barrier

18

was something that our design engineers looked at.

19

at the safety issues.

20

made a decision and they decided it wasn't necessary.

21

argued that was something that fell within the discretionary

22

functioning exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.

23

court disagreed, denied the motion for summary judgment, case

24

proceeded to trial, judgment was entered against UDOT and it

25

was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.

In that case, UDOT brought a motion for summary
Somebody went

And as the lawsuit was

They looked

They looked at the cost issues, and they
UDOT

Trial

22

1

On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme

2

Court reversed the decision, said summary judgment should have

3

been granted.

4

of costs and benefits, looking at the different factors

5

involved, they said that is precisely the types of decisions

6

and acts that fall within the discretionary functioning

7

exception of the Governmental Immunity Act.

8

reasons in there behind that saying that governmental agencies

9

have got to be able to, you know, the people who are making

They said that type of analysis, that weighing

I note the policy

10

these policy-based decisions have got to be able to make their

11

decisions without fear of being sued every time they make a

12

decision.

13

be made safer, but somebody's got to make those decisions as

14

far as, you know, with the available money.

15

we afford to make this highway.

16

THE COURT:

They note in there that, sure, every highway could

Just how safe can

So your view is if summary judgment is

17

granted, then it's going to be affirmed by the Supreme Court

18

because at least two of their members - three of their members

19

did Keeqan.

20

you'd have maybe four different members of the Supreme Court.

21

I guess by the time you, if this were appealed,

MR. JACOBSEN:

And that's true.

But I think the

22

court would at least be reluctant to alter the path which was

23

clearly followed.

24

Truiillo case followed any different type of analysis.

25

think-

And the Truiillo case, I don't think the
I

23

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. JACOBSEN:

3

That is lack of facts?
Lack of facts.

You look at that case

and they state -

4

THE COURT:

Well, isn't it basically what you did in

5

this case is you looked at Truiillo, you saw what was missing

6

and you got somebody do an affidavit to fill it in?

7

MR. JACOBSEN:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11
12
13
14

We'd be foolish not to.

I think that's basically what you were

doing.
MR. JACOBSEN:

Right.

We don't know what facts were

ultimately presented at trial on Truiillo.
THE COURT:

You must not have done a very good job

because you didn't convince the plaintiffs that you were right.
MR. JACOBSEN:

I didn't expect to, your Honor.

We're

15

hoping to convince you though.

16

with the Truiillo case, you know that it was a lack of facts

17

issue, and in that case they said them's no evidence here that

18

you ever even singled out the traffic control plan, not just

19

the particular barrier issue, but the traffic control plan.

20

But I think you're familiar

In this case, whether you want to question Mr.

21

Topham's involvement and the Federal Highway Administration's

22

involvement, there's no question that that specific issue was

23

looked at by UDOT.

24

They wanted to be sure it was safe to do it in this case.

25

under those facts, we think that the discretionary function -

It was something they hadn't done before.
And

24

1

like this case or even more so than the Keeaan case because it

2

was even a higher official in UDOT, this case has got to fall

3

within the holding of Keeaan and summary judgment would be

4

appropriate.

5

I would just address one more argument that I don't

6

think we hit in our reply brief, but that came up in the

7

opposition memorandum, and that's the suggestion that it may

8

have been a discretionary function type decision the first time

9

back LeFevre made the decision, but when it was brought back to

10

him, that was just execution of the policy and so at that

11

point, UDOT could be on the hook.

I don't think there's any

12

support for that in these cases.

You know, it would seem you

13

could get around the discretionary function exception anytime a

14

discretionary type decision's been made if you just go back and

15

ask again, I don't think there's any suggestion in the law that

16 I that's appropriate.
17

When Granite came back and proposed a change order,

18

Mr. LeFevre stated that he went back and he reviewed it again.

19

He weighed the same safety factors, the same cost factors, the

20

same time factors, and the fact that he made the same decision

21

doesn't mean he was simply executing his original policy.

22

believe it was a re-evaluation and reaffirming it.

23

think that argument should hold any weight with the Court.

24
25

I

So I don't

Moving on, your Honor, the second issue is is whether or
not UDOT could be held liable for any alleged failure to follow
25

1

the traffic control plan.

And in support of that argument,

2

your Honor, we attached to our initial brief as exhibit, I

3

believe it's Exhibit 4, contract documents which clearly spell

4

out the responsibilities for this project, spell out that the

5

contractor who was Granite had the responsibility of performing

6

the work in accordance with the terms of the contract, of

7

supplying the manpower, supplying the equipment, and then

8

there's the attachment to the contract that was also attached

9

in our brief where it specifically states that the contractor's

10

required to provide the barrels, the signs, the warning

11

devices, to implement those.

12

There's nothing in the contract documents that

13

suggest UDOT was any responsibility to be the ones out there

14

implementing this traffic control plan.

15

places that responsibility on Granite.

16

the project actually subcontracted that out to a third party

17

who was in charge of the traffic safety throughout the area,

18

setting out the barrels, doing all of that.

19

nothing to suggest either in the contract or otherwise that

20

UDOT had any duty to implement or monitor that traffic control

21

plan.

22

obligation to inspect Granite's work, to make sure they were

23

doing it right, then even in that event, your Honor, we've

24

suggested, we've argued that another exception in the

25

Governmental Immunity Act, which is the one dealing with the

Clearly the contract
Granite initially on

But there's

Even if there was some suggestion that UDOT had an

26

1

inspections would apply.

If Granite or if UDOT did have an

2

obligation to inspect Granite's work to make sure they were

3

following the traffic control plan, that exception in the

4

Governmental Immunity Act which states that - well, it

5

specifically says they can't be liable for "a failure" - and

6

this is § 63-30-10(4) - that they can't be liable for "a

7

failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate

8

inspection."

9

there monitoring Granite's employees and making sure they did

So even if UDOT had some obligation to be out

10

their job right, UDOT can't be liable for that.

We've cited

11

cases in support of that.

12

opportunity to read them, make it clear that there's some

13

limits on that exception.

14

that its own failure to maintain its own equipment is an

15

inspection that falls under this.

16

those cases state is that this exception typically applies in

17

cases where a governmental entity was involved in an inspection

18

of building, fire, safety codes, that type of thing.

19

don't limit it to that, but they say that's typically the type

20

of case that this comes up in.

21

what was going on here.

22

responsibility to do things to follow the federal guidelines

23

that had been set up for highway safety, to do it as the

24

contract documents required, and to do so in a manner which was

25

safe to both the workers on the project and the motoring

Those cases, if you had an

A governmental entity can't claim

What they state and what

They

And we think that's exactly

Granite had a contractual
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1

public.

2

or to inspect their work to ensure that that was being done,

3

that's precisely the type of act which would fall under this

4

inspection exception.

5
6

Finally, your Honor, the third issue is whether or
not UDOT can be held liable for Granite's conduct.

7
8

THE COURT:

I've read the Thompson vs. Jess and I

MR. JACOBSEN:

10

12

Obviously -

understand that argument.

9

11

And if UDOT somehow failed to monitor Granite's work

THE COURT:

Okay.

What you're arguing and [inaudible]

position.
MR. JACOBSEN:

As far as their response to that, one

13

thing I would point out, the different sections of the

14

restatement that are cited, I think it's important to note in

15

reading the Thompson decision, the court notes those sections

16

of restatement have never been adopted by the Utah courts.

17

They evaluate it for purposes of the facts of that case and

18

conclude they wouldn't apply to the facts of that case.

19

there's no other case law that's been cited by the plaintiff

20

and no reference to any cases in Thompson where the court has

21

found that those sections of the restatement -

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. JACOBSEN:

But

Were adopted.
- were ever adopted by the Utah

24

courts, and we would discourage this Court from adopting

25

something which they haven't yet chosen to do so.
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1
2

THE COURT:

Well, I think that's the business of the

appellate courts.

3

MR. JACOBSEN:

4

THE COURT:

5

I agree, your Honor.

Unless they're going to give me more

authority.

6

MR. JACOBSEN:

Okay.

Well, your Honor, based on

7

that, we think the facts of this case, despite plaintiff's best

8

efforts to suggest that there are disputed facts, we don't

9

think there are disputed facts that are material to this issue.

10

I think we've gone through those and we think that the law

11

that's applicable is clear that summary judgment should be

12

granted in favor of UDOT in this case.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

14

Okay, why don't we - as I mentioned to the counsel

15

earlier, we have an adoption that we need to take place.

16

we'll be - if you want to just maybe move one of the tables so

17

they can sit at one.

18

So

We can come forward then on the adoption.

19

(Whereupon another matter was handled)

20

THE COURT:

Okay, we'll go back to our hearing on

21

Craig Johnson vs. State of Utah Department of Transportation

22

and others.

23
24
25

Mr. Christensen, do you have any position on this
matter?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

No, your Honor.
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1
2

THE COURT:

You don't care if you have less or more

at the trial?

3

MR, CHRISTENSEN:

Well, I don't know what my personal

4

preference is varying relevance to the Court's decision in this

5

matter.

6

THE COURT:

7

Okay, Mr. Shaw?

8

MR. SHAW:

9

Okay, all right, thank you.

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I'll

be the first to acknowledge that some of this law and facts are

10

a little confusing, but what I would like to try to do is

11

synthesize our argument and the facts into three points, if

12

possible.

13

First of all, I think looking at plaintiff's position

14

in this case, the first point that I think is critical is that

15

UDOT's failure to require Granite to follow the traffic control

16

plan was an operational failure, an operational decision, not a

17

policy level decision.

18

filed, I guess yesterday or the day before, we didn't get it

19

until yesterday, and I don't think we got copies of the

20

exhibits, but you'll note that UDOT does not dispute the fact

21

that this plan required a two foot barrier or a two foot buffer

22

zone, if you will, and white striping between the buffer zone

23

and the barrels.

24

memorandum that was filed yesterday.

25

in the defendant's reply filed yesterday.

You'll note in the reply memorandum

That's undisputed as stated in the reply
I think it's paragraph 4
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1

Now, that failure to comply with the traffic control

2

plan becomes an operational failure.

3

testified, the project engineer, I believe at page 29 it's

4

Deposition Exhibit 4 in our memorandum, he acknowledged that

5

the plan itself which was filed required those safety measures

6

and on the night that this accident occurred, that definitely

7

wasn't the state of affairs that existed.

8
9

As Mr. Nichols

So I think at that level UDOT's failure to implement
its previously policy-making type decision becomes operational.

10

And that's what the Truiillo case stands for.

11

point, and I'll address Truiillo in more detail later.

12

That's the first

The second point is that UDOT personnel ordered or

13

authorized Granite to open up two lanes of travel as opposed to

14

one, despite the construction being at stage or phase 4,

15

wherein the traffic control plan itself indicated that during

16

off peak hours the traffic lane should be reduced to one lane.

17

And you may recall Jimmy Key's, Jim Key's testimony we cited in

18

our memorandum, his deposition testimony was that UDOT

19

personnel - and I think he indicated it was either Pasket or

20

Griffin were the ones who authorised that deviation from the

21

traffic control plan.

22

of operational type decisions which deviate from the original

23

traffic control plan.

24

some point prior to the construction commencing was staffed as

25

has been discussed with upper level people and so forth, Mr.

So at that level you have two instances

To say that this traffic control plan at
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1

LeFevre, Mr. Topham, those people, that's one thing.

2

as the construction is commenced and UDOT acts affirmatively in

3

a negligent manner with those two instances; failing to require

4

Granite to follow the plan, and in fact authorizing Granite to

5

deviate from the plan, these are operational decisions.

6

are decisions made by people on site every day.

7

level, those decisions become operational and they are not

8

discretionary functions given the Truiillo analysis.

9

But then

These

And so at that

I don't think there's any dispute about that either,

10

and in Exhibit 8 of our memorandum, the special provisions talk

11

about the phase 4 construction, the phase 4 construction plan

12

clearly indicates that during off peak hours one lane of travel

13

would be open.

14

as the Court knows there was no buffer zone created, these

15

barrels were placed oftentimes within the cut-out area thereby

16

causing - creating a condition that UDOT created in our

17

opinion, and I think the facts at least that is a disputed

18

fact.

What happened here was two lanes were opened,

UDOT was responsible for creating that condition.

19

Thirdly, I think it's important to note that once Granite

20

requests of Kent Nichols that UDOT make changes to the traffic

21

control plan, that in and of itself creates a different issue,

22

and creates facts that are very, very similar to the Truiillo

23

facts.

24

a fashion that are a little easier to follow than ours, but

25

commencing with Exhibit 10 of the defense memorandum, you have

The defense memorandum perhaps lays out the exhibits in
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1

a letter from Granite -

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SHAW:

March 20, 1996?
That's correct.

March 20, 1996, you have

4

the letter from Granite to Mr. Nichols wherein they are

5

requesting pre-cast concrete barriers.

6

that point clearly because of safety concerns.

7

the issue of the speed limit being reduced.

8

important to note although I'll confess that I don't - in all

9

the depositions that I've read, I don't know that UDOT - and a

The issue was raised at
They also raise

Now it's also

10

UDOT employee has indicated this - but UDOT controls the speed.

11

That's clear.

12

UDOT raised it to 65 as Mr. Jacobson points out.

13

the speed.

14

it's Exhibit 11 in their memorandum, and that's the letter or

15

memorandum from Kent Nichols to Dyke LeFevre again indicating

16

the concerns that they were having on site with the question of

17

barriers versus barrels.

18

The speed was pre-construction speed was 55.

That was an issue.

They control

You look at the next letter,

So then you have a response that comes back, and

19

that's again - well, actually Exhibit 12 is another letter,

20

March 29, 1986

21

discussion held at the District 1 office, again making a

22

specific proposal to alterations of the traffic plan.

23

what we have here are facts that clearly indicate Granite's

24

concern that maybe that decision that was initially made at an

25

operational level, and by the way I'm not conceding that point

wherein Granite apparently references a

And so
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1

at this juncture because I don't think the facts are clear on

2

that, in order for the defense to succeed they're asking the

3

Court to rule essentially as a matter of law that LeFevre's

4

decisions are operational.

5

the facts and I don't think the Court should rule like that.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SHAW:

8

I don't think that is the state of

Not operational.
Oh, excuse me, policy making, I'm sorry.

And I clearly don't believe that that's the case because -

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. SHAW:

If they were operational they'd win then.
That's right, I'm sorry.

Misspoke, your

11

Honor.

So we're not conceding that issue, but again then you

12

have specific concerns and they're raised here.

13

have a response from UDOT back to Chuck Lindsay on April 2,

14

1996 -

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

Ultimately you

What exhibit is this?
Thirteen, follows immediately.

And

17

essentially what they say there is "Look, if it can be done for

18

$450,000 or less and we can save 50 days in construction time,

19

why that's something we'd consider."

20

that they're not closing the door completely, but ultimately at

21

that point in April of A96 nothing is done.

22

have a follow up in July and that's Exhibit 14. Again - excuse

23

me, 14 is another letter.

24

received this Exhibit 14 indicating what -

25

THE COURT: (inaudible)?

And then they indicate

Okay?

Then you

Actually what happened was UDOT
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1

MR. SHAW: Yeah, what Granite could do, and nothing

2

was done.

Nothing was done to alter the traffic control plan.

3

Then in July, you have the July 2, 1996, and I think it's

4

extremely important to point out the facts contained in this

5

letter which clearly indicate that there had been numerous

6

close calls on the site.

7

to Truiillo.

8

evidence that in this particular area of construction up Weber

9

Canyon there was a higher incident of accidents occurring and

Again, these are facts very similar

In Truiillo the Court might recall that there was

10

they were concerned about that.

11

fact, this letter references a specific instance where that

12

morning a vehicle crashed through the barriers into a cutout,

13

stopped abruptly, and essentially hit the wall of the slab.

14

The very kind of accident that we're talking about in this

15

case.

16

Just as the case here, in

And again you have Mr. Lindsay's concern directed to

17

Kent Nichols, project engineer.

18

memorandum on Exhibit 16 from Nichols to Dyke LeFevre wherein

19

Mr. Nichols himself addresses these concerns.

20

the content of that memorandum is such that Mr. Nichols, one

21

can tell, was extremely concerned about the traffic control

22

plan.

23

Again you have the Nichols'

And basically

Now, from this point forward there's no other

24

evidence that we've been able to determine as to what was done.

25

Clearly there was no changes in the traffic control plan.

At
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1

this point in time, they chose to ignore their own project

2

engineer's request.

3
4

THE COURT:

That wasn't covered like with Mr. LeFevre

is his deposition or his affidavit or?

5

MR. SHAW:

I was going to address this - that portion

6

of his deposition, Judge.

I think the relevant portions of the

7

deposition commence on page 91, and I'll indicate to the Court

8

that it's a little less than clear to me when exactly the

9

discussion with Clint Topham occurs, and perhaps counsel can

10

point out exactly when that occurred.

11

the question is asked -

But if you read page 91,

12

THE COURT: Is this 91 of the first deposition?

13

MR. SHAW:

14

Let's see, Judge, I think that is the

first deposition.

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, I don't think at the

16

time of either Mr. Topham's depositions any of the parties had

17

the correspondence with them to refresh their memory or to give

18

them reference to specific dates.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

20

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

It was more just a general

21

discussion of how the progress of the requested change order

22

went.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

All right, we'll I'm on - my 91 says, so

my question is?
MR. SHAW:

Right.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. SHAW:

3

And I'll concede that, Scott.

4

The question is the Court can read that, I don't need

Right.

5

to re-read it for the record I suppose, but he says this had

6

been the initial decision before the contract was let.

7

so you remember specifically talking to Mr. Topham about

8

whether to use plastic barrels?"

9
10

"Okay,

"What - as the district director, you know, I'm not
sure I talked with him specifically about barrels."

11

THE COURT:

But that's the original thing early on?

12

MR. SHAW:

13

And then on page 92 again the question is asked in a

Right.

The original thing early on.

14

little more detail, he says, "Probably not, but you know, he

15

asked me is there any concern you have with the project or

16

anything I should know about?"

17

part of the deposition, your Honor, is that it is clear that at

18

some point in time, at least early on, Topham is asking

19

Nichols, his project engineer, about concerns that he may have

20

about the project.

21

public is created by contract is not accurate.

22

UDOT owes to the public is created in once sense by our

23

Governmental Immunity Act.

24

and highways and so forth, immunity for such defects is waived.

25

The letters that we just pointed out and memorandum Exhibits 10

Now the important point of that

To state that the duty UDOT owes to the
The duty that

It says that defects in roadways
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1

through 16 of defense memorandum clearly indicate that Kent

2

Nichols as project engineer recognizes UDOT's duty to provide a

3

safe, not only work zone, but a safe area for the motoring

4

public, for Utah's citizens.

5

duty because there's not some specific reference in a contract

6

is inaccurate and I think it's contrary to the Truiillo

7

holding.

8
9

So to say that UDOT can avoid its

The other relevant pages of the deposition that one
might inquire further into, I don't know that it does us a lot

10

of good, having heard what Scott Christensen just indicated,

11

and that is that at the time he was deposed we didn't have

12

these documents in front of us, Exhibits 10 through 16.

13

think it's important again to note that the facts of this case

14

are so similar to Truiillo, and I want to point some of those

15

out because I think this is where we disagree and I think the

16

two cases clearly that we've got to deal with are Keeaan and

17

Truiillo.

18

distinguishable from the Truiillo facts and from these facts.

19

And I think it can be said this simply.

20

conduct by UDOT employees in direct violation of a traffic

21

control plan.

22

involved that at all.

23

do with an existing barrier in the aftermath of repaving a

24

highway.

25

clearly involve traffic control plans designed to protect the

But I

And I might say the Keeaan case is easily

Keeaan did not involve

This was not a case, Keeaan was not a case that
Keeaan involved the question of what to

The facts of Truiillo and the facts of our case
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1

motoring public during the construction and designed to protect

2

the workers during the construction.

3

that.

4

remove this barrier during the course of construction.

5

wasn't the issue at all.

6

distinguishable.

Keeqan did not involve

There was no question at all in Keeqan about the need to

7

That

So I think those facts are readily

In this particular case as in Truiillo, UDOT

8

employees were on the mark, they were inspecting the work site

9

virtually daily.

They were there.

They had the opportunity to

10

see what's going on. They made certain again operational

11

decisions during the course of the construction.

12

important distinguishing factor.

13

out, Keeqan would be more in line with a question about putting

14

up a railroad barrier or a traffic light.

15

Keeqan facts.

16

case here.

17

And that's an

As the Truiillo case points

That's akin to the

That's not the case in Truiillo and it isn't the

These facts clearly indicate that what occurred was

18

UDOT violated its own plan, allowed Granite to violate its own

19

plan in the two specific areas that I've talked about, that

20

being the buffer zone, the white striping, and also opening up

21

that second lane of travel in off peak hours.

22

that Keeqan fits I think is inaccurate.

23

under these facts.

24
25

And so to say

It just doesn't fit

With respect to the law that's stated in Truiillo, I
think counsel agrees that the Truiillo case accurately reflects
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1

the law as does Keecran.

2

set forth in both cases with reference to determining what a

3

discretionary function is.

4

But I think some subtleties of Truiillo ought to be pointed

5

out.

6

was a discretionary function is an affirmative defense as

7

pointed out in Truiillo, and the defense bears that burden of

8

proof at this point in time and in trial.

9

Truiillo points out that this issue is a fact intensive inquiry

10

Clearly there's a four part test there

No one quarrels with that test.

First of allf this issue of whether or not UDOT's conduct

Second of all,

that originally would not lend itself to summary judgment.

11

THE COURT:

Well, if it doesn't lend itself to

12

summary judgment, how do you - who decides it at the time of a

13

trial and if it's the jury that decides it, how do they decide

14

it?

15

MR. SHAW:

Well, I think what happens there, Judge,

16

is just like in any other case.

17

heard and this Court has witness testimony from the stand and

18

ultimately determines as a matter of law that it doesn't

19

measure up, then this Court could say case dismissed ultimately

20

against UDOT.

21

don't dispute that.

22

I suppose that if the case is

That could happen on a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT:

I

But that's not the level of inquiry today.
But what I'm asking is if the motion

23

isn't granted and is that a decision that's going to be made by

24

the jury?

25

witnesses that have been cited in the motion and then you're

You're going to give them the facts of all these
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1

going to have an instruction for the jury to determine that or

2

am I going to determine that and how is that going to be

3

determined if it's not determined on summary judgment?

4

MR. SHAW:

Well, I think given the Truiillo language

5

where the court clearly says it's fact intensive, I think it

6

can be determined by the jury.

7

fact UDOT's conduct was not discretionary and clearly that is

8

an option.

9

THE COURT:

I think they can find that in

So we have a hard enough time

10

understanding what a discretionary function is and we're going

11

to somehow explain that to a jury and then say here's what a

12

discretionary function is and it's up to you to decide whether

13

they exercised a discretionary function or not?

14
15

MR. SHAW:
I think that -

16

THE COURT:

17

thing.

18

that.

19

I don't think that's out of bounds, Judge.

Well, no, I'm just asking a practical

I'm just liking to know how a jury's going to determine

MR. SHAW:

It's a tough call, I understand that.

And

20

like I said, I don't know that any of us have researched that

21

issue in more detail procedurally.

22

the court will ultimately have to make.

23

THE COURT:

Maybe that is a call that

I'm sure somebody here has jury

24

instructions today like we ordered about two years ago for the

25

time of the pretrial and you have one that could explain that.
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1

MR. SHAW:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SHAW:

We've got jury instructions.
Okay.
But, your Honor, back to the issues that

4

are raised in Truiillo, I think in the Truiillo case I wanted

5

to pointed out a specific cite in Truiillo, I think it's at

6

page 7 62.

7
8
9

I don't know if the Court has a copy of that case.
THE COURT:

I don't have it on the bench with me.

I'll make the note of the page though, 762.
MR. SHAW:

Let me just state for the record page 762

10

what the court stated was "We hold that these remaining

11

allegations of negligence involve operational decisions on the

12

part of UDOT which implemented or failed to implement pre-

13

established policy."

14

"Specifically, we hold the failure to reduce speed in the

15

construction zone as called for in the plan, the failure to

16

investigate accidents, the failure to meaningfully consider

17

corrective action in response to Mr. Neriman's letter," i.e. in

18

response to Mr. Nichols' letter and Granite's request, "are all

19

acts and decisions at the operational level.

20

routine matters that do not enjoy immunity under the

21

discretionary function exception."

22

THE COURT:

And it cites Nelson and Keeaan.

Those everyday

It's really nice that the appellate

23

courts clarify.

You know, if they don't want to say it's a

24

discretionary function, they just call it operational and then

25

if they want to basically have governmental immunity they will
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1

just call it a discretionary function they'll cite the facts

2

one way or the other and it's basically what they want to call

3

it.

4

They won't say that,
MR. SHAW:

I understand.

But what they do do is they

5

cite three or four separate instances of alleged negligence,

6

all of which are similar to the allegations that we're making,

7

in essence deviation from the traffic control plan by on-site

8

employees and then that gets us back to the LeFevre deposition

9

on what his duties were, and Mr. LeFevre testified I believe at

10

his deposition that, you know, these kinds of decisions were

11

essentially every day kinds of decisions.

12

distinction I think from implementation of a plan as opposed to

13

creation of a plan.

14

that the implementation of these plans are not operational.

15

THE COURT:

So you have this

And clearly the Truiillo court has said

So is it your position that although at

16

the beginning at this project said we're going to go barrels

17

instead of concrete barriers, you know, before they even

18

started and then if somebody asked them later because of

19

concerns and they make that decision a second time that could

20

never been a discretionary function?

21

because whether it's Nichols' letters or these other things

22

that when they're made aware that there are problems with their

23

initial policy decision, if they get that information, weigh it

24

all again and say we're keeping by our policy, that's always

25

going to be operational?

In other words, like
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1

MR. SHAW:

2

weigh it all again.

3

take it up the line.

4

initially and more.

5
6

The operative word there is they need to
They need to study the fact.

THE COURT:
above LeFevre?

7

They need to

They need to do everything that they did

Why do you think they have to take it up

Why do they have to take it above LeFevre?

MR. SHAW:

I don't know that they do, but I'm saying

8

if they don't, then LeFevre, based on his deposition, those are

9

the kinds of operational decisions that he makes and we cited

10

those in the memo.

11

area of the deposition.

12

those, your Honor.

13

I think those are at pages 102, 103 in that

THE COURT:

And so - in fact, I think I've marked

Well, I'm on - I have 103, I don't have

14

102.

It goes from 96 to 103 on what's attached as Exhibit 20.

15

I'm looking at the deposition, is it in yours?

16

MR. SHAW:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SHAW:

Yes, Exhibit 7 of our memorandum.
Okay.
I believe what's happening here is Mr.

19

LeFevre is referred to paragraph 15 of an affidavit Mr. Ward

20

points out and he expresses his -

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT: "My duties"?

24

MR. SHAW:

25

102?
Yeah.

Right.

About near the bottom, line 16.

And we're referring to what he

alleges his duties are in an affidavit.

Then over on page 103
44

1

he specifically asked whether or not those duties are things

2

that he did on a daily basis.

3

bottom of the page he's asked at line 21 whether or not that

4

was not only his job but the job of every other regional

5

director, and he said that's true.

6

He says, yes.

Then down at the

And so LeFevre might be, I suppose LeFevre might be

7

classified as some sort of a hybrid employee.

At some times he

8

exercises policy level kinds of decisions, at other times he

9

exercises operational kinds of decisions.

We're not saying

10

that as a matter of course any time they raise an issue of

11

safety concerns it's operational.

12

of ^96 it appears from the evidence presented that nothing was

13

done.

14

make, a policy level decision.

15

But in this case after July

There was no attempt to make whatever decision they did

And then again you go back to the issue of UDOT being

16

the party who doesn't implement or doesn't require Granite to

17

implement the traffic control, there's no buffer zone, there's

18

no white striping and there is an extra lane of travel on the

19

night that this incident occurred, clearly with the barrels not

20

placed as they should have been or were intended to be placed.

21

So all of those issues, your Honor, I think are

22

critical issues of fact that would require the Court to deny

23

defendant's motions.

24

that's all I have.

25

THE COURT:

Unless the Court has specific questions,

Where do you say these facts come from in
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1

your memo?

2

they the one to four page facts?

3

Are these the five through eight page facts, or are j

MR. SHAW:

I

Let's see, judge, I've circles the exact

4

paragraphs.

Page 2, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

Oh, there's one

5

correction too I'd like to point out.

6

depositions of Mr. LeFevre, there's paragraph 7 there where we j

7

indicate the MUTCD requires barriers to divide drop off of more j

8

than six inches.

9

that's a mis-statement.

As I read the

As I went through these depositions I think

;

I'll concede that and defense counsel

10

pointed that out in the reply.

Actually, what was happening is

11

the witness was testifying to sheet 4 of the traffic control

12

plan requiring barriers.

13

know how that occurred, but that is a mis-statement.

14

paragraph 12 of our memorandum and paragraphs 14, 16, 18 -

15

yeah, 16 and 18 establish those facts and cite to the

16

deposition and/or other evidence including the letters that

17

we've cited.

18

in our Exhibit 2, Judge, they're one right after the other.

19

And then paragraph 20 is the cite, again on the night in

20

question citing Trooper Lundell it was opened to two lanes;

21

paragraph 18 is the Jimmy Key's testimony that either Pasket or

22

Griffin authorized and ordered the opening of an extra lane of

23

travel.

That was his testimony, so I don't
Also

We actually included all of the letters I believe

24

THE COURT:

Okay, any reply?

25

MR. JACOBSEN:

Your Honor, once again I want to point
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1

out with the discretionary function exception, it's not this

2

Court's job to determine whether or not UDOT's decision was

3

right or wrong.

4

to do for purposes of this motion and the issues under the

5

discretionary function exception.

6

says -

7
8

I mean, that's not something you're required

THE COURT:

That exception applies, it

They can be dead wrong if it's a policy

decision.

9

MR. JACOBSEN:

I think you're right.

You know,

10

whether you like the statute or not, that's what the statute

11

does.

12

Shaw that obviously we didn't go through when we went through

13

facts before.

14

which facts he believe establish the disputes, it was back to

15

those pages, I believe, one through four of the opposition

16

memorandum, those first set of facts which as we discussed

17

earlier, your Honor, I think are inappropriate under Rule 4-501

18

for purposes of establishing a disputed fact.

19

There's a lot of facts that were just discussed by Mr.

I think as he just went through and pointed out

Responding to a couple other things.

As you went

20

through the letters, the various letters that went back and

21

forth, there's no question that Granite was making requests to

22

UDOT for additional funding for the purposes of using barriers.

23

That's well documented in the letters.

24

important and what distinguishes this case even more from

25

Truiillo, in Truiillo where the court says we don't even see

But I think what's
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1

anything to lead us to believe that the traffic control plan

2

was ever singled out.

3

what went on before the plan was ever let out to bid, but then

4

you've also got the fact that you've got a well documented

5

occurrence of that specific issue, the barrels versus barrier

6

issue, being re-examined.

7

reconsider this, several letters back and forth, Ken Nichols

8

didn't make that decision.

9

manager.

In this case you've got the evidence of

Where Granite comes back and says

Ken Nichols was UDOT's project

You know, I suppose if Ken Nichols had made a

10

decision out on the job site as the project engineer, we'd be

11

arguing over whether or not that decision was operational or

12

policy making, but it didn't stop with Ken Nichols.

13

as the letters went on, you see Ken Nichols as saying I think

14

Granite's got a valid concern here.

15

consider this.

16

result, that's why it climbed that ladder again.

17

made it's way back to Dyke LeFevre, that's why it went from

18

Dyke LeFevre to Clint Topham and they looked at it again.

19

undisputed that Mr. LeFevre considered the same cost factors

20

and he said, "Can you do it for cheaper.

21

save off the project if we allow you to do this."

22

different factors that he's weighing.

23

with somebody in Region 1 in UDOT's organization, that's where

24

that final decision rested.

25

LeFevre's decisions as operational because those are the types

In fact,

You know, we should

We need to give this more thought.

And as a

That's why it

It's

How much time can you
He had those

The bucks got to stop

They want to characterize Mr.
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1

of decisions he made on a daily basis.

He was the

2

administrator.

3

information, listen to his project engineers, listen to the

4

safety engineers, listen to the design engineers, and balance

5

those factors.

6

ultimately rested with.

7

job duty, I don't think makes him a hybrid employee as

8

plaintiff has suggested who sometimes making a policy-making

9

decision and other times making an operational decision.

He's the one who was appointed to gather that

That was his job.

He's the one who that

And the fact that that was part of his

In

10

this case, you know, perhaps he could argue it was operational

11

if Ken Nichols had just said to Granite, "Sure, makes sense, go

12

ahead and do it."

13

take this case so far out of the realm of Truiillo, and I think

14

take it beyond what you had in Keeaan.

15

important to note that there is the language in Truiillo where

16

the court says it's fact intensive and obviously the court was

17

asking for more facts in that case and that summary judgment

18

doesn't typically lend itself to fact-intensive analysis like

19

that.

20

can be appropriate in this type of -

21
22

But that's not what happened.

And I think it's

But the Keeaan court made it clear that summary judgment

THE COURT:

Keeqan denied summary judgment and then

they went to trial?

23

MR. JACOBSEN:

24

THE COURT:

25

Those facts

They went to trial.

And then was that sub-issue of

operational versus policy making submitted to the jury?
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1
2

MR. JACOBSEN:

It's not clear from that opinion, your

Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. JACOBSEN:

5

THE COURT:

And I think -

So I mean you basically, if I deny the

6

motion you can just give it like Keegan after the trial for

7

case review?

8
9

MR. JACOBSEN:

But I - well, but I don't think that's

the message that the Utah Supreme Court is trying to send is

10

that let's let these cases go to trial and we fix it later.

11

mean, I think they -

12

THE COURT:

I

Well, I think there's probably a

13

difference of opinion of what the Supreme Court is telling us

14

about summary judgments.

15

summary judgments, you can think that they comply with Rule 4-

16

501, they can go up and they can be reversed, and so I don't

17

know what message they're sending to us.

18
19
20

MR. JACOBSEN:

I mean, you know, you can grant

And I guess that's difficult to

interpret.
THE COURT:

I follow the rules that the rules of

21

summary judgment's appropriate should be granted whether it's

22

going to be reversed or not by an appellate court if it's based

23

upon the facts they're undisputed and it complies with Rule 4-

24

501 and the law of the State of Utah at the time.

25

MR. JACOBSEN:

And I would agree with that.
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1

THE COURT:

I guess the problem though is I'm going

2

to ask you the same question.

3

do you perceive this being given, you know, who decides this or

4

how would it be instructed to a jury?

5

MR. JACOBSEN:

If the motion isn't granted, how

Well, I think there's no answer to

6

that in Keeaan or Truiillo.

I would image what happened in

7

Truiillo is that case went to trial and then there was probably

8

a motion for directed verdict when all of the evidence was

9

before the judge.

Certainly the court would have an

10

opportunity at that time based on the evidence presented at

11

trial.

12

looking at a nightmare for the jury because not only are you

13

asking the jury to weigh whether or not UDOT's actions

14

constituted discretionary actions or operational level actions,

15

but then you're going to be asking them to apportion fault

16

between areas of fault that are perhaps protected under the

17

Governmental Immunity, and areas of fault that aren't protected

18

under - I mean, I believe it would become a real nightmare for

19

the jury, I mean, the special verdict form in that situation,

20

not only in instructing them on discretionary function issues,

21

but also then in asking them to begin apportioning fault

22

between some conduct which is under the Governmental Immunity

23

Act and other conduct which isn't.

24

nightmare, and I think it's probably the Court's responsibility

25

either at this point if there are no disputed facts or at the

I think if you give that to the jury, I think you're

It would become a
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1

conclusion of the evidence to determine the applicability of

2

that statute.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. JACOBSEN:

5

Okay.
That said, your Honor, unless you have

additional questions, we'll submit this to the Court.

6

THE COURT:

No, I don't.

Okay.

All right, well I

7

want to decide this decision today, and I guess the one

8

question we can do is if we want to take a break now or you

9

want to come back, you know, in an hour or something, we could

10

do it that way, or we could talk about the other things.

11

going to take a break at some point to review some more things

12

before I make a decision, but I want it made today so that we

13

know where we're going on the case.

14

you want to talk about the Newell Knight motion now and then

15

take a break and then we can - because what I have to do,

16

basically we still need to talk about jury instructions, voir

17

dire, etc.

18

MR. WARD:

I'm

But it's up to you whether

[inaudible] if the Court wants time to

19

consider this but also wants to make a decision today, we're

20

going to all be together later this afternoon in a deposition

21

and maybe we can touch base with you by phone since we would

22

all be together.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. WARD:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
Does that make sense to you?
That's fine.

Yeah, you're going to be 52

1

MR. JACOBSEN:

I guess my only preference would be is

2

if you're going to break at some point, you know, it would make

3

more sense to me to have you considering those issues and

4

looking at that while it's fresh in your mind before we've gone

5

into everything else.

6
7

THE COURT:
doesn't matter.

I would have no objection I think there's - well, it's up to - it

What time is your deposition?

8

MR. SHAW:

9

THE COURT:

It starts at 3:00.
Where is it at?

10

MR. JACOBSEN:

11

a decision prior to that point -

12
13

Strong & Hanni.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

And I guess if we had

The deposition is going to go

forward.

14 I

MR. JACOBSEN:

Yeah, the deposition would go forward,

15

but that would certainly impact our involvement with the

16

deposition.

17
18

MR. WARD:

Maybe we can call the court at 2:30 or 15

to 3:00 or something?

19

THE COURT:

20

Let me go through some things.

21

I wouldn't go away, I mean, it may be a half hour, it may be

22

less.

I want to - you don't - I mean,

I don't know.

23

MR. ?:

24

THE COURT:

25

Well, why don't we just take a break now.

either do this.

Should we remain available, your Honor?
Yeah, if you want to just - well, we can

You can come back at 12:30 and then I don't
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1

think what we have left to discuss is basically - I don't think

2

that other motion is going to take that long.

3

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

4

THE COURT:

5

settle it over the next hour.

6

No, I don't either.

And I think besides unless you could

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

My point is I'd just as soon, given

7

the time if the Court would prefer us to come back at a time

8

certain, I think that might be preferable.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

13

THE COURT:

14

Why don't you come back at 12:15.
12:15?

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Okay.

You can leave everything here.

It will

be locked or you can take whatever you want.

15

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

16

THE COURT:

Okay, we're back on the record in the

17

case of Craig Johnson versus UDOT and Granite Construction

18

Company.

19

Well, I've read these cases especially the Keeaan and

20

the Truiillo case again, and it seems to me the way I read

21

these cases, I mean, first of all I think there's always

22

something interesting when the Utah Supreme Court decides one

23

case and the Court of Appeals or a panel of the Court of

24

Appeals decides another case.

25

in one case they don't even cite Keeaan as an issue of summary

And when they do that, I mean,
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1

judgment.

When the Court of Appeals says this is a fact-

2

intensive issue that's really not appropriate for summary

3

judgment, they cite a couple of cases, then they say but see,

4

but they don't respond to Keeqan who they denied the summary

5

judgment and then it was reversed.

6

that means.

7

mean, I also think that if - we can do one of two things in the

8

case.

9

end of the trial, or we can have this issue decided, now

And I don't know what all

I think that this a very difficult issue, but I

We can try the case and then the issue comes up at the

10

whether that's appealed pursuant to 54(b) and not go forward

11

with the trial, that's an issue.

12

But the way I review this case is this way.

First of

13

all, it appears to me that what has happened in this case is

14

that the Defendant UDOT has taken the Truiillo case and

15

basically where they've gone through and said we didn't have

16

this evidence in the record, we didn't have this evidence in

17

the record, etc., that they basically got an affidavit to say

18

now we do.

19

Then the plaintiff in the case as they went through

20

their - so I believe UDOT complied with Rule 4-501, and I'm not

21

doing a technical description, but I think that the plaintiff

22

has not complied with Rule 4-501 on pages 1 through 4.

23

set forth all those facts and I don't know how many times this

24

needs to be said, but the whole purpose of Rule 4-501 as to

25

summary judgment is to help a judge say is there an issue,

They
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1

because everybody's going down the same way and following the

2

procedure.

3

don't believe Rule 4-501 has been compiled with and rule (sic)

4

1 to 4 I think it has been with pages 5 through 8.

5

think on pages 5 through 8 that there is created a genuine

6

issue of material fact.

7

was discussed in the argument and not really gone over that

8

much more with the plaintiff is that issues such as whether Mr.

9

LeFevre was upper most management or not.

And when they don't do that, it's very hard.

But I

But I don't

As the reply memos pointed out and as

I don't think that's

10

really a disputed fact where the other facts that were - facts

11

3, 5, 6, 20 through 24, 26, I don't believe that those - I

12

believe that there was an attempt to make then a disputed fact,

13

but I think looking at the deposition transcripts, looking at

14

the context of which some of those questions were asked in a

15

deposition, I don't think there is a genuine issue of fact.

16

Now, I can say that there are different points of

17

view that can say whether what I'm about to do is right or

18

wrong, but I'm going to grant the motion for summary judgment

19

because I feel that this is a policy-making decision and not an

20

operational decision.

21

disagree.

22

appropriate to grant that motion at this point in the case,

23

have that ruled upon and whether you want to appeal that issue

24

and postpone the trial, you know, had this been filed sooner we

25

might have been able to do something different than we're doing

Now, obviously, reasonable people might

But in light of that decision, I think it's more
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1

now, but I understand that we've got a two week trial date on a

2

1997 case, so what do the parties wish to do?

3

problem certifying this for Rule 54 (b) and having this appealed

4

immediately so that you can get the decision issue resolved.

5

If you want to go ahead and try the case and then, you know,

6

appeal that issue, I don't want you trying the case twice, but

7

we may be trying the case in vain if I denied the motion and it

8

went on appeal then you might be back or not have them in the

9

case.

10
11

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

And, your Honor, I think that's Mr.

Shaw's call.

12

THE COURT:

13

decision right now, but what -

14

I have no

MR. SHAW:

Well, I don't know if you want to make a

Right, I'd like to take that under

15

advisement with co-counsel and make a decision, then we could

16

approach the Court if we decided to do that.

17

think we'll decide to do that.

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21
22
23

Okay.

Frankly, I don't

I think we'll move forward.

Well, if that's the case, then

let's go forward with the other motion then.
MR. SHAW:

Okay.

Has the Court had a chance to read

the briefs filed with regard to THE COURT:

I have and I believe that expert

witnesses need to assist a jury.

24

MR. SHAW:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
I've read 702, just so you know I've read
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1

the Rules of Evidence,

2

and I was also on the Rules of Evidence Committee that proposed

3

to the Utah Supreme Court that we adopt the federal recent

4

changes to those rules because they're easier to follow for

5

trial judges, and the Supreme Court basically told us to go

6

chase ourselves, so but we did submit those rules and I'm

7

pretty familiar with the rules of expert witnesses.

8
9

MR. SHAW:

I'm on the Rules of Evidence Committee

Well, with that in mind, your Honor, I'll

try to keep this simple and straight forward.

I think we've

10

set forth in paragraph 6 of our memorandum, pages 3, 4, 5, 6

11

and 7 basically, and into 8 the areas that we think Mr. Knight

12

is not qualified as an expert to testify.

13

might characterize it as such, I think what the deposition

14

testimony reflects is Mr. Knight's attempt to cloak a lay

15

opinion, if you will, as an expert opinion in many ways.

16

THE COURT:

Essentially, if I

You don't have any objection to somebody

17

else coming in and saying a person in the plaintiff's position

18

could have seen this, or these were the conditions that

19

confronted the plaintiff at the time of the trial - at the time

20

of the accident?

21

MR. SHAW:

I don't have objection to that because

22

that's what we're going to do.

We're going to do that with

23

Trooper Lundell.

24

One of the considerations in that regard with respect to Mr.

25

Knight is I don't believe he visited the scene at all.

We're going to do that with the plaintiff.

So what
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1

he's relying on are photographs only in that regard.

I don't

2

dispute that if Mr. Knight had some basis to reconstruct and

3

tell us what he believes based on a reconstruction occurred

4

here, he could do so.

5

to make statements regarding a propensity to go to sleep.

6

makes statements regarding vision issues, visibility issues,

7

driver distances that he really has no idea on with respect to

8

the night of the accident.

9

of barrels which again he has no personal knowledge of

But really what he does is he attempts
He

He also talks about the placement

10

regarding the accident.

11

barrels were placed 100 feet apart, let's assume the lane of

12

travel was 12 feet, etc, etc.

13

out in those pages as I reference in our memorandum without

14

really any factual foundation at all.

15

order for Mr. Knight to testify he's got to have that actual

16

factual predicate, an adequate foundation for him to render

17

those opinions.

18

that he's not a sleep expert, he's not a vision expert, he's

19

not a human factors expert, and essentially the types of

20

opinions that he's rendering here are human factors analysis.

21

He's not qualified to do so.

22

He makes statements, let's assume the

And those statements are pointed

It's our opinion in

Clearly Mr. Knight testified in his deposition

He references this positive guidance theory without

23

any foundation as to its reliability whatsoever.

There's no

24

statement in the deposition.

25

come to court and lay that foundation, yes, this is the

I presume if Mr. Knight could
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1

positive guidance theory, this is the method by which it has

2

become generally acceptable, this is a reasonably reliable

3

scientific theory and here's why, and set all that out, well,

4

then we may have a different quarrel.

5

does none of that.

6

really in rambling -

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SHAW:

9

But at this juncture he

He talks in terms of positive guidance and

What is positive guidance?
Well, I don't know.

I'm here to tell you

I don't know from reading this deposition.

He talks in terms,

10

it's on page 8 of our memo I think, Judge, where he goes on and

11

on about what it is - 7 and 8 - and I don't know what it is

12

from that portion of his deposition.

13

primarily foundational.

14

So our objection is

The next point I guess and the final part of the

15

analysis is no matter what, assuming that he could lay a

16

foundation - we don't think he can or will - but then the Court

17

would have to adopt the comparative analysis with Rule 403 in

18 I determining whether or not Mr. Knight's statements as made are
19

probative and whether or not the probative value substantially

20

outweighs the potential for prejudice or confusion of the

21

issues.

22

page 7 up on to page 8 and tell me what the positive guidance,

23

for instance, has to do with the concept of accident

24

reconstruction.

25

again no foundation for those opinions.

I'd submit to the Court if you read that bottom of

And then he goes on and on and on there, but
And so we would ask
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1

that he be strictly limited to testimony relative to

2

reconstruction principle, which he may be qualified to talk

3

about.

4

have seen, he didn't see, he ran into the cutout area, based on

5

his foundation as set forth in this deposition I think goes

6

beyond what the expert witness Rule 702 requires.

But for him to come in and say Craig Johnson should

And really

7 I becomes argumentative, it becomes a bolstering of defense
8

counsel's argument and nothing more.

9

Typically also I think the Court would agree that

10

when a lay opinion is rendered it's based on facts observed

11

contemporaneously often times with an occurrence.

12

that's not what occurred here and Mr. Knight's offered as an

13

expert.

14

going to offer this opinion based on no foundation and couch it

15

in terms of an expert witness.

16

current state of the foundation.

17

basis, Mr. Knight's testimony should be limited as we've set

18

forth in the memorandum.

Clearly,

He shouldn't be allowed to come into court and say I'm

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

20

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

He doesn't qualify given the
So we believe that on that

Mr. Christensen.
It may be refreshing, your Honor,

21

but in one sense I do not disagree with plaintiff's counsel.

I

22

agree that this is a foundational question and I agree that

23

there was no foundation laid at Mr. Knight's deposition as to

24

the opinions that he intends to render, and the reason for that

25

is he wasn't asked those questions by plaintiff's counsel.

I
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1

certainly didn't take the opportunity to qualify my own witness

2

in the course of the deposition.

3

premature.

4

THE COURT:

I think this motion is

Well, what about this.

While it may be

5

or it may not be, I guess the question is it raises the issue

6

that they're anticipating based upon his deposition what he's

7

likely to say.

8

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

9

THE COURT:

Oh, I understand that.

And, well, what I'm going to propose and

10

you tell me what both of you think of this.

11

can really resolve this issue.

12

going to come in here and say, hey, you know, this guy could

13

have seen this and he could have seen that, and he could have

14

seen this, you know, the jury doesn't need - that doesn't help

15

a jury telling them what a person could see or not see.

16

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

17

THE COURT:

There's no way I

I can tell you if Mr. Knight's

I understand that.

He's basically substituting his opinion

18

for what the jury is going to decide in the case.

If there's

19

something else because of background or experience, I mean, in

20

the federal court, you know, you can have with the new rules of

21

Federal Rules 702 to 704 they basically have a preliminary kind

22

of matter before trial so that everybody can hear it so we

23

don't stop in the middle of the testimony and send the jury

24

out.

25

that at some point, you know, prior to the trial or before

And I think - do any of you have any objection to having
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1

trial some day or -

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Let me respond to that if I could,

3

your Honor.

4

come down at trial and in what respect I anticipate testimony

5

from Mr. Knight.

6

Knight's deposition was responding to hypotheticals that were

7

proposed to him by Mr. Ward and there was a lot of give and

8

take back and forth between them which I don't think really got

9

to the essence of what Mr. Knight is prepared to testify about.

10

And let me explain how I perceive the issues to

Because a lot of the testimony in Mr.

Now the issues as I see it in this case, to simplify

11

them as much as possible, is the plaintiffs are going to allege

12

that there were barrels missing and that there was

13

noncompliance by either the state or now Granite with the

14

traffic control plan and as a result, it lured Mr. Johnson into

15

an excavation on the side of the road and the accident

16

occurred.

17

that there were barrels in place and that Mr. Johnson, in fact,

18

fell asleep and drifted off through the barrels into the

19

excavation and that's what caused the accident.

20

The evidence that we anticipate presenting will show

Now Mr. Knight's - the Court then has the obligation

21

and the responsibility to determine if under the facts that are

22

presented under either of those theories, which is what I

23

anticipate will happen, there is a point where expert testimony

24

may be of assistance to the jury in trying to determine which

25

of those scenarios is more likely than not to have occurred.
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1

And then if the Court rules that that is an area that is

2

properly the subject of expert testimony, then the inquiry then

3

shifts as to whether this individual expert has the necessary

4

qualifications to render that testimony.

5

Now as I understand Mr. Knight's testimony, he talked

6

about - he put a label on it, this positive guidance, and what

7

I understood his testimony to be was that taken in total there

8

was enough information available to the motoring public to

9

allow them to safely travel through the construction zone.

10

THE COURT:

But is this, you know, usually when you

11

have an expert you can say like in the federal rules somebody

12

else can replicate what they do, they can basically see

13

studies, they can do other things.

14

positive guidance, that's just kind of like mumbo jumbo.

You

15

can say, hey, all these things I call positive guidance.

Now

16

can you have 15 other experts who are all Mr. Knight type of

17

experts who are going to come in and say, yep, this can all be

18

replicated; yep, this is all the same?

19

Knight saying this is my thing.

20

Mr. Knight in his subject, it's a question of is he in his

21

element right now.

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

When you talk about

Or is it just Mr.

I don't have any problem with

I understand that.

I understand

23

that.

And I think that's my obligation is to lay sufficient

24

foundation to convince the Court that Mr. Knight's opinions are

25

based upon his training, experience and education.

That's my
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1
2
3
4

obligation.
THE COURT:

But how do we do that without hearing

from him, you know, outside the presence of the jury?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That may be fine the way the Court

5

wants to do that, but I guess what my problem is is that if I

6

lay my foundation and I think the jury's entitled to hear that

7

as is the Court when I'm introducing Mr. Knight's testimony.

8

They've heard the different arguments, they've heard the

9

attorneys stand up and make their opening statements and

10

they've heard the witnesses say were there barrels there,

11

weren't there barrels there, what was actually there, what

12

wasn't there, and then if I lay the necessary foundation for

13

Mr. Knight's testimony, then if at that point the Court wants

14

to exclude the jury and then make some pointed inquiries as to

15

Mr. Knight as to whether, you know, what it is about his

16

experience or training or education that allows him to render

17

this kind of testimony, I think that's certainly appropriate.

18

THE COURT:

What I'm saying is that I don't want to

19

stop a trial in the middle of the trial, send the jury out for

20

an hour so we can do that.

21

before trial.

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

A better way to do it is to do it

If the Court wants to do that and

23

have [inaudible] evidentiary hearing and where I do have an

24

opportunity to present that evidence, I'll be happy to do that.

25

But I think the problem is is that at this point, plaintiff's
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1

counsel didn't make those kind of pointed inquiries nor did I

2

because -

3

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not arguing with you.

I'm

4

thinking the best way that we have to do is basically, unless

5

it's in the context that it's going to be done and whether it's

6

going to be appropriate.

7
8

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's certainly within the Court's

prerogative, and I will certainly present Mr. Knight -

9

THE COURT:

And I don't have a problem, I mean, I

10

guess - is the trial going to be shorter or longer in light of

11

my other ruling?

12
13

MR. SHAW:
shorter.

I think it's going to be a little bit

It won't be -

14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15

MR. SHAW:

Dramatically.

Yeah, it won't be dramatically shorter.

16

But I'm not familiar with what, you know, how many witnesses

17

you're going to call, Scott.

18

during the course of the trial to say you show up with Mr.

19

Knight at 8:00 in the morning and we can deal with that issue.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

22

THE COURT:

I think there'd be time perhaps

Okay.
That's certainly acceptable.

Well, okay, well then let's just resolve

23

it.

I'm not going to rule on this right now, I mean, I'm aware

24

and I think it's good that this issue be brought.

25

have the issue brought up earlier than hear it the day of the

I'd rather
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1

witness.

2

going to tell both of you is that if some other witness can

3

say, you know, were there barrels are there, were those barrels

4

apparent from 100 feet away or 50 feet away, you know, that's a

5

factual thing, that's a factual thing, and if you say - and

6

then you can argue, I mean, it's kind of an argument that he

7

saw or he should have saw them.

8

saying, you know, because if you get some guy up there then

9

somebody else can say well, yeah, he shouldn't have seen them.

10
11

So I understand what the facts are.

I guess what I'm

It's not a witness thing

You know, I mean.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I guess the problem is, your Honor,

12

is not all testimony is the result of the application of

13

formulas and -

14

THE COURT:

15 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

16
17

No, I agree with you.
And I think part of the evaluation

should be based on his experience and education, for example.
THE COURT:

Well, what if we say this.

I have had a

18

lot of discussions about, you know, State vs. Ramash and the

19

federal cases and the new federal rules of evidence as it

20

relates to expert witnesses.

21

people on the Supreme Court and you talk to people on the Court

22

of Appeals, you know what they say?

23

their decisions but they say to you generally something to the

24

effect that they both get to the same point.

25

the case, I'll tell you one thing.

And you know, when you talk to

They basically say not in

And that being

Most district judges
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1

believe that it would be a lot easier to follow the federal

2

rules.

And when I review things, mentally I follow the federal

3

rules.

So if you want to - when we talk about this, why don't

4

you look at federal rules 701 to 704 along with, because 702

5

talks about, you know, basically you just can't have an expert

6

say "I'm a big hot shot expert."

7

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I understand.

8

THE COURT: "Nobody else could validate my results,

9
10
11
12
13

nobody else could do my studies or anything else."

I'd like

it, you know, I'm going to look at those type of issues.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I appreciate that input, your

Honor, thank you.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

All right, well, in

14

light of that issue, then what other issues do you have that

15

you anticipate we need to discuss before the trial?

16

And before I forget, Mr. Jacobsen if you'll make an

17

order regarding the summary judgment ruling and then pass it

18

around to the other parties before it's submitted to me.

19

MR. JACOBSEN:

I'll do that, your Honor.

20

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor, my suggestion is we do

21

still have the deposition, follow-up deposition of the

22

plaintiff that's scheduled this afternoon at three o'clock.

23

Mr. Shaw and Mr. Ward could at least give us some indication as

24

to what their intentions are in reference to appealing the

25

Court's ruling by then, I think, you know, if they decide not

If
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1
2

to do that, then we can proceed THE COURT:

Well, I'm not going to tell them they

3

have to decide by three o'clock.

4

want to do that, I have no problem certifying this as 54(b).

5

If I'm not right, we ought to know that earlier than later.

6

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

9
10

I'm just saying that if you

I agree.

But I mean The problem is is that there's so

much else that needs to be done if they're not going to.
THE COURT:

I understand.

Well, realistically, Mr.

11

Shaw, what do you - I'm not putting you in a corner, I'm just

12

asking when do you think you'll be able to talk to your client

13

and Mr. Ward and know?

14

MR. SHAW:

He's obviously, for instance - Mr. Ward

15

went to get him at the airport, that's why he's not back.

16

he'll be here this afternoon I'm sure it will be discussed at

17

length and we will probably have a decision this afternoon.

18
19
20

THE COURT:

Okay.

But

Let's hope for that, and if

there's some other problem then we can discuss it.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

There is one other issue, and I

21

guess it falls on me to raise it now since the state is out.

22

And I don't know what plaintiff's intentions are.

23

additional deposition that they have noticed of a state

24

employee who was I think may have been the individual who

25

developed the traffic control plan.

There is an
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2

THE COURT:

Well, if I've missed something, but

weren't we supposed to have all discovery done -

3

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I know, and our objection is is

4

that that individual was never designated as a witness, he was

5

- by any of the parties that they intended to call or utilize

6

on.

7

one of these subsequent depositions as far as Clint Topham or

8

Dyke LeFevre, and they've noticed up his deposition.

9

objected to them using him at trial in this matter because he's

It's sort of a follow-up discovery he was identified in

I

10

never been called, I don't know what he's going to say and I

11

don't have an opportunity to respond to his testimony.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SHAW:

Okay, what's the response on that issue?
I would say we go ahead with the

14

deposition, and again I don't know what he's going to say

15

either.

16

called, especially in light of the Court's most recent ruling.

17

He may not be a relevant witness at all that we

THE COURT:

Okay, well, my attitude is having the

18

deposition if it's already set up does not mean you can make

19

your objection as to whether that person should be allowed to

20

testify or for that to be used.

21

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I guess I'll reset - they simply

22

noticed him up, and so that's my objection.

23

identified as a witness, you know, it's past time for

24

additional discovery.

25

THE COURT:

He was never

Okay, when's the deposition scheduled
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1

for?

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

3

MR. JACOBSEN:

4
5

it may be the 25th.

I don't know.

I can tell you, your Honor, I believe

It's next week.

THE COURT:

Next Monday or Tuesday.

Well, why don't you if you want to argue

6

that at another time after you discuss the matter after the

7

deposition today let me know.

8

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

Okay, what about jury instructions?

have the parties done?

11

MR. SHAW:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SHAW:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

We filed a set of instructions.
Were they filed here?
I think so.
I haven't seen them.
I filed jury instructions, voir

16

dire, and special verdict form.

17

THE COURT:

18

The special verdict form -

You filed them here?

If you file them in

Farmington I get them about three weeks later.

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SHAW: It says Layton Department, I'm assuming

22
23
24
25

What

I'm not sure they were filed.

Okay, so I have -

they got filed here.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I don't know whether the runner

that we had filed them THE COURT:

Okay, I haven't seen them.

So 71

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

1
2

filed by last Friday f and that's when they were filed.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

I will look.

7

my desk, so.

Okay •
And so I - I'm not sure -

I wi11 check on them.

If you filed them,

They haven't made it to the file and it's been on

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

8
9

The agreement was that they be

In light of the changes, there

maybe some - Dbvious.
<
Ly the re may be some alterations to them.

10

THE COURT:

Well , let's just talk - well, I mean

11

we're not goiiig to decide the jury instructions and how many

12

are really disputed?

13
14

MR. SHAW:

We just received defendant's today,r this

morning.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

Okay •
You know, Scott and I have worked together

17

in several trials.

18

that are disputed and get to the core.

19
20

THE COURT:

I think we'll be able to narrow those ones

Why don't you - if you can narrow them

and you have <Dnes that are agreed upon, let's just have that.

21

MR. SHAW:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Sure.
And then if the ones that are disputed.
Mr. Shaw's correct.

We've worked

24 1 together befo.re.
25

THE COURT:

Okay , what about voir dire?

What do you
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1

want to do on that?

2

MR. SHAW:

We submitted proposed voir dire to the

3

court.

I think most of it's pretty innocuous.

4

one or two questions he might object to, but -

5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6

MR. SHAW:

7

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

8

There may be

I haven't seen those.

Based on past experience.
I think my voir dire were also

included in there along with the special verdict form.

9

THE COURT:

10

Okay.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

So I think the real, the easy way

11

to deal with this is for both of us to look at the others and

12

then maybe see if we can decide on which ones we disagree on

13

and let the Court resolve those.

14
15

THE COURT:

Okay.

And our trial dates we said 8:30

didn't we?

16

MR. SHAW:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SHAW:

I think so, yes.
Okay, that's what we usually do.

Okay.

The only other issue is in our proposed

19

voir dire, there is a proposed confidential jury questionnaire.

20

I don't know how the Court feels about those.

21

THE COURT:

I don't have a problem dealing with them

22

in most cases.

I guess the problem is unless they come in

23

before the trial then we give them to them, then they have to

24

be written out, then they have to be copied, and then they have

25

to be looked at, and I guess my attitude is, I mean, if this
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1

were a case, you know, this isn't the -

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

3

THE COURT:

A high profile case.

Well, it's not a question of high

4

profile, it's just not question of - like the issues are

5

basically negligence, damages and causation and - I haven't

6

looked at it so I'll look at it, but how would you propose

7

doing it if we did that?

8
9

MR. SHAW:

It's five questions I think.

The way that

we've done it in the past is the jury gets that questionnaire

10

in advance.

If the court's going to start at 8:30, it may

11

require bringing the jury in the day before something like

12

that, but they get it in advance, we make one photocopy and -

13

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

14

the jury panel are you bringing in?

15

of the jury panel responses.

16
17

THE COURT:

We'd have to have - how many for
We'd make one copy of each

Well, how many jurors are you planning on

having if this is going to go for two weeks?

18

MR. SHAW:

What's the court's normal?

19

THE COURT:

20

we don't have that at the end.

21

you know, if it's two weeks I think you need some, an alternate

22

or two, I don't know how many, but.

I just don't want to start with eight and

23

MR. SHAW:

24

THE COURT:

25

want somebody - you never know.

And so, I mean, it depends on,

I think at least one alternate.
Yeah, I just don't know.

I just don't

I usually have had very few
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1

people in even a two or three week trial that has gone sick,

2

but somebody else gets sick or they have a funeral or they have

3

something else.

4
5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I'm not sure what the Court's information is.

6
7

Well, at least one possibly two.

THE COURT:
it's one or two.

Well, it won't make any difference if

I think if we could do two we'd be safe.

8

MR. SHAW:

9

MR. CHRISTENSEN: I'm just wondering what your own

10

That's fine.

experience might be as to which would be preferable.

11

THE COURT:

Well, I've never done just one extra.

12

It's usually two because the jury thinks nine, that doesn't

13

sound right, you know, you say 8, 10 or 12.

14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

That sounds good.

I would suggest 10 then.

We can agree on 10.
Okay, then we'll just have two extras and

17

then we'll just do the pre-empteries, you know, like whatever

18

the rule says I think you get three for without for the eight

19

and then you get -

20

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes, whatever it is.

Whatever the rules

say.

23

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

24

THE COURT:

25

One each for the -

All right.

Okay, what about - okay, where are you at

in settlement?
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1
2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
unsuccessful.

3
4

THE COURT:

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6

we had was $420,000.

7

THE COURT:

No, I understand.

So we were significantly apart.
I mean, was that a combined offer or both

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

10

THE COURT:

No, that was from plaintiff.

Well, I'm talking about the response.

Are there responses from both or what?

12

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Yes, there was a response from

13

both.

14

the response was $420,000 and -

15

THE COURT:

16

So there was an offer made on behalf of all defendants,

Well, as it stands it does not look like

it's going to settle.

17

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

18

MR. SHAW:

attend the mediation.

20

it until recently.

I told Mr. Jacobs I wasn't even aware of

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

23

THE COURT:

25

That's my impression.

What was the - I'm not even - I didn't

19

24

The last offer

or just?

9

11

Well, that doesn't answer the question.

I'm not determining damages.

5

8

We've had a mediation that was

Okay.
I don't have those figures today.

Well, whatever, but you're saying that

there's not going to be any significant movement that you see?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

We put what we felt was a
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1

reasonable figure.

2

the responses to reconsider that, but the gap at the time the

3

mediation terminated was so wide that it didn't appear to

4

warrant further exploration of settlement on our behalf.

5

ball is in their court if, you know, from our scrooge like

6

prospective if they wanted to get more reasonable, we'd be

7

happy -

8
9

We were willing to, you know, depending on

THE COURT:

The

Well, it's also a good time for UDOT to

think, you know, just because they got summary judgment granted

10

doesn't mean they can't try to resolve the case either because

11

you don't know what's going to happen on appeal.

12

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

13

THE COURT:

14

need to discuss before trial?

15

plaintiff's case you anticipate it would take?

16
17

MR. SHAW:

I understand.

Okay, is there any other things that you
I mean, how long will

We're thinking, judge, that it will go

through the first week.

18

THE COURT:

19

from 8:30 till noon?

Okay, knowing that we'll have Thursday

20

MR. SHAW:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SHAW:

I think we can make good use of that half

22
23

m

Uh-huh (affirmative).

day perhaps -

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SHAW:

What are the injuries of the plaintiff?
Primary injury is a severe fracture disk
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1

location of his ankle and it's a really complex orthopedic

2

injury.

3
4

He's got THE COURT:

these -

5

MR. SHAW:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SHAW:

10
11
12

I saw the picture of the foot in one of

Right.
Okay.

And that's the primary injury.
And how old is he?

He was 16 at the time.

He's now 22.

All right.
Approaching 22.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Do you have a, I mean, do you know

who you're going to call or approximately what order?
MR. SHAW:

I have a rough outline, but in light of

13

the ruling this is going to change fairly significantly I

14

think, but I'm just looking at it and I'm thinking we should be

15

able to get, you know, through our case by that Friday.

16

THE COURT:

Well, what I will do usually at the end

17

of the day is I will ask who the next witnesses are going to be

18

so we just, everybody knows who's coming.

19

question besides this last person whose depositions being taken

20

about who the witnesses are or any exhibits?

21

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Is there any

I think except for the number of

22

people who may have driven on this road that we weren't able to

23

identify everybody [inaudible].

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SHAW:

Is this 89 or where was it?
This was 1-15 right out here.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

3

THE COURT:

4

Oh, just by Layton and Clearfield.

6

MR. SHAW:

9

I've

driven the road.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

8

There have been -

My mother lives in Clearfield.

5

7

Yes.

Well, she may have been designated.

We've got a couple of surprise witnesses

that we intend to call.
THE COURT:

Then when do you want to exchange your

witnesses and exhibits?

Is there some date?

What I usually do

10

is just if you just mark your exhibits just plaintiff 1 through

11

whatever and defendant 1 through whatever.

12

stickers get the stickers, but we just do them by numbers PI,

13

Dl and what I would suggest is just mark them and then have a

14

day where you exchange them unless you want to wait till trial.

15

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

16

MR. SHAW:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SHAW:

19

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

20

THE COURT:

21

If you need

A week before trial?

That's Friday.
Okay.
You mean this Friday?
It would be this Friday because -

Well, next Friday you've got after this

week you've got -

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

23

MR. SHAW:

24

THE COURT:

25

before Thanksgiving?

A full week.

Why don't we You've got Thanksgiving.

The Monday
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1

MR. SHAW:

2

THE COURT :

3

Yeah, the 25th I think is the date.
What's today?

Today's the 19th so that

would be the 18th, i t would be the 25th.

4

MR. SHAW:

5

THE COURT :

Okay.
Okay, anything else that we need to

6

discuss?

7

determine sometime during the trial that either a morning

8

before or something that we can hear that before it goes to the

9

jury.

And then what we' 11 do with Mr. Knight is we'll

10

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

11

MR. SHAW:

12

THE COURT :

Right.

And then the court starts at 8:30?
I like to start at 8:30 simply because

13

when we start at 8:;30 we get a lot done.

14

noon and iusua lly 1:(30 to 5: 00.

15

know, the.re' s a lot you get. done if you start at that time.

16

MR. SHAW:

17

THE COURT :

18

MR. SHAW:

We go from 8:30 to

We'll take breaks, but you

And then It's psychological.
Sure, I don't mind that at all.

19

about the first day of the trial?

20

be he re at 8: 00 for a fina]. pretrial conference or?

21

THE COURT :

What

Does the Court require us to

Well, I guess I haven't looked at your

22

voir dire thiiigs.

:[ would say why don't you be here - well,

23

why don't you say 8 :15.

24

whole lot of *things that w€i're going to discuss.

25

you - what I (do - I may even send this to you before.

I don't think there's going to be a
I can give
I have\ —
80

1

have you ever seen these jury instructions that are given

2

before trial that Judge Mclff has done?

3

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

4

THE COURT:

I have seen some.

I have used them for about the last, you

5

know, two or three years, and they're basically, what you do is

6

you give instructions as you go along the way before opening

7

statement and they're in a not legalistic form.

8

do is I'll make copies of those and they can just be sent to

9

you.

What I could

And that will just show you what - I give those to you

10

usually the first day, but those are just the - they'll be the

11

preliminary jury instructions.

12

proof.

13

talk about those issues, credibility of witnesses, all of those

14

things, but they're taken - some are said before opening

15

statements, some are said before the first witness is called,

16

and then a lot of them will be just some of the standard ones

17

that you have, but I've done that.

18

They'll talk about burden of

They'll talk about preponderance of evidence.

They'll

Now the other thing that I do, I'm glad we remembered

19

this.

I allow jurors to ask questions, and this is how it

20

works.

21

committees that after you put on a witness and you've cross-

22

examined the witness and you've re-directed, then I ask the

23

jurors, do you have any questions of this witness.

24

they write them down on a piece of paper on their notepad.

25

Their notepad, then that's given to me, you approach - and I

Basically we have a process under the rules and the

If they do
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1

explain this to the jury this is how we're going to do it, you

2

come up, you make your objections if there are any and then I

3

ask the question.

4

objectionable I'll ask the question, and then you have the

5

right to ask any other questions.

6

the past, you know, especially in an injury case, there will be

7

things where both of you think that have been crystally clear

8

made and they will ask a question that you haven't even hit,

9

you know, what they've said.

Once I ask the question - if it's not

In the way it's worked in

It may be just a repeated thing.

10

If they ask something that's inappropriate, it's not read, it's

11

not done anything else.

12

I've done this 14 or 15 times and it has been positive each

13

time.

14

experience.

15

jury a lot more and it makes them more a part of this trial and

16

it's most attorneys who were dead set against it, after trials

17

have been converts because they see you get to know what the

18

jury's thinking.

19

on their mind.

20

either, you know, like you get Perry Mason asking 1,000

21

questions.

22

those preliminary instructions, that procedure that I just

23

explained.

24

have them before.

25

It's just preserved in the record.

It keeps the jury awake and I've never seen a bad
So whether you like it or not, it involves the

When they ask you a question, you know what's
So I do that.

I've never seen it abused

But I will do that and that will be explained in

So I'll send the jury instructions to you so you'll

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That may eliminate a number of the
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1

jury instructions, the standard ones.

2

THE COURT:

Well, you can look at that.

I'll look at

3

yours too, but I mean, these are just and these are given in a

4

lot more normal language.

5

instructions that are still - these are Judge Mclff down in the

6

Sixth District sent these out three or four years ago, and most

7

of the judges in Davis County have been using them and they've

8

been working really well because it gives a lot more

9

instruction to a jury as the trial goes along instead of just

It's not like the MUJI preliminary

10

at the end.

And so it tells them what to look for.

11

we're not going to go - this isn't a big - I mean, the issues

12

in this case aren't that difficult in terms of negligence and

13

damage and causation and other things of what the jury's going

14

to have to determine.

15

further, then we'll see you on 8:30, is that on the 2nd?

16

MR. SHAW:

17

THE COURT:

18

I mean,

Okay, well if there isn't anything

Yes, Monday the 2nd.
Okay, Monday the 2nd, and then well, why

don't you come actually at 8:15.

19

MR. SHAW:

20

THE COURT:

Okay.
The court will be open at 8:00, so

21

whatever.

Do you have any - if you're going to use any things

22

for, like opening statements, whatever, I mean, we have some

23

easels and things, but if you have something else, you need to

24

check with the clerk's office.

25

MR. SHAW:

Okay.
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1
2

THE COURT:

MR. ?:

4

THE COURT:

6
7

There may be Well, we have ai video, a TVr and a video

recorder, so ]/ou don'rt have to bring that.
MR. ?:

Okay.

That raised a question and I: forgot

what it was.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ?:

10

Andi if you need -

are you going to be using videotapes or anything through the -

3

5

If you need something.

Okay.

I'll think of it.

THE COURT:

Okay, well then if there's any other

11

problemsj and we need to get together on a conference call, we

12

don't need to necessarily get together if we can resc>lve

13

something by phone.

14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

17

MR. JACOBSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

18

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you, your Honor

Okay, thank you.
Thank you, your Honor.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Layton District Court

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH,
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY,
JOHN DOES l-V,
Defendants.

ORDER OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Civil No. 970700411
Judge Thomas L Kay

The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Thomas L Kay on the 18th
day of November, 2002, for hearing on defendant Utah Department of Transportation's
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney H. Scott Jacobson appeared for
defendant UDOT, attorneys Erik M. Ward and Christopher L. Shaw appeared for plaintiff

Craig Johnson, and attorney Scott W. Christensen appeared for defendant Granite
Construction. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having heard
the arguments of counsel for UDOT and plaintiff, and being otherwise fully apprised in the
premises, now enters the following:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary

judgment on plaintifTs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1-20
on pages 1 -4 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment
do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOTs Statement of Facts.
While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26, found on
pages 5-8 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment,
does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiffs response to those facts does not establish any
genuine issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment.
2.

For the reasons stated in UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting memoranda, and for the reasons stated by UDOTs counsel during the
November 13,2002 orai arguments, plaintiffs claims against UDOT must fail as a matter
of law.
3.

The decisions made by UDOT Region One Director Dyke LeFevre

surrounding the use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton2

Clearfield Project were decisions made at the policy-making level, and were immune from
liability under the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1); see also Keeaan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah
1995).
4.

Although plaintiff still has separate claims pending against co-defendant

Granite Construction, there is no reason to delay the entry offinaljudgment on plaintiffs
claims against UDOT.
5.

In order to avoid the possibility of multiple trials, the remaining claims

between plaintiff and Granite Construction should be stayed pending the resolution of any
appeal by plaintiff of the claims against UDOT.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

That UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2.

That all of plaintiffs claims against UDOT are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3.

That UDOT shall be awarded costs as prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be established by affidavit, with
interest to accrue at the rate provided for by law.
4.

That this Judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule

54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3

5.

That the remaining claims between plaintiff and Granite Construction shall

be stayed pending the resolution of any appeal of the dismissal of the claims against
UDOT.
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I hereby certify that on the \^> day of December, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
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Erik M. Ward, Esq.
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